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Decoupling human well-being from resource consumption is at the heart of the International Resource Panel’s (IRP) mandate. It is also at the heart of the Green Economy Initiative of UNEP that has just produced an impressive report on the Green Economy (February 2011). 
The conceptual framework for decoupling and understanding of the instrumentalities for 
achieving it are still in an infant stage. The IRP plans to carry out a series of investigations 
on decoupling, each of which will result in a report. The reports will aim to support the 
Green Economy Initiative and also to stimulate appropriate policies and action at global, 
national and local levels. 
This first report is simply an attempt to scope the challenges. The report presents basic 
facts and figures on natural resource flows worldwide. Four country studies embedded in 
the report show that consumption of natural resources is still rising rapidly. Drawing on 
these data, the report attempts to outline the issues that now need to be addressed to 
decouple these material and energy flows from social and economic progress. 
Even in the two countries which arguably have made the most explicit efforts towards 
decoupling, Japan and Germany, and where at first glance domestic resource consumption 
shows stabilization or even a modest decline, deeper analysis shows that many goods 
contain parts that have been produced abroad using major amounts of energy, water and 
minerals. Thus some of the advanced countries are managing the problem of high 
resource intensity by “exporting” it elsewhere. The Report observes that trade – not 
surprisingly – is generally enhancing energy use and resource flows and thus, overall, 
impeding rather than promoting decoupling.
Two case studies from developing countries, China, and South Africa, show a steady 
increase of resource flows, probably indicative of the trends in all emerging economies. 
However, in the case of China there appears to be some success in the national effort to 
achieve relative decoupling through modernization of the economy and explicit policies to 
reduce resource intensity. Absolute reduction of energy and resource consumption cannot 
yet be expected to be part of the policies of developing countries. 
On a worldwide scale, resource consumption is steeply on the rise (see Figure 2.1), and 
resource consumption is still a reliable companion of economic prosperity (see Figure 2.6). 
All such empirical facts and figures show that the world’s climate and geological 
environment are subject to ever increasing pressures, which are pushing the limits of 
sustainability. This should make citizens and policy makers impatient to reverse the 
dangerous trends and improve the situation. 
Preface
ix
The report’s Introduction lists some of the challenges that will be addressed in future 
reports of the IRP. Among the positive prospects are technologies that deliver more and 
better services using much less energy, water, or minerals; policies and appropriate 
market signals that make the transition to a clean and low resource intensity economy 
attractive and profitable; and the special role of urban areas in forging innovations towards 
a sustainable economy. Such opportunities for effective decoupling offer not only lifelines 
for the survival of human civilization but also serve as preconditions for reducing poverty 
and social inequalities. 
New reports in the decoupling agenda pipeline include ones on technologies and policies, 
and on how cities can accelerate or be impacted by decoupling interventions. We hope that 
the growing interest in Green Economy issues, particularly among policy-makers, will be 
well served by this work.
We are very grateful to the team coordinated by professors Marina Fischer-Kowalski and 
Mark Swilling for having collected the relevant data and presenting a rounded picture of 
resource intensities and the attempts to reduce them. We thank the authors of the four 
case studies on national decoupling policies, which give strong inputs and support to the 
conclusions of the report. We hope that other such case studies will be triggered by the 
publication and circulation of this report, particularly by national institutions.
We also wish to thank Jeff McNeely, member of the IRP, for serving as Peer Review 
Coordinator for the report, and the (anonymous) peer reviewers who have gone to the 
trouble of reading and commenting the draft report; their suggestions have certainly 
improved its quality. Finally, we would like to thank the Paris Office of UNEP, notably 
Ms. Janet Salem, for excellent support work throughout the preparation of the report.
Dr. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Emmendingen, Germany
Dr. Ashok Khosla, New Delhi, India
Co-Chairs, International Resource Panel (IRP)
31 March 2011
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A transition to a low carbon resource efficient Green Economy has become one of the leitmotifs of international efforts to evolve sustainable development in a rapidly changing 21st century.
Next year in Brazil, governments will meet again 20 years after the Rio Earth Summit of 
1992 amid a landscape of persistent and emerging challenges and against a backdrop of 
recent and on-going crises that in part are being triggered by the way society manages or 
more precisely mismanages natural resources.
A Green Economy, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, is 
one of the two central themes of Rio+20. It underlines that it is in the interests of all 
nations – developed and developing and state or market-led – to begin reducing 
humanity’s planetary impact in ways that reflect national circumstances.
This new report by UNEP’s International Resource Panel is an important part of this 
overall discourse and direction. It brings empirical evidence to bear on the levels of natural 
resources being consumed by humanity and the likely consumption levels if past trends 
are mirrored into the future.
Indeed, it suggests that such unsustainable levels of consumption could triple resource 
use by 2050 and it brings forward the powerful and urgent concept of ‘decoupling’ as a key 
action in order to catalyze a dramatically different path.
Decoupling at its simplest is reducing the amount of resources such as water or fossil 
fuels used to produce economic growth and delinking economic development from 
environmental deterioration. For it is clear in a world of nearly seven billion people, 
climbing to around nine billion in 40 years time that growth is needed to lift people out of 
poverty and to generate employment for the soon to be two billion people either 
unemployed or underemployed.
But this must be growth that prizes far more efficient resource management over mining 
the very assets that underpin livelihoods and our economic opportunities in the first place.
Overall the analysis suggests that over the coming decades the level of resources used by 
each and every person may need to fall to between five and six tons. Some developing 
countries are still below this level whereas others, such as India are now on average at  
4 tons per capita and in some developed economies, Canada for example, the figure is 
around 25 tons.
Foreword
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The report points out that technological and systematic innovation, combined with rapid 
urbanization, offer an historic opportunity to turn decoupling from theory into reality on the 
ground. The report spotlights the countries of China, German, Japan and South Africa 
where governments are making headway with conscious efforts to stimulate decoupling.
It underlines too how the complexities of the modern world, with globalized trade and 
exporting economies demand the kind of sophisticated analysis provided by the Panel if 
decoupling is to be fully understood and – more importantly – realized.
The sharp spikes in commodity prices have served to remind the international community 
of the risks we all run if a transition to a Green Economy is unfulfilled and postponed into 
an indefinite future. The evidence from preparations on the road to Rio+20 is that 
governments, the private sector and civil society realize this and are looking for the options 
that can scale-up and accelerate such a transition. 
Decoupling represents a strategic approach for moving forward a global Green Economy – 
one that “results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities”. 
I would like to thank the International Resource Panel under the leadership of Ashok Khosla 
and Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker as co-chairs for its pioneering work presented in this 
report. It not only inspires current generations but also protects the interest of future ones.
Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director, UNEP
Nairobi, Kenya, March 2011
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The 20
th century was a time of remarkable progress for human civilization. Driven by 
scientific and technological advances, the extraction of construction materials 
grew by a factor of 34, ores and minerals by a factor of 27, fossil fuels by a factor of 
12, and biomass by a factor of 3.6 (Figure 2). This expansion of consumption was 
not equitably distributed, and it had profound environmental impacts. Over-exploitation, 
climate change, pollution, land-use change, and loss of biodiversity rose toward to top of 
the list of major international concerns. One result was that ‘sustainability’ became an 
over-arching global social, environmental and economic imperative among governments, 
international organizations, and the private sector. Leaders increasingly understood that 
making progress towards a more sustainable economy requires an absolute reduction in 
resource use at a global level, while human well-being demands that economic activities 
should expand and environmental impacts diminish.
UNEP’s International Resource Panel (IRP) has applied the concept of ‘decoupling’ to this 
challenge. While the term has been applied to everything from electronics to physical 
cosmology to linear algebra, in the sense used here decoupling means using less 
resources per unit of economic output and reducing the environmental impact of any 
resources that are used or economic activities that are undertaken. Figure 1 captures the 
essence of the two key aspects of decoupling as applied to sustainable development, 
namely resource decoupling and impact decoupling.
Executive summary
Figure 1. Two aspects of ‘decoupling’
Human well-being
Economic activity (GDP)
Resource use
Environmental impact
Resource decoupling
Impact decoupling
Time
xiii
The report focuses on the extraction of four categories of primary raw materials – 
construction minerals, ores and industrial minerals, fossil fuels, and biomass – which 
together are estimated to be harvested at a rate of 47 to 59 billion metric tons (47–59 Gt) 
per year (2005 data), with continued increases into the future a clear tendency (see Figure 
2). The steady increase in the use of these raw materials has been accompanied, or 
perhaps prompted, by continuously declining prices of most of these categories of 
resources. Declining prices may be interpreted as reflecting increasing supply, but are 
more likely to reflect more efficient means of extraction and structurally weak market 
positions for certain resource-rich resource-exporting developing countries. On the other 
hand, many critical resources are becoming more expensive to extract, with petroleum in 
the Arctic and in the open sea being outstanding examples. More recently, at least some of 
these resources are showing greater price volatility, which may support a more rapid 
transition based on the decoupling of growth rates from rates of resource use and negative 
environmental impacts.
Figure 2. Global material extraction in billion tons, 1900–2005
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009
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Decoupling will require significant changes in government policies, corporate behaviour, 
and consumption patterns by the public. These changes will not be easy, and this paper 
will not attempt to chart the course toward their achievement or fully explore all of the 
challenges the concept poses. Rather, it will seek to build understanding of the critical 
concept of decoupling, which provides the foundation for the work of the International 
Resource Panel (IRP).
This report is envisaged as the first in a short series, with the subsequent reports from the 
Decoupling Working Group of the IRP seeking to respond to the most significant 
challenges that are identified here (Chapter 5). Other work of the IRP will apply the 
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concept of decoupling to greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation technologies, metal flows and 
recycling, land and soil, and water. 
Having reviewed the trends in the use of natural resources and accompanying undesirable 
environmental impacts in the first section of Chapter 2, the last section of that chapter 
considers possible future implications by presenting three brief scenarios: (1) business as 
usual (leading to a tripling of global annual resource extraction by 2050); (2) moderate 
contraction and convergence (requiring industrialized countries to reduce their per capita 
resource consumption by half the rate for the year 2000); and (3) tough contraction and 
convergence (aimed at keeping global resource extraction at its current levels). None of 
these scenarios will lead to actual global reductions in resource use, but all indicate that 
substantial reductions in the resource requirements of economic activities will be 
necessary if the growing world population can expect to live under conditions of 
sustainable resource management.
Technological innovations have often led to greater resource consumption; however, 
innovations in resource extraction and use systems (Chapter 3) will be required to enable 
decoupling to take place in different settings, with a diversity of approaches being applied. 
Economic innovations will also be essential, perhaps even leading to a substantially 
revised progress indicator that complements GDP with environmental and social concerns. 
In this context, UNEP’s Green Economy Initiative seeks to couple a revived world economy 
with reducing ecosystem degradation, water scarcity, and carbon dependence. The 
increasing trend of resource consumption has been driven in part by technological 
innovation, and such innovations that can instead support decoupling will be discussed in 
more detail in future reports of the Decoupling Working Group. 
Drawing especially on case studies from South Africa, Germany, China, and Japan (full 
case studies are included in Chapters 6–9), Chapter 4 explores some of the ways that 
decoupling affects development. One major lesson learned is that the rising economic and 
environmental costs of resource depletion and negative environmental impacts have 
affected the economic growth and development trajectories of these countries, leading all 
of them to adopt policies that commit both governments and industries to reduce the 
amount of resources used for each unit of production (or increase resource decoupling) 
and reduce negative impacts on the environment (or implement impact decoupling). The 
case studies also show that concepts of resource efficiency, resource productivity, 
dematerialization, material flows and decoupling are used in somewhat different ways in 
these countries, indicating that these ideas can be expected to evolve in nationally-specific 
ways that reflect the unique circumstances of each country. This diversity in approaches to 
decoupling can be taken as a sign of the strength of the concept.
Chapter 4 discusses decoupling as applied to trade and the distribution of resources, 
making the key point that many imported resources are subsequently exported in a 
different form, such as manufactured goods, which may be interpreted as shifting at least 
part of the responsibility for consumption (and therefore decoupling) to the ultimate 
consumer. Trade is of growing concern, as internationally traded materials increased from 
5.4 billion tons (5.4 Gt) in 1970 to 19 billion tons (19 Gt) in 2005, complicating the 
application of decoupling by obscuring responsibility for it. Decoupling potentially can also 
enhance equity among nations, drawing on the concept of ‘metabolic rates’ (resources 
used per capita) as an objective means of comparing resource consumption rates of 
different countries. Overcoming inequity needs particular attention. As an indicator of 
inequity in resource consumption, the richest 20% of the world’s population were 
xv
responsible for 86% of consumption expenditure in 1998, while the poorest 20% had to 
settle for just 1.3% of such expenditure. 
Chapter 4 also suggests that innovation towards decoupling may be developed especially 
in urban settings, where an increasing majority of the world’s people will live in the coming 
years. It has already been demonstrated that more dense forms of living allow for lower 
consumption of many raw materials at the same levels of material comfort, suggesting 
fertile grounds for further decoupling. Decoupling may also experience a ‘rebound effect’, 
which requires addressing the concern that efficiency gains in resource use may 
paradoxically lead to greater resource use.
Some of the major challenges of decoupling that remain to be addressed include:
• How can the understanding of global resource flows and their associated 
environmental impacts be coupled to related challenges, such as climate change and 
the role that ecosystem services play?
• How can policymakers (and the general public) be convinced about the absolute 
physical limits to the quantity of non-renewable natural resources available for human 
use under current economic conditions?
• How can the decoupling that has already started to happen at least in some countries 
lead to rapid escalations in investments in innovations and technologies to accelerate 
decoupling more generally?
• How can appropriate market signals be developed to help resource productivity 
increases become a higher priority?
• How can cities best become the spaces where ingenuity, resources, and communities 
come together to generate practical decoupling in the ways cities produce and 
consume?
• How can decoupling come to be accepted as a necessary precondition for reducing the 
levels of global inequality and eventually help eradicate poverty?  
This paper presents substantial evidence supporting the need for both resource 
decoupling and impact decoupling, and indicates some examples of where such 
decoupling is actually occurring. While different categories of resources have very different 
kinds of environmental impacts, progress toward decoupling has been made in 
construction minerals, ores and industrial minerals, fossil fuels, and biomass. But this 
progress to date has been indicative rather than decisive, and a far greater effort will be 
required to convince key audiences of the critical importance of decoupling. The future 
work of the International Resource Panel is designed to support such efforts, in hopes of 
leading to an effective transition to a Green Economy that enhances human welfare while 
sustaining environmental resources.!
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The objective of this study is to provide a solid foundation for the concept of decoupling, clearly defining key terms and concepts and indicating its many applications to resource management. It assesses whether decoupling is already taking place, and identifies the driving factors, both technological and economic. 
This report aims to also provide some indications of the kinds of policy measures and 
considerations that may be needed to stimulate decoupling. The word “Resources” usually 
refers to materials, water, energy and land. This report focuses on material resources, 
namely fossil fuels, minerals, metals and biomass. As such, it is not the intention of the 
International Resource Panel (IRP) to cover all resources in a single report, rather this 
report will be complemented by concurrent reports of the IRP on land and soil, water, 
metals and other topics. 
Future work of the IRP will build on the foundation of this scoping report on decoupling. 
The first prioirity will be to identify which product groups and materials have the greatest 
negative environmental impacts, or are reaching alarming levels of scarcity. The priority 
attention will be given to those resources that are amenable to policy interventions and 
improved forms of management that will decrease any negative impacts while continuing 
to contribute to human wellbeing. The IRP expects to identify a substantial list of such 
resources, and provide policy options for improving their management. It is expected that 
this more systematic approach will lead to others – governments, the private sector, and 
civil society – adopting decoupling as an essential component of sustainable development. 
One IRP working group is focusing on the flows of metals, providing accurate assessments 
of the global flows of metals and indicating where recycling and reusing of metals will 
reduce demand for opening of new mines (which are often associated with negative 
environmental impacts). The first reports from the working group are already indicating 
some key metals that can be recycled at far higher levels, with substantial economic 
savings and reducing environmental impacts (in other words, resource decoupling).
Another working group is addressing water, a scarce resource in many parts of the world. 
A better understanding of the hydrological cycle is especially challenging as climate 
change is leading to unpredictable distribution of water in both time and space. Torrential 
rainfalls and subsequent droughts are clear indicators that improved water management 
is an essential part of human wellbeing. The working group on water will be working at the 
landscape scale, examining new approaches to more efficient use of water (such as drip 
irrigation), demonstrating how both agricuutre and industry can enhance water-use 
efficiency. Methods being assessed include improved efficiency in water harvesting, more 
effective water storage, more comprehensive approaches to water sharing so that all 
users have a fair allocation of water, greatly enhanced recycling of water, and reducing 
demand. Already, many companies in the private sector are enhancing water efficiency in 
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their production processes and signficantly reducing water pollution. The IRP will be 
assessing the various approaches and providing policy options on how water-use efficiency 
can be substantially improved across multiple sectors.
Water is an essential resource for virtually all aspects of human enterprise, from 
agriculutre to energy to industrial production to human health. Many of these applications 
will receive attention from IRP working groups in due course, but one urgent matter is the 
more efficient use of land and soil. With food prices now at an all-time high, due to factors 
such as increased energy prices, growing demand, climate change, conversion of food 
crops to biofuels, and many others, it becomes all the more important to assess the 
management of land and soils at a global level. A new IRP working group is now beginning 
such an assessment, with the objective of enhancing sustainable management of land and 
soils. Land is seen in the broad sense of land use and land use planning, which is 
becoming more urgent as multiple demands are being placed on this limited resource; 
indeed, the amount of land may be declining as sea levels rise, making it all the more 
important that land use is well informed by solid science as well as social and economic 
factors. The focus on soil is on maintaining its productivity, including the diversity of soil 
micro-organisms, reducing pollution, and developing new approaches to maintaining soil 
productivty without excessive use of chemical fertilizers. Significant investments are being 
made by both governments and the private sector toward these ends, and the IRP working 
group will be working with them to assess the most promising approaches to decoupling 
the use of lands and soils from the economic production of these important natural 
systems.
As the concept of resource decoupling is further developed, the IRP expects to identify 
other materials and resources that can benefit from decoupling. Sustainable development 
and new approaches to "green economics" will greatly benefit from the contributions that 
the IRP will be making through its work on decoupling resource consumption from 
economic growth.!
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1.1 Why decoupling?
Human well-being and its improvement, 
now and for a still growing world 
population in the future, is based upon the 
availability of natural resources such as 
energy, materials, water and land. 
Economic development so far has been 
associated with a rapid rise in the use of 
these resources. Many of them are 
becoming less abundant relative to 
demand, and some run the risk of critical 
scarcity in the near future (as indicated by 
declining grades of ores being mined, in 
Figures 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14). Undesirable 
environmental impacts can arise from any 
part of the life cycle of resources: in the 
phases of extraction, production/
manufacture, consumption/use or post-
consumption. These impacts may be 
caused by deliberate interventions into 
natural systems such as land cover change 
and resource extraction, or by unintended 
side effects of economic activities, such as 
emissions and wastes. Thus, a focus on 
decoupling requires attention both to the 
amount of resource use linked with 
economic activity, and to the environmental 
impacts associated with this resource use 
at all stages of the life cycle. These impacts 
may lead to a disruption of the ecosystem 
services that are essential to human 
well-being. 
This Report is one in a series of reports by 
the International Resource Panel (IRP) that 
seeks to assess the key challenges of 
decoupling resource use and negative 
environmental impacts from economic 
activity. Addressing these challenges 
successfully will contribute to the overall 
goals of meeting the needs of a growing 
world population, eradicating poverty, and 
supporting economic development, with a 
minimum of strain on the world’s resource 
base and without threatening future earth 
and ecosystem services. In order to achieve 
these goals, natural resource use and 
associated negative environmental 
impacts, on a global and long term level, 
must as far as possible be decoupled from 
the economic activity required to support a 
growing population. 
Natural resources can be given a broad 
definition that includes anything that 
occurs in nature that can be used for 
producing something else. This inclusive 
definition can cover the song of a bird 
inspiring a composer, the shine of a star 
used by a captain to find his way, or a stone 
in a farmer’s field. The first two are 
‘immaterial resources’, whose use has no 
effect on the qualities that make them 
useful; nor can they easily be given an 
economic value. The third – the rock in the 
field – is a ‘material resource’ whose value 
is characterized by the qualities that render 
it useful for certain applications. Its value 
for building a wall, for example, is different 
from its value if it is merely an annoyance 
for the farmer trying to plough his field. But 
if the rock contains gold, its value is 
suddenly increased, assuming that the 
farmer recognizes this value. 
Using immaterial resources does not 
change the qualities that make them 
useful, or reduce the range of available 
applications. The same song of the bird 
Introduction1
1
may be used by still another composer or 
give highly-valued pleasure to a bird-
watcher, and the same starlight can 
provide information for hundreds of 
captains and later provide information to 
astronomers about the creation of the 
universe. With material resources, making 
use of them can eliminate at least some of 
the qualities that make them useful for the 
purpose at hand. A rock used to build a 
wall cannot then be used to build another 
wall or be converted to gold jewellery (if it 
contains gold) without destroying the first 
wall. Material resources do not disappear 
through transformation (basic physics does 
not allow for the disappearance of energy/
matter), but their potential usefulness for 
the same purpose is no longer available. 
How much of a resource declines as it is 
used (or converted from one state to 
another) depends largely on how much the 
resource is modified through use. 
Most material resources are scarce in 
economic terms, which provides the basis 
for determining their price. But a few 
material resources, such as wind, 
sunshine or tidal energy, are so abundant 
that they cannot possibly be depleted. 
Their economic price is determined not by 
their supply but rather by the cost of 
converting them into forms that can then 
be applied to other uses (for example, 
running wind farms, solar panels, or tidal 
energy generators). 
The broad definition provided above makes 
everything in the material world potentially 
a material resource, and everything may be 
put to a theoretically infinite number of 
uses.1 Because resources and resource 
use conceptually serve as one of the most 
important links between the environment 
and economic activities, this report 
chooses a more precise definition of 
material resources that considers only the 
actually used resources and thus better 
1 This wide definition was adopted by the Commission of the 
European Communities (COM 527, 2003) in preparation of its 
sustainable resource strategy, and also used by the Technical 
Report on the Environmental Impact of the Use of Natural 
Resources (JRC 2005, p.11)
complies to the use of this term in 
economics: Material resources are natural 
assets deliberately extracted and modified 
by human activity for their utility to create 
economic value. They can be measured 
both in physical units (such as tons, joules 
or area), and in monetary terms 
expressing their economic value. Such a 
narrower focus allows generating a finite 
and (on the most aggregate level) short list 
of ‘material resources’ for which also, in 
principle at least, accounting schemes 
exist: energy, materials, water and land. 
As far as resources are concerned, this 
report seeks to remain complementary, not 
replicating existing similar efforts. It will 
focus on material resources, with the main 
classes being biomass, fossil fuels, 
industrial minerals and ores, and 
construction minerals. It will pay relatively 
little attention to energy resources and the 
carbon cycle, as these issues are well 
addressed by IPCC assessments and by the 
ongoing Global Energy Assessment (GEA) 
being conducted by International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)2. It will 
leave issues of water resources and land 
and soil resources to future reports under 
preparation by the IRP. 
The use of material resources in this report 
will be addressed at global, national, and 
city levels, where information on population 
and economic activity level (GDP) is 
available. This has been complemented by 
four case studies of countries that have 
taken a particular policy interest in dealing 
with decoupling resource use from 
development: China, Germany, Japan and 
South Africa. In a follow-up report on 
decoupling, the IRP plans to supplement 
this country-level focus with a more 
sector- and technology-oriented focus.
The degree to which resource use causes 
detrimental environmental impacts 
depends not only on the amount of 
resources used, but also on the types of 
resources used and on the ways in which 
2 See www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ENE/GEA/index_gea.html
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they are used (see IRP report on the 
Environmental Impacts of Production and 
Consumption3). 
This report seeks to establish the 
quantitative frame from which strategies 
for decoupling can be designed. For the 
assessment of resource uses and their 
environmental impacts, a global and long-
term perspective will be employed. 
However, while the challenges of resource 
depletion and environmental disruption are 
global challenges, they affect people 
differently in different regions of the world. 
Extraction of a resource, its conversion into 
a commodity, and its ultimate consumption, 
often occur in different countries, and the 
benefits as well as the environmental 
impacts associated with each stage in the 
life cycle are widely distributed across time 
and space. This report also assesses these 
distributional issues. 
This report is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 defines decoupling more 
3 See www.unep.org/resourcepanel
specifically. Chapter 2 then deals with 
observed trends in global resource use and 
associated undesirable environmental 
impacts, and closes with a section on 
scenarios for global resource use up to the 
year 2050. Chapter 3 discusses the need 
for system innovations in order to achieve 
decoupling beyond the incremental 
improvements of resource productivity that 
have been demonstrated as being part of 
business-as-usual. It closes with lessons 
from the four country case studies, which 
are spread across different stages of 
development, and efforts of these countries 
to achieve decoupling. Chapter 4 describes 
the interrelation of decoupling and 
development dynamics: the role of trade 
and the link between decoupling, 
development and inequality, and rebound 
effects. The major policy challenges, 
deriving from the outcomes of these 
chapters are summarized in Chapter 5, and 
the four country case studies are included 
in Chapters 6 to 9.
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1.2 Defining decoupling
1.2.1 Roots of the decoupling concept
The OECD appears to have been the first 
international body to have adopted the 
concept of resource decoupling, treating it 
as one of the main objectives in their policy 
paper ‘Environmental Strategy for the First 
Decade of the 21st Century’ (adopted by 
OECD Environment Ministers in 2001)4. The 
OECD defines decoupling simply as 
breaking the link between ‘environmental 
bads’ and ‘economic goods’.5 
 
Much earlier, the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
coined the term ‘eco-efficiency’, which is 
achieved through the delivery of 
“competitively priced goods and services 
that satisfy human needs and bring quality 
of life while progressively reducing 
environmental impacts of goods and 
resource intensity throughout the entire life 
cycle” (Schmidheiny, 1992). Thus, without 
mentioning the word ‘decoupling’, the 
substance was already being used, 
including the life cycle approach.
Similarly, the European Union (EU) in 2005 
adopted the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs,6 which gave high priority to more 
sustainable use of natural resources, and 
called upon the EU to take the lead towards 
more sustainable consumption and 
production in the global economy. This was 
followed by the adoption of the EU’s 
Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use 
of Natural Resources under the 6th 
Environmental Action Program (6th EAP). 
This strategy has the objective of achieving 
a more sustainable use of natural 
resources by reducing the negative 
environmental impacts generated by the 
use of natural resources while ensuring 
economic growth. The Strategy recognizes 
decoupling of both resource use and its 
impacts from economic growth.
4 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/40/1863539.pdf
5 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/52/1933638.pdf
6 Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, 2007, document available at 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/structural_reforms/growth_jobs/
index_en.htm [accessed 01/07]
In a developing world context, the 
Sustainable Development and Human 
Settlements Division of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) recommended 
that sustainable development for 
developing economies could best be 
achieved by pursuing a strategy of “non-
material economic growth” (Gallopin, 
2003). Although the specific term 
‘decoupling’ was not used in this report, 
the distinction made between ‘material’ 
and ‘non-material’ economic growth was 
effectively about decoupling growth from 
resource consumption. 
In line with this literature, resource 
decoupling could be referred to as 
increasing resource productivity, and 
impact decoupling as increasing eco-
efficiency.
Resource decoupling means reducing the 
rate of use of (primary) resources per unit 
of economic activity. This ‘dematerial-
ization’ is based on using less material, 
energy, water and land resources for the 
same economic output. Resource 
decoupling leads to an increase in the 
efficiency with which resources are used. 
Such enhanced resource productivity can 
usually be measured unequivocally: it can 
be expressed for a national economy, an 
economic sector or a certain economic 
process or production chain, by dividing 
added value by resource use (e.g. GDP/
Domestic Material Consumption). If this 
quotient increases with time, resource 
productivity is rising. Another way to 
demonstrate resource decoupling is 
comparing the gradient of economic output 
over time with the gradient of resource 
input; when the latter is smaller, resource 
decoupling is occurring (see Figure 1.1).
Impact decoupling, by contrast, requires 
increasing economic output while reducing 
negative environmental impacts. Such 
impacts arise from the extraction of 
required resources (such as groundwater 
pollution due to mining or agriculture), 
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production (such as land degradation, 
wastes and emissions), the use phase of 
commodities (for example transport 
resulting in CO2 emissions), and in the 
post-consumption phase (again wastes and 
emissions). Methodologically, these 
impacts can be estimated by life cycle 
analysis (LCA) in combination with various 
input-output techniques (see UNEP, 
2010b). Impact decoupling means that 
negative environmental impacts decline 
while value is added in economic terms. On 
aggregate system levels such as a national 
economy or an economic sector, it is 
methodologically very demanding to 
measure impact decoupling, because many 
environmental impacts need to be 
considered, their trends may be quite 
different or not even monitored across 
time, and system boundaries as well as 
weighting procedures are often contested. 
A distinction can be made between ‘relative’ 
and ‘absolute’ decoupling. Relative 
decoupling of resources or impacts means 
that the growth rate of the environmentally 
relevant parameter (resources used or 
some measure of environmental impact) is 
lower than the growth rate of a relevant 
economic indicator (for example GDP). The 
association is still positive, but the elasticity 
of this relation is below 1 (Mudgal et al., 
2010). Such relative decoupling seems to be 
fairly common. With absolute decoupling, in 
contrast, resource use declines, irrespective 
of the growth rate of the economic driver. 
This latter relation is shown by the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve that claims 
that if prosperity rises beyond a certain 
point, the environmental impact of 
production and consumption decreases. 
Absolute reductions in resource use are 
rare (De Bruyn, 2002; Steger and 
Bleischwitz, 2009); they can occur only 
when the growth rate of resource 
productivity exceeds the growth rate of the 
economy. 
This assessment deals with resource 
decoupling and impact decoupling as the 
two interrelated modes under the 
decoupling concept as used by the IRP. 
Strategically, they differ in various 
respects. Resource decoupling seeks to 
alleviate the problem of scarcity and 
respond to the sustainability challenge of 
intergenerational equity by reducing the 
rate of resource depletion, while reducing 
costs by raising resource productivity. 
Resource decoupling may be expected to 
simultaneously reduce the environmental 
impacts of certain resources over the full 
Figure 1.1. Stylized representation of resource decoupling and impact decoupling
Human well-being
Economic activity (GDP)
Resource use
Environmental impact
Resource decoupling
Impact decoupling
Time
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life cycle by using less of them. Resource 
decoupling is relatively easy to measure 
and monitor, but may be more difficult to 
achieve than impact decoupling.7 By 
contrast, impact decoupling means using 
resources better, more wisely or more 
cleanly. Reducing environmental impacts 
does not necessarily have a mitigating 
impact on resource scarcity or production 
costs, and may even sometimes increase 
these. An example of this is carbon capture 
and storage (CCS): since this technology 
currently requires more energy per unit of 
output, resource decoupling does not take 
place, but since CO2 is no longer released 
into the atmosphere, the environmental 
impact over the life cycle is reduced. 
This discussion of the two modes of 
decoupling being considered here implies 
that: 
1. resource decoupling is particularly 
important when:
• a specific resource is scarce and 
its further depletion could frustrate 
societal progress (such as oil, 
rare minerals, or fertile land to 
produce food for the growing human 
population) (see UNEP, 2010a; 
UNEP, 2010b)
• a specific resource poses high 
environmental risks that cannot 
be alleviated by using the resource 
better. Reduction of its use is 
then the only solution. Historical 
examples are asbestos and 
chlorofluorocarbons used in cooling 
devices. At present, fossil fuels are 
7  The well-known “Jevon’s paradox” states that productivity 
increases, in the end, do not result in resource savings but in 
accelerated economic growth. This rebound effect is discussed 
further in section 4.3. Some argue that the exergy – the energy 
available to be used – of resources is an indispensable driver of 
economic growth (Ayres, 2005; Ayres and Warr, 2005). 
the most important case, even if 
using CCS could alleviate some part 
of the CO2 problem through impact 
decoupling.
2. impact decoupling is particularly 
important when:
• the use of a resource poses 
immediate threats to human and 
ecosystem health (such as toxic 
emissions, persistent organic 
pollutants, or impacts on soil 
fertility) 
• technological solutions have 
substantial potential to prevent harm 
to humans and ecosystems. 
While numerous forms of economic activity 
have negative environmental impacts of 
one form or another, some are deliberately 
designed to have positive environmental 
effects, for example forest reserves, 
agricultural set-asides, or payments for 
ecosystem services. Socio-technical 
changes that have reduced negative 
environmental impacts in the past may 
have resulted in the decoupling of 
economic growth from certain specific 
impacts, while other impacts remained 
unchanged or even accelerated. Therefore, 
it can be problematic to consider impact 
decoupling in general without 
acknowledging that specific interventions 
can have unintended consequences or else 
ignore some impacts. It follows that it may 
be difficult to design a system-wide set of 
interventions capable of decoupling 
resource use from all negative 
environmental impacts simultaneously.!
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Designing strategies for a decoupling of economic activity from undesirable environmental impacts requires an improved 
understanding of trends and their drivers. 
This chapter will assess past trends and 
project resource consumption into the 
future to outline the magnitude of the 
challenge. The first section will deal with 
the temporal dynamics of resource use1 of 
materials, water and land.2 Wherever 
possible, the sources used will employ a 
global and long-term perspective. The 
second section will inquire into the 
dynamics of related environmental impacts 
and assess to what degree, and in which 
respects, environmental impacts have 
followed the dynamics of resource use, and 
where an additional impact decoupling – 
allowing impacts to be dissociated from 
increasing resource use – could be 
observed. Finally, the third section will 
present three scenarios for future resource 
use until the year 2050, based upon 
previous trends and the existing knowledge 
of drivers.
2.1 Note on methodology
While measuring consumption of energy 
resources is fairly straight-forward, 
1 From now on, for reasons of brevity and simplicity, we shall use 
the term “resources” to mean “natural resources”. Of course, 
economic activity is based on a number of different resources, apart 
from natural resources, in particular also on capital, labour, and 
knowledge.
2 The terms of reference for this working group did not include a 
focus on energy resources, as they are dealt with in many other 
contexts. We are aware that from several perspectives, the energy 
(or exergy) aspects of natural resources are crucial (Ayres & Warr, 
2005; Smil, 2008), but the purpose of the task at hand is to illuminate 
other aspects of resource use that are often neglected.
seeking a consistent methodology for 
documenting the extent of use of other 
resources is a relatively new field that is 
still under development. 
For material resources, such a 
methodology and sets of indicators have 
been developed only recently under the 
term of ‘material flow accounting’ (MFA), 
which accounts for all materials used in 
economic activities. Some approaches (for 
example Bringezu et al., 2004; Rodrigues & 
Giljum, 2005) account not only for the 
resources used in economic processes, but 
also for the total material mobilized during 
the extraction process (i.e. the ‘total 
material requirement’). This is clearly 
justified, as these additionally mobilized 
materials are responsible for substantial 
additional impacts, though the analysis can 
be compromised by data reliability. For 
convenience and clarity, this report will 
focus on materials actually used in 
economic processes measured in terms of 
their mass (metric tons), i.e. total used 
extraction. As a rule of thumb, total 
extraction is about double total used 
extraction. The MFA methodology 
generates accounts in physical terms that 
are analogous to national accounting in 
economic terms, and according to the 
same system boundaries (Eurostat, 2001; 
Eurostat, 2007). Thus it yields data that 
support an analysis of decoupling of 
economic activity from material resource 
use. Until now, SERI (2008) is the only 
dataset presenting time-series data on 
global materials extraction, country-by-
Global long-term trends in the 
use of natural resources and 
in undesirable environmental 
impacts2
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country.3 It provides a quantitative estimate 
of global resource extraction for the period 
1980 to 2005. Based partly on this dataset, 
and on other sources, Krausmann et al. 
(2009) recently published a centennial time 
series of global material extraction and use 
(see Figure 2.1).
For assessing the use of water and land in 
relation to economic activities, the data 
situation is somewhat less well developed. 
While estimates of global freshwater use in 
long time series are available (see Gleick, 
2009; Hoekstra & Chapagain, 2007; Alcamo 
and Vörösmarty, 2005; Shiklomanov and 
Rodda, 2003), no country-by-country 
database is available to support an analysis 
of the coupling between economic activity 
and water use. This paucity of data is 
3 See, for example, Adriaanse et al., 1997; Rogich et al., 2008; Eurostat, 
2007; Gonzalez-Martinez and Schandl, 2008; and Russi et al., 2008. 
Economy-wide material flow accounts for historical periods have 
been compiled for a growing number of individual countries. Most of 
these country-level case studies document historic trends ranging 
from several years up to several decades. Only very few studies 
include time periods before 1970 (see e.g. Matos and Wagner, 1998; 
Schandl and Schulz, 2002; Petrovic, 2007). Several attempts have 
been made to compile global country-by-country material flow 
accounts for recent years (Schandl and Eisenmenger, 2006; Behrens 
et al., 2007; Krausmann et al., 2008b).
related to the fact that water use is often 
considered a free common good not 
reflected in economic statistics. System 
boundaries also raise problems, as the 
same water can be used many times over. 
Future IRP reports will explore water 
decoupling issues in greater depth. 
With land, the statistical situation is much 
better, at least as far as cropland is 
concerned. The main focus of accounting 
for land resources is put on land cover 
(such as cropland, grassland or forest) and 
its change over time (Erb et al., 2007). 
However, the coupling of economic activity 
and land use is reflected not only in land 
cover change, but also in the intensity of 
use. An increase in yields or multi-cropping 
on existing arable land, or an increase in 
livestock grazing on grassland, does not 
necessarily lead to change in land cover 
types, but nevertheless represents an 
increased use of land resources. For this 
reason, existing land use statistics are not 
easily applied to an analysis of decoupling. 
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As a result of these data constraints on 
water and land, the assessment of 
resource decoupling in this report will 
focus mainly on the use of materials as 
accounted for by MFA. 
Indicators for undesirable environmental 
impacts of economic activities and 
resource use globally and in long time 
series do not exist on an aggregate level. In 
recent decades, a broad literature on 
environmental impacts and impact 
assessment has evolved. Environmental 
impacts are usually described as impacts 
on environmental media and on human 
health. An assessment of environmental 
impacts is mainly operationalized on the 
product level in life cycle assessments 
(LCA) and a definition is found in ISO 14.040 
standards where the following seven 
impact categories are differentiated 
(Nielsen et al., 2005): acidification; climate 
change and global warming; ecotoxicity; 
human toxicity; eutrophication/nutrient 
enrichment; photochemical ozone 
formation (summer smog); and 
stratospheric ozone depletion. This list 
considers negative environmental impacts 
that “are known, well explored and 
operationalized, and for which statistical 
information is available” (Moll et al., 2004, 
p.4). This literature did not, however, 
converge in a shared understanding of 
what environmental impacts actually are 
and how they should be conceived and 
classified (see the effort in UNEP, 2010b). 
On the most general level, negative 
environmental impacts can be considered 
as undesirable changes in the natural 
environment (or one of its compartments) 
that can be causally linked to some 
socio-economic activity. 
The ‘undesirability’ of an environmental 
impact of a socio-economic activity always 
needs to be legitimized, as the socio-
economic activity as such usually pursues 
desired goals and environmental impacts 
occur as trade-offs, or unintended side-
effects, in reaching these goals. This 
legitimacy can be most easily established 
for cases having two or more functional 
equivalents for pursuing the goal (products, 
production processes, materials, etc.) that 
can be compared in terms of their 
environmental trade-offs. It is now broadly 
accepted that the choice between 
alternatives should take into account 
potential negative side effects. Classical 
examples of this kind are the choice 
between plastic or paper bags, and 
between chloride and ozone bleaching in 
paper production. If the outcomes of 
impact assessments are contested, they 
can be debated impact by impact on this 
level of complexity. 
On higher levels of aggregation, overall 
impact assessments become increasingly 
indeterminate. Among the difficulties 
encountered are problems of:
• impact selection: which environmental 
concerns need to be accounted for, on 
which spatial and temporal level, on 
which level of causal proximity (e.g. 
habitat loss or threat to biodiversity)
• impact weighting and composing 
aggregates
• system completeness (potential 
omissions) and double counting.
Even the few high-quality studies that have 
made serious attempts at comprehensive 
solutions (such as van der Voet et al., 2005; 
EEA, 2005) were not able to establish solid 
conventions for the field. An assessment 
based upon this research strand was 
provided in one of the previous IRP reports 
(UNEP, 2010b).
CO2 emissions (and, to a certain extent, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions) are the 
only well documented environmental impact 
indicator available at the global level. Having 
these data available in longer time series 
and on a country-by-country basis makes it 
possible to analyse the coupling between 
population dynamics, economic activity and 
the carbon/temperature matrix.
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2.2  The global dynamics of 
material resource use
The global use of natural material 
resources corresponds to the sum total of 
raw materials extracted. 4 At the beginning 
of the 21st century, estimates for the 
quantity of global raw materials extraction 
ranged between 47 and 59 billion metric 
tons (47–59Gt) per year (Fischer-Kowalski 
et al., 2011). At the global level, the amount 
of raw materials extracted is roughly 
equivalent to the global amount of raw 
materials then used in economic 
processes. On the level of individual 
countries, the materials they extract in 
their domestic territory (termed DE, 
domestic extraction) is not equivalent to 
their materials use, as they may export or 
import products for use. 
Figure 2.1 shows global material 
extraction for the period 1900 to 2005 in a 
breakdown by the four major material 
classes: biomass, fossil energy carriers, 
ores and industrial minerals, and 
construction minerals. Total material 
extraction increased over that period by a 
factor of 8. The strongest increase can be 
observed for construction minerals, which 
grew by a factor 34, ores and industrial 
minerals by a factor of 27, and fossil 
energy carriers by a factor of 12. Biomass 
extraction increased only 3.6-fold. This 
comparatively low increase of biomass 
extraction, while the world population 
needing food had quadrupled, is mainly 
due to a substitution of biomass use for 
combustion by fossil fuels. For much of 
the 20th century, biomass had dominated 
among the four material types: in 1900, 
biomass accounted for almost three 
quarters of total material use. One 
century later, its share had declined to 
only one third. Thus on top of using more 
biotic renewable resources, the global 
socio-economic metabolism has 
4 System boundaries of extracted materials can be defined in various 
ways. What is reported here is the fraction of extracted materials 
actually used afterwards in the economic process, so, for example, 
no overburden in mining or harvest residues. Variations in storage 
are not considered.
increasingly turned towards mineral 
resources.5
A major driver of the overall increase in 
raw material extraction and use is 
population numbers (Steinberger et al., 
2010; Krausmann et al., 2008). The world’s, 
and each country’s, material use (called 
domestic material consumption, DMC) is 
tightly coupled to the number of 
inhabitants. This is plainly evident for food, 
for example, but it also holds true for other 
material resources that have become part 
of a certain material standard of life. Thus 
it is common to calculate metabolic rates, 
that is resource use per capita, as a fairly 
robust overall measure of material 
standard of living (see for example 
Krausmann et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 
2007; Haberl et al., 2009). From another 
perspective, metabolic rates can be seen 
as the ‘material footprint’ of an individual 
person living by a certain country’s average 
level of consumption. These metabolic 
rates are by more than one order of 
magnitude different for different countries. 
For example, one person more in India 
means on average an additional 4 tons of 
resource use, while one person more in 
Canada means on average 25 tons more 
resource use per year. 
While global resource use has increased 
eightfold during the course of the 20th 
century (Figure 2.1), average resource use 
per capita merely doubled (Figure 2.2). A 
global inhabitant in 2005 required 
somewhere between 8.5 (Behrens et al., 
2007) and 9.2 tons (Krausmann et al., 2009) 
of resources annually, while a hundred 
years earlier the average global metabolic 
rate was 4.6 tons. 
5 The issue of renewability of resources that had played such a 
prominent role in the environmental and sustainability debate (see 
for example Daly, 1977) is today difficult to evaluate. On the one 
hand, the use of renewable biotic resources, even if it is not plainly 
an overuse beyond the regeneration capacities of the resource, 
is considered to cause some of the most severe environmental 
impacts (van der Voet et al., 2005). On the other hand, for example 
with minerals used for construction, the distinction between 
renewable and non-renewable is not so easy. Most of these 
minerals are abundant in the earth crust, but not necessarily close 
to those population centers where they are needed.
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
10
Average global metabolic rates have 
sometimes stagnated (such as the period 
from 1900 to the end of World War II), and 
sometimes grown rapidly (such as the 
period from the end of WW II up to the 
global oil crisis in the early 1970s).6 From 
this first oil shock in 1973 until the turn of 
the century, the global average has again 
remained stable (see Figure 2.2) and has 
continued to do so in the industrialized 
countries up to now (Figure 2.3). Globally, 
though, in recent years the metabolic rates 
started to rise again, due to a large extent 
to the growth of large emerging economies 
such as Brazil, China and India. This marks 
a new phase of international convergence 
in metabolic patterns in which a number of 
developing countries have adopted growth 
strategies that make it possible for a 
rapidly expanding middle class to achieve 
high consumption levels that are similar to 
those OECD countries achieved during the 
decades after WWII.
6 This phase is known as the “Fifties Syndrome” (Pfister, 1996), but 
might also be addressed as the US-American New Deal spreading 
across the world, in combination with decolonization and the “green 
revolution” .
The phases of metabolic patterns are not 
reflected economically in terms of average 
income (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3), 
which showed a more or less continuous 
exponential growth (with minor downturns 
during the first world economic crisis in 
the 1930s and World War II). These findings 
warrant further investigation, as they 
indicate some decoupling of economic 
development and resource use.
These data indicate that global material 
resource use during the 20th century rose 
at about twice the rate of population, but at 
a substantially lower pace than the world 
economy. Thus resource decoupling has 
taken place ‘spontaneously’ rather than as 
a result of policy intention. This occurred 
while resource prices were declining, or at 
least stagnating. Further research is 
needed on this relationship between 
‘spontaneous’ relative decoupling and 
declining resource prices. 
Figure 2.1. Global material extraction in billion tons, 1900–2005
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009
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Figure 2.2. Global metabolic rates 1900–2005, and income
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009; based on SEC Database "Growth in global materials use, GDP and population during the 20th century", Version 1.0 
(June 2009): http://uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/3133.htm)
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Figure 2.3. Gross Domestic Production and Domestic Material Consumption in OECD countries, 
1980–2000 
Source: OECD, 2008b. Data update provided by OECD on 1 April 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/12/40464014.pdf
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According to Wagner (see Figure 2.4), 
resource prices declined by about 30% in 
the course of the 20th century. After the 
first oil crisis, the price level increased to a 
first centennial climax, only to return to its 
trend of decline after less than a decade. 
A similar phenomenon may now be 
happening in conjunction with the present 
economic crisis (see Figure 2.5). A steep 
rise in raw material prices reached its peak 
in 2007, and a return to usual price levels 
may have started already in 2008. For the 
Figure 2.4. Composite resource price index (at constant prices, 1900–2000)
Source: Wagner et al., 2002
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Figure 2.5. Commodity price indices
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), historical price data, available from http://blogs.worldbank.org/prospects/global-
commodity-watch-march-2011
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time being, though, it is hard to tell 
whether such a return to price levels ‘as 
usual’ with a further tendency of decline 
will actually take place. It could just as well 
be that symptoms of increasing scarcity in 
conjunction with steeply rising demand will 
lead to financial speculations that keep raw 
material prices at higher levels than 
before, and even enforce a reversal of the 
long-term trend of decline (see for example 
AIECE, 2009).
Nevertheless, even in a context of 
declining raw material prices, the growth 
rates of global raw material extraction 
throughout the 20th century remained 
below the growth rates of economic 
activity as measured by GDP (see Figure 
2.1). While material resource use 
increased by a factor of 8, world GDP 
increased by a factor of 23 (OECD, 2008). 
This means that even under the 
unfavourable conditions of price decline, 
a certain amount of resource decoupling 
is evident, or put differently, a certain 
level of ‘dematerialization’ of the world 
economy has spontaneously occurred, 
effectively raising resource productivity 
Figure 2.6. The global interrelation between resource use and income (175 countries in the year 2000)
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(added value/resource use) by about 
1–2% annually at the global level 
(Krausmann et al., 2009). This decoupling 
has been particularly marked among the 
industrial countries. Similar findings have 
also been presented by Bringezu et al. 
(2004). 
Statistically, the relation between economic 
activity (measured in terms of GDP) and 
resource use is robust, as has been shown 
by an analysis by Steinberger et al. (2010) 
of 175 countries for the year 2000 (see 
Figure 2.6). However, while globally the 
loglinear correlation was R2 = 0.60 
(weighted by country size), the scatterplot 
demonstrates a large number of outliers. 
Redrafting on linear scales shows that the 
steepness of the function is much higher in 
low-income ranges, declines with level of 
income, and no saturation is evident.
This suggests that it is possible for some 
countries to achieve relatively high 
incomes per capita while consuming fewer 
resources per capita, while other countries 
display very high resource consumption 
levels per capita without a corresponding 
rise in incomes per capita. This is related to 
factors like population density (see below), 
but it is also strongly related to trade. 
Countries may shift their domestic economy 
towards services, reducing their primary 
and secondary sectors, and increasing their 
dependence on imported manufactured 
goods. This leads to a lowering of domestic 
Source: Steinberger et al., 2010
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resource use (measured in tons) while 
income per capita rises, and to a shifting of 
the material and environmental burden 
into developing countries. Other countries 
may specialize as raw material producers 
(e.g. many African countries) or 
manufacturers (e.g. many Asian countries), 
with a high domestic material resource use 
and environmental burden as a 
consequence, without significant 
corresponding increases in income per 
capita. These issues have become a strong 
focus of research that will be assessed in 
Chapter 4.
Clearly the global average metabolic rate 
rests upon highly unequal metabolic rates 
across countries, varying by a factor 10 or 
more (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2007). 
According to a recent analysis (Krausmann 
et al., 2008), two key factors account for 
much of this variation: development status 
(developing or emergent vs. fully 
industrialized countries with concomitant 
income) and population density.7 Each of 
these factors, looked upon independently, 
seems to be responsible for roughly a 
doubling of the metabolic rate. For the 
industrial countries, those with high 
population density (among them many 
European countries and Japan) have an 
average metabolic rate of about 13 tons/
capita, while those with low population 
density (for example Finland, the USA and 
Australia) have a metabolic rate twice as 
high and more, although income and 
material comfort do not substantially differ. 
The same variation can be observed among 
the rapidly industrializing countries: while 
among them the high-density developing 
countries (such as China and India) showed 
average metabolic rates of 5 tons/capita in 
the year 2000, the metabolic rates in 
comparable low-density developing 
countries (e.g. Brazil and South Africa) 
were more than twice as high. It appears 
that densely populated areas and regions, 
7 A similar typological effort was undertaken by Romero-Lankao 
et al. (2008) to explain carbon emissions, putting the ecological 
modernization theory to a test. She developed a typology combining 
income, urbanization and stage in the demographic transition to 
explore trends of global convergence of carbon emissions.
for the same standard of living and 
material comfort, need fewer resources 
per capita. This still needs to be 
corroborated by research, for each of the 
larger components of material flows. The 
apparent difference in the use of biomass 
(see Figure 2.7) may be partially due to the 
fact that food and feedstock is produced in 
less populated areas, and only the lower-
weight refined produce such as meat, milk 
or cheese is exported to densely populated 
regions. But regions with a traditionally 
high population density often tend towards 
a diet less dependent on meat and dairy, 
and livestock that causes large material 
flows tends to be kept and used in low-
density regions. Densely populated areas 
also have less need for transport fuels (as 
has often been demonstrated for cities, see 
Newman and Kenworthy, 2007), and the 
supply of heat for housing can be provided 
more efficiently. Industrial facilities 
requiring particularly high material flows 
(such as mines), on the other hand, tend to 
be located in sparsely populated areas.8 
Finally, the per capita use of construction 
minerals follows a similar pattern: 
understandably, people in urban areas save 
space and therefore construction material 
and use infrastructure more frequently and 
thus more efficiently.
The decrease in need for materials with 
rising population density is essentially 
good news in a world of rapid 
urbanization. The doubling of per capita 
material use due to resource and energy 
intensive modes of industrialization, which 
can be seen in Figure 2.7, is a major 
challenge for those high-density countries 
themselves if the ‘material footprint’ of 
each of their inhabitants doubles. It is also 
a challenge for the rest of the world in 
terms of resource depletion and 
environmental impact, especially if this 
conventional industrialization mode is 
coupled to growth strategies in developed 
economies that are driven by ever-rising 
consumer demand and globalized capital 
8 Why the per capita use of ores tends to be higher in low density 
areas needs further research.
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investment flows. It is necessary, 
therefore, to relate strategies dealing 
with resource use to developmental 
strategies. While it seems fully justified to 
discuss resource use reductions for 
industrialized countries, this is not 
applicable for developing countries. Low 
metabolic rates in developing countries 
often reflect a lack of satisfaction of basic 
needs and a low standard of material 
comfort, and social justice calls for 
environmental and economic space to 
eradicate poverty through investment in 
the necessary material infrastructures. 
However, the key question is how these 
countries go about this. If they emulate the 
technologies and industrial processes of 
the developed economies, their efforts will 
be undercut by the consequences of 
resource depletion and environmental 
impacts. Their optimal strategy, therefore, 
is to exploit this space while 
simultaneously pursuing a less resource 
and energy intensive growth and 
development pathway. Decoupling 
(resource and impact) as discussed in this 
report can help describe what such a less 
resource- and energy-intensive pathway 
could look like and how it can be achieved. 
2.2.1 Conclusion
Annual global resource extraction and use 
increased from about 7 billion tons (7 Gt) in 
1900 to about 55 billion tons (55 Gt) in 2000, 
with the main shift being from renewable 
biotic resources to non-renewable mineral 
ones. Even in the existing economic 
environment of continuously declining 
resource prices, some decoupling of 
resource use from economic activity has 
taken place: the world economy has been 
dematerializing. The most inelastic 
relationship exists between resource use 
and population numbers. The ‘metabolic 
rate’, the annual resource use per capita, 
represents the material standard of living 
in a country, and if population rises or 
Figure 2.7. Average metabolic rates (resource use in tons/capita) by development status and population 
density 
High-density means a population density of 50 people/km2 or higher. Share in world population: 13% industrial, high density, 6% industrial, low density, 
62% rest of the world, high density, 6% rest of the world, low density. 
Source: Krausmann et al., 2008
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declines, so proportionally does resource 
use. The global average metabolic rate has 
doubled from 4.6 tons/capita in 1900 to 
8–9 tons/capita at the beginning of the 21st 
century. The metabolic rate strongly 
depends on the development status of a 
country (doubling or tripling in the course of 
the industrial transformation), on income 
and on population density: regions with 
high population density display 
substantially lower metabolic rates for the 
same standard of living. These insights can 
be used for projecting future resource use 
and for modelling resource depletion, 
development strategies and resource 
decoupling. An important finding is that 
metabolic rates9 have stabilized10 in highly 
industrialized countries in the past three 
decades, irrespective of further rising 
incomes, while the metabolic rates in many 
parts of the rest of the world keep rising. 
2.3 Assessing the dynamics 
of global environmental 
impacts 
The key questions of this report are 
whether a decoupling of environmental 
impacts from resource use and economic 
growth is taking place, and what are the 
challenges facing the further supporting 
and enforcing of decoupling by policy 
measures. Resource use has been shown 
to have numerous indicators – not fully 
comprehensive but statistically robust – 
that enable the assessment and monitoring 
of the degree of decoupling of resource use 
from population dynamics and economic 
growth, both globally as well as at the level 
of individual countries. For assessing the 
decoupling of (undesirable) environmental 
impacts from population and economic 
dynamics, no such aggregate 
comprehensive indicators exist. 
However, substantial historical evidence 
indicates that the same level of economic 
9 Including traded products, but not the upstream material 
requirements of traded products.
10 A similar phenomenon can be observed for total primary energy 
consumption (TPES).
activities can be associated with a higher 
or a lower level of environmental impacts. 
Most environmental policies in the past 
decades have been directed at specific 
impacts, such as putting a halt to 
deforestation, keeping the stratospheric 
ozone layer intact, reducing carcinogenic 
or other toxic substances in the human 
food chain, preventing eutrophication of 
water bodies, or reducing air-polluting 
emissions detrimental to human health. In 
relation to economic activities, they tended 
to impose additional costs (often addressed 
as ‘internalizing externalities’) and met 
with variable levels of success.
2.3.1 Strategies to reduce impacts
In relation to resource use, undesirable 
environmental impacts can be reduced by 
basically two strategies: (a) changing the 
mix of resources used through 
substitution of more harmful by less 
harmful resources, and (b) using 
resources in a more environmentally 
benign way throughout the life cycle. 
Strategy (a) is certainly effective but also 
has its limits. An informative example is the 
substitution of coal for combustion by 
petroleum or natural gas; the latter have a 
lower amount of carbon emissions per unit 
of mass and per unit of energy delivered. 
The more recent example of substituting 
biofuels for fossil fuels needs careful 
assessment on a case-by-case basis, as a 
recent IRP report (UNEP, 2009) has 
demonstrated. The IRP reports on metals 
demonstrate that a key trend is using 
increasing amounts of ever more 
substances as resources, across all 
naturally occurring mineral elements. This 
expansion puts limits to (present or future) 
substitution. Further, the purposes for 
which material resources can be used do 
not allow for an indefinite range of 
substitutions: energy resources, freshwater 
and land are required for practically all 
economic activities, though in different 
qualities and quantities. The substitutability 
of materials is limited by their physical and 
chemical properties. Of course, it has been 
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Source: Adapted from Wilkinson et al., 2007
Figure 2.8. Environmental risk transition framework
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very important in terms of environmental 
impacts to reduce the amount of SO2 or lead 
in transport fuels, thereby reducing the 
overall environmental impacts of fuel use in 
transportation.11 But beyond a certain point, 
it is crucial to use less transport fuels, i.e. 
less resources. The same applies to many 
other economic activities.
Strategy (b), using resources 
environmentally more carefully or smartly 
throughout their life cycle, is doubtless a 
key strategy for environmental policies. For 
example, using construction minerals for 
thermal insulation and refurbishment of 
houses probably has an overall positive 
environmental impact, while using them for 
an extension of the road network probably 
does not, more or less independently of the 
amounts used. Some environmental 
impacts, such as the energy and associated 
11 For a further step in reducing the environmental impact of transport 
fuels, namely reducing the emission of NOx by the use of catalysers, 
an important additional scarce resource, platinum, was required.
carbon emissions required for the 
transportation of the construction 
minerals, probably remain in both cases a 
function of amounts of resource use. 
2.3.2 The Environmental Kuznets 
Curve
Working at a global level, Wilkinson et al. 
(2007) revived a hypothesis that had already 
been expressed by Holdren et al. (2000) in 
UNDP’s world energy assessment (see 
Figure 2.8). This hypothesis claims 
interdependence between the scale level of 
environmental impact and its relation to 
economic activity and increasing wealth. It 
assumes that household-level 
environmental burdens (such as dirty water 
or indoor pollution) decline with a rise in 
wealth and community-level burdens (such 
as urban air pollution) display a hump-
shaped, typical environmental Kuznets 
function, while global environmental 
burdens (such as greenhouse gas 
emissions) rise. 
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It assumes that over time, global impacts 
on the environment are becoming more 
important than local ones, and delayed 
impacts are becoming more important 
than immediate ones (see green arrows at 
the bottom of Figure 2.8). Across those 
scale levels, impact decoupling is not easy 
to assess. 
2.3.3 Empirical studies of impacts 
On the global level, the only well-
researched and quantified coupling 
between economic activity (and/or resource 
use) and environmental impact is the one 
between the use of fossil fuels and CO2 
emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. On the centennial time scale 
(1900–2000), world GDP had been rising by 
a factor of about 22 (see Figure 2.1, 
depending on GDP indicators), fossil fuel 
use by roughly a factor of 14, and global 
CO2 emissions had been rising by a factor 
of 13 (Smil, 2008, p.328). The relation 
between world GDP and world CO2 
emissions across this time span can be 
very well represented by a loglinear 
function.12 The growth rates of CO2 
emissions (the environmental impact of 
concern) are smaller than the respective 
growth rates of GDP, so a relative 
decoupling has occurred. However, the 
degree of impact decoupling across this 
longer time period has been practically the 
same as for resource decoupling. In recent 
years, the increasing use of coal again 
raised the level of CO2 emissions per unit of 
fossil fuel use, though future CCS (carbon 
capture and storage) may reduce net CO2 
emissions (IPCC, 2007). 
Another illuminating case is the relation 
between biomass use and its impact on the 
global cycles of sulphur, nitrogen and 
phosphorus. While these impacts are 
considered substantial, with human-
induced flows being of the same order of 
magnitude as natural flows (Ayres, 1994; 
12 After many efforts to the contrary, it may be concluded that fossil 
fuel use and CO2 emissions do not follow an Environmental Kuznets 
Curve, that is they do not rise during earlier stages of development 
or at low income while declining at later stages of development or 
at higher incomes (Stern, 2004; Luzzati and Orsini, 2009).
Smil, 2002; Tilman, 1999), no time series 
data exist that allow judging how closely 
these flows are related to changes in global 
GDP or global biomass extraction. 
Figure 2.9 shows that cereal production 
growth since 1960 has been decoupled 
slightly from land area, but coupled to 
increasing amounts of fertilizer use.
Very much the same may be said about 
one of the environmental impacts of 
human resource use that is considered 
most important: biodiversity loss, due 
largely to biomass extraction and land 
use. Although long-term data 
documenting biodiversity loss on a global 
level are sparse, the available data 
indicate a global decline of biodiversity in 
marine (see Sala and Knowlton, 2006), 
freshwater (see Dudgeon et al., 2006) and 
terrestrial (e.g. Sanderson et al., 2006) 
ecosystems. Whether this decline is 
steeper than the rise in resource use, or 
even steeper than growth in GDP, cannot 
yet be quantified. Thus, any decoupling of 
these environmental impacts from 
economic activity cannot be documented.
The environmental impacts associated with 
the extraction and use of fossil fuels are 
another very important issue.13 In the past 
decades, the use of coal and oil shifted 
towards natural gas that was 
environmentally relatively beneficial; it 
reduced the specific CO2 emissions per ton 
of fossil fuel used, but it also increased the 
rate that natural gas resources were 
depleted. Now, the use of coal is on the 
rise again (IEA, 2008), which has an impact 
in the opposite direction. 
Estimates of remaining recoverable oil 
resources vary greatly (and depend to an 
extent on shifting economic and 
technological conditions), but are 
ultimately less important than annual flow 
rates of oil production. Hubbert (1956) 
presented a model wherein oil production 
in any given region follows a roughly 
13 This section on oil resources was prepared by Jeremy Wakeford of 
the Sustainability Institute, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
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bell-shaped curve, reaching a ‘peak’ rate 
when approximately half of the ultimately 
recoverable resource has been consumed. 
Oil production has already peaked and 
declined in the majority of individual oil 
producing nations, and in large regions 
such as North America and Europe 
(Hirsch, 2008). Thus ‘peak oil’ is an 
empirically verifiable phenomenon (Sorrel 
et al., 2009, p.vii). Evidence suggests that 
the world is rapidly approaching a world 
oil production peak. Global new oil 
discoveries reached their height in the 
1960s and have been on a declining trend 
ever since (see Figure 2.10), despite 
remarkable improvements in exploration, 
drilling and extraction technologies, and 
episodes of high prices in the 1970s and 
2000s (ASPO, 2009). 
A comprehensive review of recent oil 
production capacity forecasts by academics, 
industry experts and international agencies 
(Sorrel et al., 2009, p.ix) concluded that “a 
peak of conventional oil production before 
2030 appears likely and there is a significant 
risk of a peak before 2020”. Although 
unconventional oil reserves (e.g. oil sands 
and extra-heavy oil) are large, their flow 
rates are severely constrained by high 
energy and economic costs as well as 
environmental factors (Aleklett et al., 2009). 
An additional concern is that it is requiring 
increasing amounts of energy to find, 
extract, refine and deliver oil to markets 
(Gagnon et al., 2009). The easier to access 
oil deposits, typically discovered decades 
ago, are being rapidly depleted and the 
frontier for new oil has moved into areas 
that are economically more costly and 
technically more difficult to access (such as 
deep off-shore wells and polar regions). 
Thus the ‘net energy’ derived from oil – i.e. 
the energy output minus the energy inputs 
– is set to decline faster than the ‘gross 
energy’; this will in turn further raise the 
monetary and possibly also the 
environmental costs of oil. In effect, as long 
Figure 2.9. Global growth of cereals production and fertilizer consumption
Note: Global growth in the production of cereals since 1961 almost exclusively depended on intensification (nitrogen input, tractors, yields and 
many other factors not shown on this graph), whereas the expansion of harvested area played an insignificant role.
Source: UNEP GEO Portal, as compiled from FAOSTAT database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
http://geodata.grid.unep.ch 
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as carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technologies are not proven to be fully 
operational and provide substantial relief on 
emissions, it cannot be expected that the 
overall environmental impacts of fossil fuel 
use will decouple from the amounts used. 
Perhaps even the opposite will be the case.
Industrial minerals and ores are a very 
heterogeneous class of resources, 
dominated quantitatively by ferrous metals 
and mineral fertilizers. These resources 
are used in highly diverse processes, so it 
is impossible on this level of generality to 
assess potential environmental impacts 
(see also IRP metals reports). The most 
accessible issues are connected to the 
extraction phase in the life cycle of those 
resources. 
While issues of use and recycling are 
subject to other IRP reports on metals 
(UNEP, 2011), here some issues 
concerning a potential decoupling of 
impacts for the extraction phase in the life 
cycle of those resources are discussed. The 
location of resource extraction is relevant 
from an environmental impact point of view 
under the assumption that environmental 
regulation standards differ across the 
world. Most likely, those standards are 
tightest in wealthy industrial countries, and 
less tight in poorer, developing countries. 
According to SERI’s Mosus database, 
extraction of industrial ores and minerals 
has not only doubled in the last 25 years, it 
has also shifted from industrial towards 
developing and newly industrializing 
countries (NIC) (see Figure 2.11); in 2006, 
more than half of all minerals and ores 
were extracted outside of industrial 
countries.
This finding has implications for 
environmental impacts associated with 
extraction activities. If legal standards on 
average are likely to become weaker, 
environmental impacts per unit of extracted 
material might become more severe. An 
equally indirect indication may be derived 
from worldwide declining ore grades. 
Figures 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 display the 
decline of ore grades for several key 
Figure 2.10. World conventional oil discoveries and production 
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Figure 2.12. Ore grades of mines in Australia, 1840–2005 
Source: Mudd, 2009
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Figure 2.11. Global extraction of industrial minerals and ores 1980 and 2006, by type of country 
Source: SERI, Mosus data base, own calculation, http://seri.at/projects/completed-projects/mosus
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Figure 2.13. Ore grades of gold mines, 1830–2010 
Source: Giurco et al., 2010
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Figure 2.14. Ore grades of nickel and copper mines, 1885–2010 
Source: Giurco et al., 2010
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metals and countries that belong to the 
world’s major providers of industrial 
minerals and ores. Today, depending on 
the metal concerned, about three times as 
much material needs to be moved for the 
same ore extraction as a century ago, with 
concomitant increases in land disruption, 
groundwater implications and energy use. 
Therefore, even if today’s extraction is done 
more carefully than a century ago, and 
even if the release of aggressive chemicals 
has declined, no data are available to 
suggest that the growth rates of 
environmental impacts will lag behind the 
growth rates of the amount of ores 
extracted.
Most of the environmental impacts of 
extraction and use of construction 
minerals occur only at a regional level. All 
extraction activities of these minerals lead 
to the disturbance of land, air and water 
ecosystems. Futhermore, energy use for 
extraction and transport needs to be 
considered.14 Similarly, a large part of the 
processing involves the production of 
concrete, 15% of which involves cement 
that is a major source of CO2 emissions 
(1kg of cement generates about 1kg of CO2 
emissions). Due to the normally high 
waste-to-product ratios, extractive 
operations often generate large volumes of 
waste; similarly, at the end of the life cycle 
high volumes of waste require disposal. 
Therefore, many European countries have 
introduced mining charges or aggregate 
levies to reduce the demand for primary 
materials and encourage recycling (EEA, 
2008, p.25). As most of the environmental 
impacts of the extraction of construction 
minerals are a direct function of their 
volume, one should expect their dynamics 
to be fairly proportional to the amount of 
resource extraction and use, perhaps with 
the exception of concrete: lowering the 
proportion of concrete, and improving the 
technology of cement production, could be 
a pathway to further decoupling of 
environmental impact from resource use. 
14 In Germany, for example, 45% of the tonnage of freight vehicles is 
consumed by aggregates, see Bundesamt für Güterverkehr. 2006. 
Different considerations apply to impacts 
in the use phase of construction minerals, 
with impacts depending on what is being 
built, where and how it is being built, and 
possibly relate only weakly to the amounts 
of resources used. By using additional 
material to provide thermal insulation to 
buildings, for example, CO2 emissions may 
be reduced.
2.3.4 Conclusion
The environmental impacts associated with 
resource use are multifold, vary between 
the resources under consideration,15 and 
are not documented in a quantitative 
fashion that renders them accessible to a 
statistical assessment or target-setting for 
decoupling. It appears that short term and 
local environmental impacts of resource 
use across the life cycle have been and 
can be mitigated in a way that allows for 
impact decoupling beyond resource 
decoupling. With global and far-reaching 
environmental impacts, this is less likely 
to be the case. While the extraction of 
different classes of resources must be 
assumed to have very different 
environmental impacts, a substitution 
between them as a strategy to reduce 
impacts is not easily feasible, because they 
serve very different functions. 
For fossil fuels, at least in the extraction 
phase, environmental impacts appear to be 
rising both with the recent sharp increase in 
coal mining, and with the rise in the 
extraction of so-called unconventional fuels 
(which include increasing risks posed by the 
shift of oil and gas production into socially 
and politically unstable environments).16 In 
the use phase (main impact considered: CO2 
emissions), most research results point in 
the direction of a proportionality of resource 
use with CO2 emissions, which might tip in 
the direction of even less decoupling with 
increasing use of coal. In the future, it is 
hoped that carbon capture and storage will 
reverse this tendency, but this is far from 
15 See in more detail in the IRP report 2010 on environmental impacts.
16 As well illustrated by the 2010 major accident in offshore drilling in 
the Gulf of Mexico. 
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certain. For biomass use, some global 
evidence indicates impact decoupling in the 
sense that while material flows (harvest) are 
increasing, the amount of land required 
remains stable. At the same time, though, 
fertilizer use and irrigation are increasing; it 
is therefore difficult to judge whether overall 
environmental impacts are stable, or 
whether some remain stable or decline at 
the expense of others that keep rising. In 
particular, impacts on biodiversity loss are 
not quantified in a way that enables 
decoupling to be assessed. For industrial 
minerals and ores (main impacts 
considered: land degradation at extraction 
sites and energy consumption) indications 
suggest that impacts associated with the 
extraction phase may be rising over-
proportionally, due to a shift in the location 
of extraction sites (towards developing 
countries with possibly lower environmental 
standards) and a global decline in ore 
grades implying rising overburden and land 
degradation relative to the amounts 
extracted. With construction minerals (main 
impacts: land degradation, wastes and CO2 
emissions from transportation and cement 
production) some environmental impacts 
are closely proportional to the volumes of 
extraction and use of the respective 
resource. Other environmental impacts 
associated with the use phase of 
construction minerals entirely depend on 
the quality of use and may not be related to 
the quantities of the materials used.
2.4 Scenarios for future 
global materials use 
The preceding sections indicated that the 
present high level of annual raw material 
extraction and the future trend of further 
strong increases in demand constitute a 
serious threat of resource overuse and 
depletion, as well as a challenge to the 
world’s climate and various ecosystem 
services in the future. In the 20th century, it 
was mainly the highly industrialized 
countries (Europe, America and a few Asian 
countries) that contributed most to global 
resource consumption, at least on a per 
capita basis. However, the newly industrial-
ized and developing countries are now 
playing an increasingly important role. Two 
relevant factors are population numbers 
and rising metabolic rates (resource use/
capita). Metabolic rates vary between 
countries by a factor of ten or more, 
depending especially on development 
status and population density (see Figure 
2.7). The global average per capita 
metabolic rate in the year 2000 is 
somewhere between 8 tons (Behrens et al., 
2007; Krausmann et al., 2009) and 10 tons 
(Krausmann et al., 2008) of annual 
resource use. However, the average 
metabolic rate for the industrialized 
countries (which make up only one fifth of 
the world population) is twice the global 
average and four or five times that of the 
poorest developing countries. 
The scenarios presented here assume a 
continuation of the current patterns 
documented in Figure 2.7, that densely 
populated regions and countries require 
only about half the metabolic rate (annual 
resource use per capita) for the same 
standard of living as sparsely populated 
areas. All scenarios also assume that 
developed industrialized and developing 
countries (some of which are already 
committed to rapid industrialization of 
their economies) should over time 
converge to a point where all countries 
have similar levels of resource use. This 
does not at all imply that developing 
countries must all follow the Western 
industrial model. This option is the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (Scenario 1). 
Scenario 2 implies a significant deviation 
from the traditional Western industrial 
model, possibly similar to the model 
adopted by many Latin American 
economies. Scenario 3 envisages a very 
radical break from the traditional Western 
industrial model, in particular for 
developing industrializing countries like 
China, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, 
Turkey, India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. Scenario 3 also means that 
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developed industrialized countries will 
need to fundamentally break from the 
resource- and energy-intensive high 
consumption economic growth model that 
remains a central point of agreement for 
political parties in these countries. All 
three Scenarios assume that this 
convergence process will be completed by 
the year 2050. Furthermore, all three 
Scenarios accept similar assumptions to 
those that underlie the IPCC’s SRES 
scenarios,17 without explicitly introducing 
GDP growth as a variable. 
The Scenarios are optimistic about the 
future in two respects. First, similar modes 
of analysis (Romero-Lankao et al., 2008) 
have shown that at present convergence 
trends can be observed for some countries, 
but not for others. The implications of this 
are that the vision of ‘convergence by 2050’ 
17 In the SRES scenarios, convergence of income (GDP/capita) is 
somewhat more protracted and occurs, depending on the scenario, 
between 2050 and 2100 (see the analysis of Romero-Lankao et al., 
2008, p.23).
(which expresses a normative commitment 
to socio-economic justice) is unrealistic and 
the ‘fortress world’ scenario as outlined in 
the GEO scenarios (UNEP, 2004) might be 
more likely. This scenario is excluded from 
the Scenarios because the purpose here is 
to reveal the implications for resource 
consumption of the normative assumptions 
that underlie different economic growth 
and development models. For example, 
Scenario 1: Business As Usual reveals the 
underlying resource use implications of the 
growth and development model advocated 
by the Growth Commission which, in turn, 
reflects a mainstream economic policy 
consensus at a global level. Scenario 3 is 
pointing out the resource use implications 
of the IPCC’s recommended scenario for 
preventing warming by more than 2 degrees 
that most governments in the world 
approved. No doubt, a ‘fortress world’ 
scenario would require far less than the 
projected 140 billion tons (140 Gt) of 
resources annually, but the result would be 
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severe conflict between those who benefit 
and those who do not – or what is referred 
to these days as Resource Wars. Second, no 
assumption of physical constraints is built 
into the model. This is clearly unrealistic, 
but intentional because nearly all the 
mainstream growth and development 
models make a similar assumption. These 
scenarios seek to demonstrate the 
consequences of this. For example, 
Scenario 1 shows that business-as-usual 
means assuming that 140 billion tons 
(140 Gt) of resources are available for 
annual extraction, use and disposal. This 
may not be stated explicitly in any global 
growth projection that advocates either 
explicitly or implicitly a business-as-usual 
approach, but it is nevertheless a glaring 
unsubstantiated assumption about available 
resources for use over the long term. The 
purpose here is to reveal this assumption in 
order to validate the need to question it 
empirically. Wherever the global 
consumption of a resource comes close in 
future to supply constraints, the threat of 
distributional conflicts will always arise. To 
confirm this one needs only to refer to the 
many resource-based conflicts that already 
exist in the world today (see UNEP report on 
resource conflicts18). 
Based upon these considerations, the 
following Scenarios for the year 2050 may 
be compared to the baseline of the year 
2000.19 All Scenarios assume a population 
change according to UN projections 
(medium variant), calculated country by 
country. They assume the ratios of 
metabolic rates between high and low 
density countries to remain stable, and 
they assume that the composition by 
material components remains the same.
 
18 http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf
19 The year 2000 is used as a baseline, as it best reflects a metabolic 
equilibrium that dominated the 25 preceding years (see Figure 1.2) 
and was mainly shaped by trends in the industrialized countries. In 
the years since, a new phase of growth can be observed that we 
chose to capture in the scenario part of our analysis, as according 
to more detailed data it is already due to a “catching up” process by 
major developing countries (such as China and India).
2.4.1 Scenario 1: Business as usual
Freeze (industrial countries) and catching 
up (rest of the world)
In this scenario, relative decoupling in 
industrial countries continues as it has 
since the early 1970s. This means their 
average metabolic rates remain stable at 
year 2000 levels (freeze), while developing 
countries build up to the same metabolic 
rate by 2050 (catching up). For developing 
countries, this implies something more 
than a doubling of their metabolic rates, 
which, in combination with projected 
population growth, boosts their material 
demand as their most important method 
for eradicating poverty. For some of the 
least developed countries, convergence 
implies a fivefold increase in their 
metabolic rates. This scenario complies 
well with the trends observed in recent 
decades (‘business as usual’). For 
industrialized countries, metabolic rates 
remained fairly stable since the mid 1970s 
(Bringezu and Schütz, 2001; Eurostat, 2002; 
Weisz et al., 2006; NIES/MOE, 2007; Rogich 
et al., 2008; and several other national MFA 
studies20), while in many developing 
countries a steep increase could be 
observed (Giljum, 2002; Gonzalez-Martinez 
and Schandl, 2008; Xiaoqiu Chen and Lijia 
Qiao, 2001; Perez-Rincon, 2006; Russi 
et al., 2008; see also OECD, 2008). In short, 
for this scenario the long-term trend is a 
continuation of relative decoupling for 
developed economies, and effectively no 
decoupling for emerging and developing 
economies.21 
This scenario results in a global 
metabolic scale of 140 billion tons 
(140 Gt) annually by 2050, and an 
average global metabolic rate of 16 tons/
capita. In relation to the year 2000, this 
20 Barbiero et al., 2003; Schandl et al., 2000; Scasny et al., 2003; 
Pedersen, 2002; Maenpaa und Siikavirta, 2007; Muukkonen, 2000; 
German Federal Statistical Office – Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000; 
Hammer and Hubacek, 2003; De Marco et al., 2000; Femia, 2000; 
Isacsson et al., 2000; Schandl and Schulz, 2002; DETR/ONS/WI, 2001.
21 This BAU-scenario complies very well with what SERI Global 
and Friends of the Earth Europe (2009) have calculated as trend 
projections, in which they arrive at an increase of annual global 
resource use from 55 billion tons in the year 2000 to 100 billion tons 
in the year 2030.
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would imply more than a tripling of 
annual global resource extraction, and 
establish global metabolic rates that 
correspond to the present European 
average. 
This scenario assumes no major system 
innovation towards sustainability such as a 
switch away from fossil energy, which 
represents an unsustainable future in 
terms of both resource use and emissions, 
probably exceeding all possible measures 
of available resources and assessments of 
limits to the capacity to absorb impacts. 
Average annual per capita carbon 
emissions would triple and global 
emissions would more than quadruple to 
28.8 GtC/yr. Such emissions are higher 
than the highest scenarios in the IPCC 
SRES (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), but 
since the IPCC scenarios have already been 
outpaced by developments since 2000 
(Raupach et al., 2007), it might in fact be 
closer to the observable trends. 
2.4.2 Scenario 2: Moderate 
contraction and convergence
Reduction by factor 2 (industrial 
countries) and catching up (rest of the 
world)
In this scenario, industrial countries 
commit to an absolute reduction of 
resource use and reduce their metabolic 
rates by a factor of 2 (i.e. from an average 
of 16 tons/capita to 8 tons/capita), while 
developing countries would then 
moderately increase their metabolic rates 
and catch up to these reduced rates by the 
year 2050. This scenario presupposes 
substantial structural change, amounting 
to a new pattern of industrial production 
and consumption that would be quite 
different from the traditional resource-
intensive Western industrial model. So far, 
despite efficiency gains in various domains, 
metabolic rates in the past have declined in 
absolute terms in only a few industrialized 
countries. Given the resource productivity 
gains that have occurred in the past, these 
metabolic rates could support a 
comfortable middle class lifestyle for all in 
both developing and developed economies. 
For developing countries, this scenario 
implies relative decoupling to increase 
their metabolic rates by no more than a 
factor 1.2 to 1.3 (depending upon density) 
which, in turn, represents a substantial 
commitment to sustainability-oriented 
innovations for decoupling. 
This scenario amounts to a global 
metabolic scale of 70 billion tons (70 Gt) 
by 2050, which means about 40% more 
annual resource extraction than in the 
year 2000. The average global metabolic 
rate would stay roughly the same as in 
2000, at 8 tons/capita. The average CO2 
emissions per capita would increase by 
almost 50% to 1.6 tons per capita, and 
global emissions would more than 
double to 14.4 GtC. 
Taken as a whole, this scenario would be 
achievable only with significant decoupling 
through investments in sustainability-
oriented innovations that result in systems 
of production and consumption that 
generate far more per unit of resources 
than is currently the case. While overall 
constraints (e.g. food supply) will not be 
transgressed in a severe way beyond what 
they are now,22 developing countries in this 
scenario have the chance to achieve a 
rising share of global resources, and for 
some an absolute increase in resource use, 
while industrial countries have to cut their 
consumption. The emissions that 
correspond to this scenario are more or 
less in the middle of the range of IPCC 
SRES climate scenarios.
2.4.3 Scenario 3: Tough contraction 
and convergence
Freeze global resource consumption at 
the 2000 level, and converge (industrial 
and developing countries)
In this scenario, the level of global resource 
consumption in 2050 is limited to equal the 
22 In terms of global footprint; existing resource consumption exceeds 
the Earth’s carrying capacity, let alone another increase of 40%.
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global resource consumption of the year 
2000. It is anticipated in this scenario that 
metabolic rates of industrial and 
developing countries converge at around 6 
tons per capita. This scenario requires 
far-reaching absolute resource use 
reductions in the industrialized countries, 
by a factor of 3 to 5. In this scenario, some 
countries classified as ‘developing’ in the 
year 2000 would have to achieve 10–20% 
reductions in their average metabolic rates 
while simultaneously eradicating poverty – 
an outcome that is only conceivable if it is 
accepted that sustainability-oriented 
innovations can result in radical 
technological and system change. 
This scenario amounts to a global 
metabolic scale of 50 billion tons (50 Gt) 
by 2050 (the same as in the year 2000) and 
allows for an average global metabolic 
rate of 6 tons/capita. The average CO2 per 
capita emissions would be reduced by 
roughly 40% to 0.75 tons/capita, so global 
emissions would remain constant at the 
2000 level of 6.7 GtC/yr.
Taken as a whole, this would be a scenario 
of tough restraint that would require 
unprecedented levels of innovation. The key 
message of this scenario is that despite 
population growth to roughly 9 billion 
people, the pressure on the environment 
would remain roughly the same as it is 
now. The emissions correspond 
approximately to the lowest range of 
scenario B1 of the IPCC SRES, but are still 
20% above the roughly 5.5 GtC/yr advocated 
by the Global Commons Institute for 
contraction and convergence in emissions 
(GCI, 2003).
The implications of these scenarios are far 
reaching. Given that the ‘business-as-
usual’ (BAU) scenario (Scenario 1) 
assumes that developing countries adopt 
growth and development strategies aimed 
at ‘catching up’ with the resource 
consumption patterns of industrialized 
countries, this will result in the tripling of 
global annual resource extraction and 
consumption by 2050. Specifically, this 
means more than doubling biomass use, 
while almost quadrupling fossil fuel use 
and tripling the annual use of metals 
(ores) and construction minerals. This 
scenario would place an equivalent burden 
on the planet as if the human population 
Figure 2.15. Resource use according to three different scenarios up to 2050
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009 (Development 1900–2005) and own calculations (see text)
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Baseline
Scenario 1:
Business as 
usual
Scenario 2:
Moderate 
contraction and 
convergence
Scenario 3: 
Tough 
contraction and 
convergence
Year 2000 2050 2050 2050
World population
(Billions) 6.0 8.9 8.9 8.9
World Metabolic rate
(Tons/capita/year) 8 16 8 5.5 
World Metabolic scale
(Billion tons/year) 49 141 70 49 
Metabolic rate Industrialized 
High density 13 13 6.5 5
Industrialized 
Low density 24 24 12 8
Developing
High density 5 13 6.5 5
Developing
Low density 9 24 12 8
Table 2.1. Metabolic scales and rates, overview of scenario analysis
tripled by the year 2050 to 18 billion people, 
while maintaining the resource 
consumption patterns (metabolic rate) of 
the year 2000. Moreover, this increase 
would, if global manufacturing continues to 
be concentrated in low-wage environments 
endowed with viable infrastructures and 
institutions, take place in countries that 
were classified as developing countries 
with a very high population density in the 
year 2000, such as China and India. Thus, 
the burden of resource flows per unit area 
would in 2050 be substantially above the 
European or Japanese levels of today. This 
BAU scenario is incompatible with the 
IPCC’s climate protection targets. 
Although Scenario 2 (moderate contraction 
and convergence) assumes substantial 
structural change in the dominant industrial 
production and consumption patterns, it still 
implies a roughly 40% increase in annual 
global resource use with associated 
environmental impacts. If global 
manufacturing continues to be concentrated 
in low-wage environments, practically all of 
that increase would occur in the countries 
classified as ‘developing’ in the year 2000. 
Such a fast increase in resource 
consumption would render the existing 
policies of a ‘circular economy’ (OECD, 
2008) very difficult, if only because the 
potentially reusable wastes are very much 
smaller than the required inputs. For the 
industrialized countries, achieving a factor 
2 reduction of metabolic rates would imply 
resource productivity gains of 1–2% 
annually (which is within the range of the 
productivity gains of the past two decades), 
net of any income-based rebound effects 
(Greening et al., 2000). More realistically, it 
would require much higher innovation rates 
and productivity (efficiency) gains.23 In either 
case, this scenario would require 
substantial economic structural change and 
massive investments in innovations for 
resource decoupling. 
Scenario 3 (tough contraction and 
convergence) does not raise global 
resource consumption above the 2000 
23  One should be aware that achieving a substantial reduction 
in resource use on an economy-wide per capita level is much 
more difficult than achieving substantial resource productivity 
gains within certain areas of production. For an overall “Factor 
2”-reduction of metabolic rate, much larger resource productivity 
gains have to be achieved in some areas (cf. Weizsäcker et al., 
1997 “factor 4”; or Schmidt-Bleek, "factor 10" cf. Hinterberger and 
Schmidt-Bleek, 1999; or “factor five” in, Weizsäcker, et al., 2009), 
while, for example, food supply can only be reduced by a much 
smaller margin. 
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levels; thus it would be most compatible 
with the existing (if unknown) limits to the 
Earth’s resource base, and best adjusted 
for as much circularity in economies as is 
technically feasible. To achieve this overall 
strategic goal, absolute resource use 
reductions will not only be necessary in 
developed economies, but also in already 
advanced developing countries. Most 
politicians are likely to regard this scenario 
as too restrictive in terms of developmental 
goals such as reducing poverty and 
providing for the material comfort of a 
rapidly expanding middle class. Thus this 
scenario can hardly be addressed as a 
possible strategic goal, but is valuable 
insofar as it illuminates the implications of 
a hypothetical barrier to further global 
increase of resource extraction.
All scenarios demonstrate that without 
significant improvements in resource 
productivity, it will not be possible to meet 
the needs of nine billion people (including 
the eradication of poverty) by 2050. 
Nevertheless, the business-as-usual 
scenario (Scenario 1) is a projection into the 
future of the currently structured and 
managed global economy. It assumes 
limited investments in innovations for both 
resource and impact decoupling. The policy 
implications are clear: as the economic 
consequences of resource scarcities and 
degraded environments start to work their 
way through the economy, policy-making 
will start to take more and more seriously 
the implications of scientific research about 
both the consequences of BAU and possibly 
solutions. However, even if it were possible 
to build a global political consensus on the 
need for absolute resource use reductions 
in developed economies and relative 
decoupling in developing countries 
(Scenario 2), change will only be able to go 
as fast as the levels of investment in 
innovations for decoupling across the entire 
value chain. Although it has been assumed 
in these scenarios that impact decoupling 
follows resource decoupling, in reality it is 
impossible to predict where innovations for 
decoupling will have the greatest impact. It 
is conceivable that impact decoupling could 
even accelerate ahead of resource 
decoupling (e.g. via radical pollution 
reduction), but the reverse could also be 
true (e.g. biomass production to reduce CO2 
could exacerbate soil and water scarcities). 
Whatever the dynamics, the single clear 
policy implication of Scenario 2 is that any 
Government that gets ahead of the game by 
facilitating investments now in innovations 
for decoupling in the future will clearly reap 
the benefits when pressures mount for 
others to change rapidly by depending on 
technology transfers from elsewhere.
Scenario 3 is more or less consistent with 
the IPCC assessments of what would be 
required to prevent global warming 
beyond 2 degrees. Although Scenario 2 
envisages a mix of absolute reductions 
and relative decoupling, the policy 
implication is clear: Scenario 3 will 
require greater global consensus on the 
need for convergence than Scenario 2, and 
this consensus would need to be 
supported by a clear case as to why 
poverty reduction in a resource scarce 
world will depend more on innovations 
for decoupling than if investments 
continue to prioritize BAU production and 
consumption technologies and systems. 
Equally, threats to over-consumption need 
not be equated to threats to well-being 
and middle class lifestyles, but rather as 
threats to particular kinds of resource-
intensive modes of consumption.!
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3.1 Rethinking growth
The logic of decoupling as defined in this 
report has significant implications for the 
understanding of economic growth, based 
on a rich tradition within the sustainable 
development literature that has attempted 
to redefine growth from a sustainability 
perspective. 
The term ‘growth’ is surrounded by 
confusion, as the term means different 
things to different audiences. When 
businesses and governments talk about 
growth they generally mean economic 
growth, the amount of economic value and 
monetary transactions using indicators 
such as GDP. For environmentalists, 
growth tends to be focused on the growth 
of physical throughput in the economy, or 
physical/material growth.
Economic growth and physical growth are 
different. Economic growth, measured by 
the GDP of a country, is defined as the 
added (monetary) value of all final goods 
and services produced within a country in a 
given period of time, usually a calendar 
year. It includes the sum of economic value 
added at every stage of production (the 
intermediate stages) of all final goods and 
services produced during that time. 
Decoupling and the need for 
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Physical growth of the economy means 
that it spreads over more physical area, or 
it has a larger material and energy 
throughput, or it has a larger stock of 
physical products, buildings or 
infrastructure. Physical growth is often 
coupled to increased environmental 
pressures, damage and resource 
depletion.
 
Based on this understanding of these two 
types of growth, it becomes conceptually 
possible for economic growth (defined now 
as money flow, or value) to be decoupled 
from physical growth of the economy 
(resource consumption) and associated 
environmental pressures. Ekins (2000) 
made the same point when he argued: 
“It is clear from past experience that the 
relationship between the economy’s 
value and its physical scale is variable, 
and that it is possible to reduce the 
material intensity of GNP. This 
establishes the theoretical possibility 
of GNP growing indefinitely in a finite 
material world.” 
Writing from a developing country context, 
Gallopin (2003) develops a similar line of 
argument. He distinguishes between 
development (improvements in well-being 
plus material economic growth), 
maldevelopment (material economic 
growth with no improvements in well-
being), underdevelopment (no material 
economic growth and no improvements in 
well-being), and sustainable development 
(improvements in well-being plus non-
material economic growth) (Figure 3.1). He 
argues as follows:
“In the very long-term, there are two 
basic types of truly sustainable 
development situations: increasing 
quality of life with non-material growth 
(but no net material growth) and zero-
growth economies (no economic growth 
at all). Sustainable development need 
not imply the cessation of economic 
growth: a zero growth material economy 
with a positively growing non-material 
economy is the logical implication of 
sustainable development. While 
demographic growth and material 
economic growth must eventually 
stabilize, cultural, psychological, and 
spiritual growth is not constrained by 
physical limits.” (Gallopin, 2003, p.27)
The logic of Gallopin’s framework is that 
development strategies for developing 
countries should be split into two modes 
(which could be consecutive phases in 
certain circumstances). The first mode 
would entail moving from maldevelopment/
underdevelopment to development whereby 
improvements in well-being for the 
majority are achieved via inclusive material 
economic growth. This is what mainstream 
development economics is all about, and it 
is the central focus of The Growth Report 
Source: Redrawn from Gallopin, 2003, p. 27
Figure 3.1. The different guises of development
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that brings together the perspectives of the 
most influential economists in the world 
today (Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2008). However, it virtually 
ignores ecological sustainability, except for 
a minor reference to global warming. 
The second development mode would entail 
a shift into sustainable development 
whereby improvements in well-being are 
achieved via non-material economic growth. 
When references are made to ‘leapfrogging’, 
this usually means either shortening the 
transition from the first to the second mode 
considerably, or skipping the first phase 
altogether (Sachs, 2002). Leapfrogging, 
however, will depend entirely on whether 
the capacity for innovation exists within a 
particular developing country and whether, 
in turn, an appropriate set of institutional 
arrangements are in place to provide 
incentives and harness innovations that 
demonstrate economically viable ‘leapfrog’ 
technologies.
The UK Sustainable Development 
Commission (UK-SDC) has produced a 
report entitled Prosperity without Growth: 
the Transition to a Sustainable Economy 
(Jackson, 2009). What Gallopin calls 
‘non-material growth’, the UK-SDC calls 
‘prosperity’ which is when “humans can 
still flourish and yet reduce their material 
impact on the environment”. Once 
prosperity ceases to mean increasing 
consumption of material goods, then the 
focus shifts towards the capabilities that 
citizens will need to “participate 
meaningfully and creatively in the life of 
society”. However, the report dismisses 
relative decoupling on the grounds that 
this simply implies increasing 
consumption in more efficient ways. It 
dismisses absolute decoupling on the 
grounds of lack of evidence that this has 
happened in practice, or that it can 
happen in practice in developed 
economies. Instead, the report turns to an 
updated version of Herman Daly’s classic 
notion of a steady-state economy (or what 
Gallopin calls ‘non-growth economies’), 
coupled to a programme to dismantle the 
insatiable hunger for goods that drives 
contemporary consumer culture. It lacks a 
conception of transition, something that 
the concepts of resource and impact 
decoupling can provide. 
In conclusion, decoupling can lead to a 
rethinking of assumptions about economic 
growth and, by implication, GDP as the key 
indicator of growth. Alternative indicators 
of growth will be required to encourage 
decoupling and dematerialization. An 
example of this is the Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI) (Talberth, 2008; Talberth 
et al., 2007) or a Happiness Index (Stiglitz 
et al., 2009). The GDP indicator on its own 
will always depend on rising quantities of 
extracted resources, especially as they are 
depleted and prices are pushed upwards, 
which, in turn, will accelerate their 
depletion. The GPI puts in place different 
incentives, especially if it can be reinforced 
by a material flow analysis perspective 
(Haberl et al., 2004). However, it would not 
be advisable to eliminate the use of GDP as 
an indicator altogether. It should be 
retained as a good measure of economic 
activity, but not as a good measure of 
human progress and ecological 
sustainability. Other indicators are needed 
to complement the GDP indicator in order 
to generate a more balanced 
understanding of development. The 
Human Development Index is one example. 
The next step is to find an agreed indicator 
of development that reflects progress 
towards more sustainable modes of 
production and consumption by means of 
decoupling. As the China case study in 
Chapter 8 suggests, a Decoupling Index 
might be one element of such an indicator. 
3.2 Innovation and 
decoupling 
The core logic of the argument thus far is 
that a more sustainable global economy will 
depend on the decoupling of growth rates 
from the rates of resource consumption 
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(‘resource decoupling’) and environmental 
degradation (‘impact decoupling’). To bring 
about these changes, radically new visions 
of a future global socio-ecological 
metabolism will be required. To translate 
these visions into practice will require rapid 
improvements in the capacity for instigating 
innovations for more sustainable resource 
use. The second report of the Decoupling 
Working Group will document many of these 
innovations in more detail, but this section 
will outline the rationale for linking 
innovation to sustainability. 
Economists who accept the assumptions of 
endogenous growth theory see knowledge 
and information as the key drivers of 
economic growth, and that the returns on 
investments in knowledge outweigh the 
returns on investments in capital and 
un- and semi-skilled labour. New 
knowledge and information processing 
capacities that get built into production 
processes as technologies, operating 
routines or managerial/organization 
systems at the firm and/or macro-economy 
level are considered innovations. These 
innovations are a function of ‘milieus of 
innovation’ where overlapping networks of 
expertise, knowledge and system design 
mesh together in ways that create 
information-driven growth engines that 
replace the old ‘smokestack’ industrial 
nodes that were the primary drivers of 
economic growth until the 1960s (with 
Silicon Valley being the archetypal model of 
the new approach) (Evans, 2006; for 
overviews see Castells, 1997; Evans, 2005). 
The problem with the national innovations 
systems that have been promoted by many 
governments around the world over the past 
two decades is that they are aimed at 
promoting economic growth with insufficient 
attention paid to the various dimensions of 
decoupling (cleaner production being an 
obvious exception). In other words, 
innovation is not in and of itself a good thing 
from a sustainable resource management 
perspective. A new concept of innovation will 
be required (Montalvo, 2008). 
Eco-innovation is such a new concept. For 
the European Commission, eco-innovation 
is defined as “the production, assimilation 
or exploitation of a product, production 
process, service or management or 
business method that is novel to the 
organisation [sic.] (developing or adopting 
it) and which results, throughout its life 
cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, 
pollution and other negative impacts of 
resources use (including energy use) 
compared to relevant alternatives.” (Kemp 
and Pearson, 2008). Building on this 
definition, eco-innovation is defined by 
OECD (2009) as “the creation or 
implementation of new, or significantly 
improved, products (goods and services), 
processes, marketing methods, 
organizational structures and institutional 
arrangements which – with or without 
intent – lead to environmental 
improvements compared to relevant 
alternatives”. In this definition, eco-
innovation is not limited to 
environmentally-motivated innovations, 
but includes “unintended environmental 
innovations”. The environmental benefits 
of an innovation can be a side effect of 
other goals, such as recycling heavy 
metals in order to reduce abatement 
costs. Institutional innovations such as 
changes in values, beliefs, knowledge, 
norms, and administrative acts are 
included, along with changes in 
management, organization, laws and 
systems of governance that reduce 
environmental impacts. However, eco-
innovation tends to focus on what this 
report has referred to as ‘impact 
decoupling’. Sustainability-oriented 
innovations for resource decoupling is a 
different matter altogether.
Whereas the first generation of innovation 
investments has focused on labour 
productivity through the application of 
knowledge embedded in information 
systems, the second generation will need 
to focus on resource productivity. In 
Figure 3.2, the results of the first generation 
show substantial increases in labour 
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productivity, with materials and energy 
productivity lagging behind. Prices as the 
key driver of first generation innovations are 
reflected in Figure 3.3, showing that labour 
costs have gone up steadily, while materials 
and energy prices remained static or even 
declined (until recently, when many material 
costs increased rapidly).
Figure 3.2. Resource productivity, labour productivity and energy productivity in EU-15
1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Note: Labour productivity in GDP per annual working hours; material productivity in GDP per domestic consumption (DMC) and energy 
productivity in GDP per total primary energy supply (TPES).
Source: EEA, 2011
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Figure 3.3. Price dynamics of wages, materials and electricity
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
Note: All series are in real prices without direct taxes. Wages are based on collectively agreed wages (CAO) in the Netherlands (source CBS). 
Materials are from the CRB Commodity Price Index (CCI) reflecting world-wide prices. Electricity prices are from CBS and Eurostat. Own calculations 
in the wages series and electricity series in order to standardize different series on each other (multiplicative standardization).
Source: De Bruyn et al., 2009
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The key to decoupling in practice will be 
innovations that make it possible to increase 
resource productivity, thereby reducing 
metabolic rates. Increasing resource 
productivity may also justify increasing 
resource prices, benefitting resource 
producers (often in developing countries). 
Innovation for resource productivity, 
therefore, may well define the core 
challenge for sustainable resource 
management for the coming decades. One 
lesson from innovation studies is that state 
intervention is required to sustain high 
levels of consistent investment in innovation, 
because the returns on investment in 
innovation accumulate within the public 
domain, even if these are funded by private 
agents who, therefore, do not always have 
an incentive to invest in innovation, 
especially during recessionary times. 
Four key insights on innovation are relevant 
for sustainable resource management 
(Lundvall, 2007):
• Innovations are different from 
inventions. An invention results from a 
new idea emerging for a new product 
or process, while an innovation is the 
synthesis of the idea with the necessary 
set of financial and institutional 
arrangements to implement the new 
idea on a broader scale; 
• Innovations are not random events, 
but are rather the result of specific 
incentives and investments;
• Innovations do not arise from single 
individuals or single firms, but rather 
from well-networked economic agents 
working collaboratively with knowledge 
institutions (such as universities) and in 
ways that are open, creative, problem-
driven and connected to learning from 
practice; and 
• Innovations are not about building up 
stocks of knowledge capital (patented 
ideas) created for trade in the so-
called ‘knowledge economy’, but rather 
innovations are continuous learning 
processes responsive to the fact that 
in a highly complex globalized world, 
fixed bits of knowledge rapidly become 
obsolete – the modern economy, 
therefore, is a learning economy, not a 
knowledge economy.
Innovation is not simply about 
technological solutions (the so-called 
‘techno-fix’ approach). Rather, innovation 
is a process that has three different forms:
• technological innovations, providing 
specific techniques for managing/
processing materials and energy (e.g. 
the steam engine, hydrogen fuel cell, 
micro-chip, or a process that achieves 
more with less);
• institutional innovations for managing 
on a society-wide basis – or even 
globally – incentives, transaction costs, 
rents, benefit distribution, dispersal, 
contractual obligations, precautions, 
and individual obligations; and 
• relational innovations for managing 
cooperation, social cohesion, solidarity, 
social learning and benefit sharing . 
These three forms of innovation provide 
different outcomes. As Figure 3.4 suggests, 
to achieve the radical break from BAU 
patterns (i.e. Factor 5 to Factor 10 
improvements in resource productivity), all 
three will be required.
Past innovation concerned with economic 
competitiveness and growth has 
contributed to an extraordinary increase in 
production, consumption and economic 
activity and therefore improvements in the 
average human welfare. However, this has 
occurred along an unsustainable 
trajectory. Innovation now needs to be 
harnessed for resource productivity and 
environmental restoration. Merging these 
seemingly disparate themes of 
sustainability and systems of innovation 
offers an opportunity to realize 
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‘sustainable systems of innovation’ 
(Montalvo, 2008), or ‘sustainability-
oriented innovation systems’ (Stamm 
et al., 2009). This requires innovations that 
contribute to decoupling through reducing 
environmental pressure and contributing 
to sustainability during economic activities 
(Stamm et al., 2009; Montalvo, 2008). A 
sustainability-oriented innovation system 
(SOIS) “refers to the transition from one 
socio-technical system to another, 
qualitatively different one” (Geels & Elzen 
in Stamm et al., 2009, p.26). 
Stamm et al (2009) advocate the SOIS 
approach, showing how innovation has been 
linked to sustainability through ‘system 
innovation’ in which socio-technical systems 
provide the lens through which systems 
transitions can be analysed and understood. 
Therefore SOIS provide a departure point for 
decoupling, a reduction of socio-economic 
metabolism and sustainability. 
Geels (2004) extended the narrow focus of 
innovation at the sectoral level to 
encompass a broader perspective of 
technology, including production, 
distribution and use within society. This 
furthers understanding of transitions 
which affect both technology and the 
system in which that technology is 
embedded (Geels, 2004); in these cases 
the system and technology adapt and 
co-evolve as socio-technical systems (von 
Malmborg, 2007). Furthermore, the scope 
provided at the system scale allows for the 
radical innovation (paradigm shift) needed 
to address sustainability challenges 
(Tukker, 2005). However, the ‘radicalness’ 
of innovations is dependent on the actors 
present within the system, the learning 
that occurs, and behavioural changes, 
which are attributed to the process of 
system innovation during which new 
knowledge is learnt and explored, while 
old knowledge undergoes creative 
destruction (von Malmborg, 2007). Figure 
3.5 is an idealized image that 
demonstrates the difference between 
incremental innovations, which have been 
described above as technological 
improvements, and systems innovation. 
Changes at the system level offer the 
most effective way to achieve decoupling 
(Vollenbroek, 2002).
Figure 3.4. Conceptual model of innovations
Source: Weterings et al., 1997
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If growth and development are dependent 
on the capacity for innovation, what are the 
implications for developing countries that 
clearly lag behind developed economies 
when it comes to scientific and 
technological capacity? Many economists 
are pessimistic about the possibility of 
developing countries ‘catching up’, 
precisely because they will never be able to 
bridge the ‘ingenuity gap’ (Homer-Dixon, 
2000). However, developing countries may 
not wish to ‘catch up’ to a level and mode 
of economic development which is now 
regarded as ecologically unsustainable. If 
it is recognized that development is about 
accelerating the spread of sustainable 
economic alternatives, are developing 
countries still at a disadvantage? Following 
Montalvo (2008), developing economies 
actually may have an advantage over 
developed economies concerning eco-
innovations in the following respects: firms 
in developing countries do not always face 
the power of entrenched financial interests 
vested in technological paradigms; new 
technologies in developing countries may 
have more regulatory space to flourish; in 
many developing countries investment in 
fixed infrastructures has only just begun 
which provides space for innovation that 
does not exist in countries where existing 
infrastructures are a sunk cost and difficult 
to change; and markets in developing 
countries may not be saturated or mature 
and can, therefore, be moulded to adapt to 
new kinds of consumer behaviours.
An important question from a decoupling 
point of view is how technological 
leapfrogging can enable developing 
countries to skip some of the dirty stages 
of development experienced by 
industrialized countries (Sauter and 
Watson, 2008). For example, many 
developing countries have partly skipped 
landline phone systems in favour of mobile 
phone systems. A crucial condition for 
leapfrogging is that a nation possesses a 
sufficient level of absorptive capacity (that 
is, the ability to adopt new technologies). 
This capacity includes technological 
capabilities, knowledge and skills as well 
as supportive institutions. A strong role for 
government may be needed. For example 
“leapfrogging in the Korean steel and 
automobile industries was enabled by 
x
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Figure 3.5. System innovation 
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Source: Vollenbroek, 2002
Improvement in eco-efficiency 
Factor
X –
197 20 020 0
4 –
2 –
System innovation
Presenta
Transition
Existing technologies
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
40
investments in technological capabilities 
in the countries concerned. This was 
enhanced by a balanced and coherent 
policy mix of economic, industrial and 
R&D policies” (Sauter and Watson, 2008, 
p.2). The success of the Indian and 
Chinese wind industries owed a great deal 
to the benefits of incentives for the 
deployment of wind technology. In these 
countries, international market creation 
was allied with the development of 
domestic wind manufacturing industries. 
This, in turn, was enabled by access to 
external knowledge and the creation of 
knowledge networks.1 This last case 
reflects only a partial leapfrogging, as the 
majority of the power generation 
investments are still in coal technology in 
these countries.
The difficulties with leapfrogging may be 
generally underestimated. “To begin with it 
is far from clear that the evidence of the 
first-tier Asian newly industrializing 
countries can be replicated in developing 
countries today. For one thing, the 
1 Based on http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/
DFIDLeapfroggingReportWeb.pdf
Summary of a theory of socio-technical transition to sustainable development
A multi-level-perspective (MLP) provides a framework for “...understanding sustainability transitions that provide an 
overall view of the multi-dimensional complexity of changes in socio-technical systems” (Geels, 2010, p.495). The MLP is a 
three-tiered framework which consists of the landscape (macro), regime (meso) and niche (micro) levels. 
The socio-technical landscape, or macro level, is considered as an external factor and it provides the greater structure 
for activities in a system. As it is external, it is out of the control of actors within the system and thus cannot be changed 
according to preference and is in relatively stable condition, adapting slowly according to indirect adjustments at a lower 
level. But the landscape by nature is unpredictable, responding to variations in macro-economic, environmental and social 
conditions (Tukker, 2005). 
At the micro level are socio-technical niches, isolated protected pockets where creation, development and testing of 
radical novelties and innovations take place. These novelties are learning experiments that respond to changes or demands 
at both the meso and macro levels; while the isolation provides a mechanism for protection against other market products, 
niches are the starting points for change (Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007). Furthermore, niche innovations usually occur 
within a small network of actors who provide the financial and technical support for their realization. 
The meso level, or socio-technical regime, represents the existing configuration of institutions, rules, culture and 
techniques, forming the set of practices, exhibiting dynamic stability carried out by social groups (Geels, 2002). 
This stability is reinforced by the consistent reference to a particular regime – whether it is science, technology, economics, 
politics or culture – identified according to its function, which hampers the introduction of niche innovations. Geels and 
Schot (2007) argue that the meso level is deeply embedded within the ‘cognitive routines’ of engineers, policy makers, the 
private sector and even academic institutions, consequently inhibiting the entry of radical innovations onto the market. 
Through the interaction of its three embedded interconnected and interdependent components, the MLP allows for the 
emergence of socio-technical transitions. Changes at the macro and micro levels exert pressure on the socio-technical 
regime, which can lead to a transition. At the micro level, small networks developing radical innovations exert upward 
pressure through a build up of internal momentum which weakens the barrier of the regime level; eventually ‘breaking 
through’ when sufficient and simultaneous pressure has been exerted from the macro level. This breakthrough or ‘window 
of opportunity’ is created via the mutual tension from the macro and micro levels which destabilize the particular socio-
technical regime, allowing competition between new and existing regimes, be it technological, cultural, political, economic 
or scientific. These changes have the capacity to influence or change the landscape level, while the landscape and regime 
levels directly affect or influence the niche innovation level. While numerous radical innovations are necessary to resolve 
the ecological crisis, technological transitions occur via step by step processes as opposed to radical regime changes. 
Various niche innovations, when connected, can thereby accrue to a system transition. 
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development success of the first generation 
of Asian tigers was predicated on a number 
of country-specific characteristics 
(competent, goal-directed and insulated 
bureaucracies, etc.) not found in many other 
parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. For 
another, many of the state interventions 
(trade protection, subsidies, procurement, 
etc.) that were used to promote local 
industrial development in the past are no 
longer available to developing countries 
under today’s international trade and 
investment rules” (Perkins, 2003, p.181)
For leapfrogging, Perkins suggests: 
• Clearer and more specific definition of 
what it is to be ‘leapfrogged’;
• Targeting priority sectors for 
investment;
• Supporting the development of 
leapfrogging capabilities and 
technologies; and
• Promoting cooperative partnerships 
between key actors.
In conclusion, over the past two decades 
much has been learned about the 
dynamics of the innovation process. 
Investments in innovations, however, have 
been motivated primarily by the desire to 
accelerate growth, with little attention paid 
to various dimensions of decoupling 
(although impact decoupling has received a 
lot more attention than resource 
decoupling). The challenge is to apply the 
insights about innovation to resource 
productivity. Sustainability-oriented 
innovations hold the key to decoupling as a 
practical framework for action. In this 
regard, developing countries may enjoy a 
strategic advantage because they do not 
face the same market and institutional 
rigidities that stem from a dependence on 
technological and physical infrastructures 
that are rapidly becoming obsolete as more 
ecological thresholds are breached. 
3.3 Cities as spaces 
for innovation and 
decoupling
Cities have historically been centres of 
political, economic, cultural and 
informational power. As of 2007, over 50% 
of people live in cities (United Nations, 
2006); yet cities occupy only 2% of land 
surface. Nevertheless they consume three 
quarters of all natural resources and in 
2006 accounted for 71% of the world’s 
energy-related CO2, with transport, 
industry and building sectors being the 
largest contributors. This share will rise to 
about 76% by 2030 as urbanization 
continues (IEA, 2008).2
As the world’s population grows from the 
current 6.8 billion people (2010 estimate) to 
8 billion by 2030, and perhaps at least 9 
billion by 2050 (United Nations, 2004b), 
cities will most likely become the home for 
the additional 2 to 3 billion people of the 
future world population. This is driving 
what is called the ‘second urbanization 
wave’. Whereas the ‘first urbanization 
wave’ from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s 
involved the urbanization of only about 400 
million people mainly in Europe and North 
America, the next 2 billion people who will 
be living on Earth are most likely to be 
living in Asian and African cities (United 
Nations, 2006). However, the bulk of this 
expansion will be in secondary and tertiary 
cities, not the existing sprawling mega-
cities like Cairo, Calcutta, Mumbai, 
Shanghai, San Paulo, Seoul, Dhaka, 
Karachi, Buenos Aires and Manila 
(National Research Council, 2003). It has 
been projected that by 2015 nearly 60% of 
the total urban population will be living in 
cities of less than a million people. 
The global networks of primary and 
secondary cities have become the locales of 
massive population concentrations due to 
factors such as globalization, resource 
efficiency, improved infrastructure, 
economic opportunities, and the information 
2 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008): World Energy Outlook 2008
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and communication technology (ICT) 
revolution. The global economy is now 
organized into intensely concentrated 
clusters of economic activities that are 
dispersed across a networked set of cities 
across the globe, each of which has a place 
in the new international division of labour 
created by globalization. Computerization 
made it possible to set up the coordination 
and logistical systems for these globally 
networked activities, attracting millions for 
jobs, education, shelter, protection, cultural 
assimilation, and access to information. 
Unsurprisingly, levels of urbanization 
correlate with rising levels of GDP per capita 
(Figure 3.6). Inequality, however, is pervasive 
– 1 in 3 urban dwellers in the world today 
live in slums (United Nations Centre for 
Human Settlements, 2003).
The ‘second urbanization wave’ in the 
developing world plus the rise since the 
1980s within developed country cities of the 
property development industry as a key 
driver of growth (as cheap credit was used 
to fuel consumption of imported goods 
securitized against property), helps explain 
why the extraction of industrial and 
Figure 3.6. The relation between urbanization level (%) and Gross National Income (GNI)
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construction minerals increased by 40% 
(Behrens et al., 2007). The construction 
industry worldwide is a US$4.2+ trillion 
global industry, is responsible for 10% of 
global GDP, employs over 100 million 
people, and consumes around 50% of 
resources, 45% of global energy (5% during 
construction), 40% of water and 70% of all 
timber products (Van Wyk, 2007). 
Just as countries have metabolic rates, so 
do cities. Cities usually have a lower 
metabolic rate than the countryside, as 
they rely upon peripheral areas for highly 
energy- and materially-intensive services 
such as raw material extraction. As a 
general rule, as the GDP per capita 
increases, the metabolic rate of the city 
increases. At the same time, cities 
concentrate large numbers of people into 
small places, and they also concentrate the 
knowledge, financial, social and 
institutional resources required for 
sustainability-oriented innovations. This 
captures the dilemma of cities for 
sustainability: they drive the global 
unsustainable use of resources, but they 
are also where the greatest potential exists 
for sustainability-oriented innovations. 
Judging from a review of the literature, 
daily reports from cities around the world 
and the proliferation of websites about 
sustainable cities and neighbourhoods, 
urban infrastructure could become one of 
the primary focuses of sustainability-
oriented innovations around the world, in 
particular where energy use, mobility and 
the water cycle (sources, uses and reuses) 
are concerned. A new academic literature 
is emerging that addresses urban 
infrastructure from a sustainability 
perspective by examining the metabolic 
flows that are conditioned by the wide 
range of extremely complex ‘socio-
technical’ and ‘socio-ecological’ networks 
that mediate these flows (Guy et al., 2001; 
Graham & Marvin, 2001; Heynen et al., 
2006; Pieterse, 2008). Low carbon and 
even zero-carbon sustainable cities are 
being planned, for example the Zero 
Emission City planned in Boughzoul, 
Algeria or in Dongtan on Chongming 
Island off Shanghai, Masdar in Abu Dhabi, 
Songdo in South Korea and Treasure 
Island in San Francisco Bay. While these 
are capital-intensive, they may be 
pioneers for future decoupling. 
It has been estimated that the urban 
infrastructure of the world’s cities over the 
next 20 years will require US$41 trillion for 
investments in urban infrastructure, 
including US$22.6 trillion on water and 
sanitation, US$9 trillion on energy, US$7.8 
trillion on road and rail services, and 
US$1.6 trillion on air/sea ports. This 
represents an opportunity for sustainability 
as “...cities that ignore environmental 
impact will themselves face another 
collapse of infrastructure 30 or 40 years 
from now ...” (Doshi et al., 2007). 
Worldwide networks of cities focus attention 
on the need for local authorities to find ways 
of reducing their metabolic rates. Prominent 
examples of international local government 
associations include ICLEI – Local 
Governments for Sustainability and United 
Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) with 
member cities from across the globe. In 
addition, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
Group, which lists 45 major cities as 
affiliates, including 22 from developing 
countries, builds local government 
coalitions to fight climate change. Building 
on the privatized urban infrastructures that 
have been built up over the past 25 years, 
the global league of Large Cities envisages 
investments in new forms of urbanism that 
will differ radically from the past, including 
sustainable transportation, reduced 
dependence on fossil fuels, increased 
dependence on locally grown food and 
localized supply of (recycled) water, compact 
urban form and much higher densities, 
integrated living and working 
neighbourhoods, zero waste systems, 
cleaner production, and responsible 
ecologically sustainable consumption.
In conclusion, innovations for more 
sustainable use of resources are already 
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underway in the world’s cities. It may be 
time to transform the concept of decoupling 
into an operational tool that will help cities 
to determine their metabolic rates and the 
potential of different interventions to reduce 
these rates over time. 
3.4 Experiences and lessons 
from the country case 
studies 
This section draws lessons from the case 
studies contained in Chapters 6 to 9 of this 
report. These case studies of China, 
Germany, Japan and South Africa were 
written by Panel members (or by a team 
commissioned by a Panel member) during 
the course of 2008. Political conditions 
have since moved on in each country but 
the overall policy trend toward decoupling 
has not shifted fundamentally. The 
selection of cases was based on their 
approaches to decoupling and was not 
intended to be representative of the 
diverse global contexts, lacking, for 
example, a study of a large low-density 
developed economy (e.g. USA or Australia) 
or of a large low-density developing 
economy such as Brazil. Nevertheless, the 
four case studies demonstrate at country 
level emerging responses to resource 
depletion and environmental impacts. This 
suggests that more detailed and thorough 
country case studies that are 
representative of the different global 
contexts could be a useful topic for future 
research. 
The case studies reveal that governments 
in these countries are responding to the 
threat of rising prices of resources that are 
at least partly caused by resource 
depletion. Although none of the countries 
have fully-fledged integrated policy 
frameworks for achieving comprehensive 
resource and impact decoupling, significant 
empirical trends and the key elements for 
comprehensive policies that could result in 
more sustainable use of resources are in 
many ways already in place across these 
very diverse contexts. Three themes were 
used to structure the case studies:
• whether rising prices of resources 
have been recognized either directly or 
indirectly;
• how policy responses to both resource 
depletion and negative environmental 
impacts have evolved over time; and
• what evidence indicates concerns for 
resource and impact decoupling, both 
empirically and at the level of policy 
intent.
Germany and Japan are advanced high-
density industrial economies that are 
dependent on external sources of materials 
and markets for their products. China is a 
large rapidly-industrializing high-density 
developing economy that is both a massive 
resource importer and goods exporter as it 
has evolved into the world’s manufacturer. 
South Africa is a small fairly low-density 
industrializing developing economy that is 
heavily dependent on exports of primary 
resources. 
The case studies indicate that the rising 
economic and environmental costs of 
resource depletion and negative 
environmental impacts have affected the 
economic growth and development 
trajectories of these countries. 
Significantly, all four countries have 
responded by adopting policies (of varying 
degrees of efficacy) that commit the 
respective governments and industry 
players to some form of resource use 
reduction and impact decoupling. The 
language of resource efficiency, resource 
productivity, dematerialization, and 
material flows has clearly entered 
mainstream policy language in these 
countries, and most likely many others, in 
ways that reflect a very diverse 
understanding of what decoupling means 
in practice. These ideas are evolving in 
nationally-specific ways that make cross-
country comparisons difficult. 
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3.4.1 Recognizing resource 
depletion and negative 
impacts
All four countries have been responding to 
the particular manifestations of resource 
depletion – in the case of Japan and 
Germany, the 1970s oil shocks were clearly 
important triggers of policy and scientific 
trends that culminated in more mature 
perspectives by the late 1990s. Although 
policy responses in these initial decades 
were to negative environmental impacts, 
the brief concern after 1973 with oil prices 
and security of supply did trigger 
responses that were concerned with 
resource inputs into the economy. Only 
after the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
did China and South Africa start taking 
resource depletion more seriously (at least 
at the policy level).
In the case of Germany, policy changes 
that can be traced back to the late 1970s 
culminated in the adoption of the National 
Strategy for Sustainable Development 
(NSSD) in 2002. Its aim was to promote the 
doubling of ‘resource productivity’ by 2010. 
Although policies in the 1970s and 1980s 
focused on the environmental impacts of 
industrial growth, in particular on air, 
water and soil, by the late 1990s the focus 
was on resource productivity. Germany has 
clearly understood that resource 
productivity makes economic sense, and it 
provides the strategic framework for 
investments in technological innovation 
and capacity that could reposition Germany 
within a global economy facing resource 
depletion. For example, DESERTEC, a 
project driven by a group of German 
technology companies, is a massive solar 
power plant planned for the Sahara Desert 
to supply Europe with green energy. 
South Africa’s Constitution carries the 
injunction that the state must ensure “…
ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social 
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development” (Section 24 (b)). This 
provided the basis for decisions in 2008 by 
the government to adopt two key policy 
documents: the National Framework for 
Sustainable Development which calls 
specifically for ‘resource and impact 
decoupling’; and the Long-Term Mitigation 
Scenario (LTMS) which envisages GHG 
emissions cuts of 30–40% by 2050. These 
can be seen as a direct response to a long 
history of highly unsustainable resource 
use. But reversing this dependence on the 
so-called ‘mineral-energy complex’ will not 
be easy. Since the birth of democracy in 
1994, South Africa has been a resource-
rich resource-exporting developing country 
economy that is heavily dependent on its 
vast supply of cheap coal; earns the bulk of 
its external revenues from primary 
resource exports (often at prices below the 
real cost of natural capital); suffered the 
decline of manufacturing as it liberalized 
its capital markets and reduced tariff 
barriers; pursued growth by stimulating 
consumer demand (for an increasing 
number of imported products) with easy 
credit; and then suffered the consequences 
when commodity prices collapsed when 
the financial crisis hit in 2007/2008. 
However, the domestic economy became 
marginally more resource productive over 
the past two decades, showing some 
resource decoupling. Only since 2007 has 
the government begun to realize that due 
to abundant cheap coal, the carbon 
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) of 
South Africa’s economy is the highest in 
the world (0.99) and its emissions per 
capita are 9.8 tons, double the world 
average and similar to developed high 
density countries like the UK and Germany. 
In 2003 China adopted a Scientific Outlook 
of Development as its primary philosophy 
and guiding principle of development and 
in 2007 committed itself to the building of 
an ‘ecological civilization’. This over-
arching political vision informed the 
detailed commitments to mandatory 
targets such as energy conservation, 
pollution abatement and the ‘circular 
economy’ in the 11th Five Year Plan. This 
was in direct response to China’s 
increasing concerns about the 
consequences of rapid industrialization 
and urbanization in a country with a weak 
natural resource base and increasingly 
polluted and degraded ecosystems. 
Calculated in contemporary prices and 
current exchange rates,3 over the 30 years 
from 1978 to 2008, China’s GDP expanded 
by an annual average of 9.8% to 
US$4.4 trillion. This growth has been 
non-linear and features an accelerated 
rate of growth in later years accompanied 
by massive emissions of pollutants. 
According to some calculations (which 
China questions), China is now the world’s 
largest CO2 emitter (although still one of 
the lowest when measured in terms of CO2 
per capita). It may also top the world in 
SO2 emissions and chemical oxygen 
demand (COD) discharge. COD discharge 
in China has exceeded the environmental 
bearing capacity by 80% and the picture of 
SO2 emission is similarly grave. On the 
resource input side, what Chinese 
researchers refer to as the ‘resource 
intensity4 per unit of GDP’ is about 90% 
higher than the world average, while 
energy efficiency is 10% below that of the 
developed world. The Chinese government 
acknowledges that the environmental 
costs of economic growth have been 
excessive. 
China has become a net exporter of energy 
(energy expended in producing a processed 
commodity). The China Council for 
International Cooperation on Environment 
and Development (CCICED) estimated that, 
from 2002 to 2006, China’s net export of 
embodied energy jumped from 240 million 
tons (240 Mt) of standard coal equivalent 
(TCE) to 630 million tons (630 Mt), and the 
proportion of exported embodied energy in 
China’s overall primary energy 
consumption increased from 16% to 26%.
3 US$1 against RMB 6.8337 in February 2009.
4 Including freshwater, primary energy, steel, cement and common 
non-ferrous metals.
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Japan has explicitly recognized the need 
for system changes that respond to rising 
costs that are derived directly and indirectly 
from resource depletion. In response to the 
1998 annual Quality of the Environment 
report, which was the clearest statement of 
the resource risks Japan faced by then, 
Japan adopted its Sound Material Cycle 
Society policy framework. The Japanese 
economy is highly dependent on imports of 
natural resources, such as energy, food 
and other raw materials. This geopolitical 
fact means that its use of primary 
materials is to a large extent separated 
from the environmental impacts at the 
point of their extraction. Yet Japan is facing 
serious problems associated with its 
increasing volume of solid wastes, such as 
shortage of disposal sites, risk of 
environmental pollution by waste treatment 
facilities, illegal dumping, and rising costs 
of waste. In addition to the challenge of 
waste disposal, the 1973 and 1979 oil 
shocks triggered changes that resulted in 
significant levels of decoupling between 
energy consumption and economic 
production by manufacturing industries 
during the late 1970s to early 1980s. While 
oil dependency of national primary energy 
supply has decreased gradually to less 
than 50%, it is still higher than other 
developed economies.
In short, the governments of all four 
countries have experienced the long-term 
consequences of resource depletion and 
negative environmental impacts, and 
responded by adopting policies that include 
decoupling. 
3.4.2 Policy responses
In crude terms, policy making with respect 
to resource use and environmental impacts 
over the past four decades has gradually 
shifted from a ‘command-and-control’ 
focus on negative environmental impacts 
(especially pollution) to responses to 
resource depletion challenges that use 
economic instruments. This has taken 
place against a background of rapid global 
growth as economic globalization 
facilitated the relocation of key 
manufacturing sectors from developed to 
developing countries. The resultant 
increase in material flows from 40 to 55 
billion tons (40–55 Gt) per year over the two 
decades starting in 1980 explains in part 
why resource depletion issues have 
become a concern of policymakers at 
national government level. 
The German NSSD comprises strategic, 
mostly quantitative, trend objectives and a 
set of 21 indicators grouped under different 
headings. Indicator 1 (‘resource 
conservation’) is the most important one 
for the purposes of this Report, as it 
includes sub-indicators 1a ‘energy 
productivity’ and 1b ‘resource productivity’. 
The NSSD goal is to double both energy 
productivity (base year 1990) and resource 
productivity (base year 1994) by 2020. 
These goals were affirmed by the 
government after 2005 and can now be 
considered as the cornerstone of the 
government’s position on resource use. 
With the Integrated Energy and Climate 
Programme (IECP, 2007/2008) the German 
government reinforced the NSSD by 
adopting two dozen policies and measures 
whose collective aim by 2020 is to raise the 
share of renewables as a percentage of 
total supply of electricity to 30%, for heat to 
14%, the share of Combined Heat Power 
(CHP) for electricity to 25% and to save 
energy in all sectors via substantial energy 
efficiency interventions. With the help of 
the IECP and additional measures it is 
expected to reach at least a 30% CO2-
reduction by 2020. 
South Africa’s key macro-economic policy 
frameworks (Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa and 
National Industrial Policy Framework) do 
not recognize resource constraints as an 
economic factor, although the South 
African scientific community has reached 
almost complete consensus that resource 
depletion is an urgent priority when it 
comes to water and soil, while relative 
decoupling is needed with respect to 
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energy and a wide range of environmental 
impacts. The views of the scientific 
community were reflected in the 2008 
National Framework for Sustainable 
Development (NFSD), the first official policy 
since democracy was introduced that 
argued for ‘dematerialization’ and the 
‘decoupling’ of rates of resource use from 
economic growth rates. The NFSD 
proposed five strategies: enhancing 
systems for integrated planning and 
implementation; sustaining ecosystems 
and using resources sustainably; investing 
in sustainable economic development and 
infrastructure; creating sustainable human 
settlements; and responding appropriately 
to emerging human development, 
economic and environmental challenges. 
During the course of 2010, the NFSD was 
transformed into a more comprehensive 
National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development.
Support for this strategic perspective has 
come primarily from the National Treasury 
and the Minister of Finance who has 
recognized that South Africa must keep up 
with global trends. In April 2006 the 
National Treasury circulated for comment 
its Framework for Considering Market-
Based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South 
Africa. As the title implies, this report 
recommends using economic rather than 
command-and-control instruments, 
including a gradualist approach of small 
steadily-rising taxes on a wide range of 
what it called ‘environmental bads’. 
However, it is probably fair to say that 
compared to the other three countries 
studied, South Africa has the least 
developed policy and regulatory framework 
for linking economic policy to resource 
reduction and mitigation of negative 
environmental impacts. 
Since the adoption of its Scientific Outlook 
of Development in 2003, the Chinese 
government has fundamentally altered its 
development philosophy, resulting in the 
move towards building an ‘ecological 
civilization’. This approach made resource 
and environmental concerns top policy 
priorities. The 11th Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development (2006–
2010) marked a key turning point for the 
process of reconciling rapid 
industrialization with the ambition to build 
an ecological civilization. The plan sets 22 
quantitative indicators of which eight are 
mandatory targets, five of them related to 
environment and resources. The most 
challenging targets are a 20% reduction of 
GDP energy intensity and a 10% drop of SO2 
emission and COD discharge by 2010 (from 
2005 levels). To ensure achievement of 
these targets, the State Council of China 
established the Leading Group on Energy 
Conservation and Pollution Reduction as 
well as Climate Change, headed by 
Premier Wen Jiabao, and issued the Action 
Plan for Energy Conservation and Pollution 
Reduction. An intensive programme was 
launched across the country, and 
significant progress has been made. 
Since 2006, China has run nationwide 
mandatory energy saving and pollution 
reduction programmes to address what 
Chinese researchers refer to as ‘low 
resource efficiency’ and ‘high pollution 
levels’. The so-called ‘circular economy’ 
strategies were implemented to address 
the linear process from primary resources 
to products and further to post-
consumption wastes. In addition to the key 
‘circular economy’ policies such as the Law 
on Circular Economy Promotion, other 
measures included the Law on Cleaner 
Production Promotion, management and 
taxation policies for comprehensive 
utilization of wastes and used resources; 
Assessment Standards to evaluate eco-
industrial parks and set out codes for their 
establishment; green procurement by 
governmental agencies and public 
institutions; and investment policies for 
piloting the circular economy, including a 
special fund to support pilot projects. 
In responding to climate change, the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change 
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was introduced in 2007 and a target of 
reducing 40–45% in CO2 emission per unit 
of GDP by 2020 against 2005 levels was set 
by the Chinese Government in 2009. In the 
process of coping with the global financial 
crisis, initiatives to implement the green 
economy and low carbon economy 
approaches have been emerging nationwide. 
China is, in many ways, the test case for 
the global economy. Because of China’s 
dominant economic position, and because 
it wants to continue its rapid economic 
growth but use resources more 
sustainably, the measures that China 
introduces to reconcile these objectives will 
be of crucial significance for every other 
developing country with similar policy 
intentions. 
In 2007 the Japanese government adopted 
a policy that committed Japan to becoming 
a ‘Sustainable Society’.5 It proposes to build 
a Sustainable Society through 
comprehensive measures integrating the 
three aspects of such a society, specifically, 
a Low Carbon Society, a Sound Material-
Cycle Society and a Society in Harmony 
with Nature. This decision both 
consolidates a long period of sectoral 
policy development, and sets the stage for 
integrated planning in the future. The 
foundations were laid when the Basic 
Environment Law was adopted in 1993 
followed by adoption of the Basic 
Environment Plan in December 1994. The 
Sound Material Cycle Society (SMC) 
concept is central to the Japanese 
approach and is firmly rooted in 3R 
principles.6 As a result, material flow 
accounts (MFA) have become an integral 
feature of Japanese environmental policy, 
identifying the whole system of material 
flows in the national economy and providing 
itemized overviews for such flows. 
A Fundamental Law for Establishing a 
Sound Material Cycle Society has been in 
5 See www.env.go.jp/en/focus/070606.html
6  Reduce, reuse and recyle.
place since 2000. The 1st Fundamental Plan 
for Establishing a Sound Material Cycle 
Society was adopted by the cabinet in 2003, 
and a revised 2nd Plan was adopted in 2008. 
These legal instruments provide the 
fundamental framework to integrate 
environmentally sound management of 
wastes and efficient use of natural 
resources into Japan’s mainstream 
economic processes. 
Much can be learned from what Japan has 
achieved because these instruments are 
probably the most advanced examples of 
measures aimed at increasing resource 
productivity and minimizing negative 
environmental impacts in practice.
As can be seen from this review, 
decoupling economic growth from 
negative environmental impacts and 
promoting resource productivity have 
found a place in the policy agenda of all 
four countries. They have adopted policies 
that call for the integration of economic 
and sustainable development policies. 
Although much more difficult to achieve in 
practice, the fact that consensus has been 
reached on what is needed is of great 
significance. All four are members of the 
G-20, thus suggesting that the G-20 
statement below was more than just 
another global statement of good intent, 
but was rooted in the evolution of policy 
thinking at national government level:
“We will make the transition towards 
clean, innovative, resource efficient, low 
carbon technologies and infrastructure.” 
Statement of the G-20, London,
2 April 2009
To ensure the diffusion of learning, it will 
be essential to monitor these policy 
frameworks, how they are implemented, 
and their outcomes and impacts. 
3.4.3 Decoupling
Although decoupling as defined in this 
Report is a long-term process of macro-
structural transformation to build 
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sustainable socioecological systems, the 
trends at country level that emerge from 
the case studies confirm that relative 
decoupling with respect to resource use is 
already underway in developed economies. 
Resource use reductions will be much 
more difficult but are, ultimately, what 
really is needed most. However, the key 
factor that will determine whether this 
happens will be the degree of investment in 
innovations for more sustainable use of 
resources. A key driver here will be 
whether prices of critical resources rise in 
response to resource depletion. 
Empirical evidence from the German 
context suggests that between 1994 and 
2007 a seemingly impressive level of 
resource decoupling7 occurred in Germany. 
While resource productivity (raw material) 
rose by 35.4% and GDP by 22.3%, raw 
material input decreased by 9.7%. 
However, these figures do not include 
biotic resource flows (that may increasingly 
7 This includes all used abiotic raw material extracted in Germany as 
well as imported abiotic materials.
replace abiotic resources such as fossil 
fuels), domestic unused primary material 
extraction, and the various environmental 
impacts embodied in imported materials 
and goods. If these are factored in, 
Germany’s achievements might be 
somewhat less impressive. 
A macroeconomic analysis for German 
industry demonstrates that even if only half 
of the existing ‘resource efficiency’ targets 
were realized, there would still be an 
increase in gross national product, creation 
of new business areas and growth in 
employment levels. These macroeconomic 
effects seem to justify a long-term 
modernization and innovation policy for 
increasing resource productivity as a way to 
boost growth and employment.
The Wuppertal Institute has also proposed 
an Innovation Programme for Resource 
Efficiency to form part of a comprehensive 
German effort to mitigate the economic 
crisis.8 By scaling up existing experiences 
8 See Hennicke & Kristof, 2008.
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(see detailed case study in Chapter 6) with a 
total amount of €10 billion from the federal 
budget for the small and medium enterprise 
(SME) sector, its aim would be to foster 
‘ecological modernization’ by creating new 
employment and business fields for 
GreenTech. It would be operated by a lean 
federal Resource Agency together with a 
network of regional and local partners. 
Support for SMEs would comprise a mixture 
of impulse and in-depth audits combined 
with investment subsidies.
To understand decoupling trends, a 
Decoupling Index (DI) is used in the China 
case study. Primary energy consumption 
appears to have become more efficient 
since 1992, providing evidence of relative 
resource decoupling. In most of the past 
10 years, China achieved decoupling 
between rates of increase in freshwater 
consumption and economic growth rates; 
during 1998–2007, total freshwater 
consumption varied within a small range 
between 290.1 and 306.2 billion m3 while 
GNP nearly doubled. But in terms of 
mineral consumption China still faces huge 
challenges. For instance, the country’s 
steel consumption jumped nearly tenfold 
from 53 million tons (53 Mt) in 1990 to 
520 million tons (520 Mt) in 2007, and steel 
consumption per unit of GDP increased at 
a rate higher than GDP growth.
On the environmental impact side, the 
emission/discharge of many pollutants 
began to decouple from economic growth 
in the early 1990s. Since 1992, industrial 
wastewater discharge and solid waste 
discharge have decoupled in many years, 
with the DI of solid waste falling below –1 
several times. Progress in this area owes 
much to the improved recycling rate and 
proper disposal of industrial solid waste. 
Following adoption of its 11th Five-Year 
Plan, the Chinese government has pursued 
a three-pronged strategy to raise energy 
efficiency and reduce pollution: industrial 
restructuring to reduce dependence on 
resource-intensive polluting industries; 
energy conservation programmes and 
construction of pollution treatment 
facilities; and strengthened environmental 
management. By the end of 2009, the GDP 
energy intensity had reduced by 15.6%, and 
SO2 emissions and COD discharge dropped 
by 13.14% and 9.66% respectively against 
2005 levels, suggesting that China may be 
able to achieve its mandatory targets for 
energy conservation and pollution 
abatement that were set in the 11th Five-
Year Period by 2010/2011. However, 
whether these measures and 
achievements sufficiently succeed in 
countering the impact of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization remains 
to be seen. 
Japan’s fundamental plan for a Sustainable 
Material Cycle Society (SMC) sets a 
national target of resource productivity and 
binds the government itself to achieve it, 
but the plan does not set binding targets 
for industries. Nevertheless, voluntary 
efforts have been made to incorporate the 
‘Factor X’ concept into businesses. For 
example, as many as eight Japanese 
leading electronics companies (Fujitsu, 
Hitachi, Panasonic, Mitsubishi, NEC, Sanyo, 
Sharp and Toshiba) are collaborating to 
develop the guidance system for the 
Common Factor X approach.
In many countries, the energy efficiency of 
electrical appliances is enhanced by 
Minimum Efficiency Performance 
Standards (MEPS). Japan followed a 
different strategy. Instead of setting a 
minimum efficiency standard, its Top 
Runner Programme searches for the most 
efficient model on the market and then 
stipulates that the efficiency of this top 
runner model should become the standard 
within a certain number of years. The Top 
Runner Programme applies to machinery 
and equipment in the residential, 
commercial, and transportation sectors, 
setting targets by product category.
The Fundamental Plan for Establishing 
SMC Society adopted a resource 
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productivity indicator that is simple and 
easily understood, i.e. GDP divided by DMI 
(total weight of direct inputs of resources). 
Since the adoption of the 1st Fundamental 
Plan in 2003, performance has been 
reviewed annually by the Central 
Environmental Council of Japan.
As far as South Africa is concerned, some 
evidence suggests that the domestic 
economy is becoming more resource 
efficient. The growth rate of domestic 
extraction used within the domestic 
economy has decoupled from the 
economic growth rate, but this ignores the 
increased dependence on exported 
primary products. Policies call for 
dematerialization and decoupling with 
respect to resource intensity, and for 
emissions cuts with respect to negative 
environmental impacts. Various sectoral 
responses to biodiversity degradation, 
depletion of fisheries, pollution of water 
resources, air pollution and excessive 
solid waste disposal are evident. However, 
South Africa has no integrated material 
flow analysis, nor a set of indicators for 
measuring future progress. To this extent 
South Africa lags far behind the other 
three countries. Over the past two years 
the focus of discussion has been on 
energy and water decoupling. South 
Africa’s bulk energy demand has caught 
up with supply, and the traditional solution 
of building more coal-fired power stations 
contradicts the Long-Term Mitigation 
Scenario (which is South Africa’s strategy 
for building a low-carbon economy). This 
has forced policymakers to focus on 
energy efficiency and renewable energy 
solutions. The same applies to water: 
South Africa is a water-scarce country and 
the scientific community and policymakers 
agree that no more water is available to be 
allocated for future development, leaving 
water efficiency and reuse as the only 
solution. One potential new water source 
is desalination of seawater, but this is 
sustainable only if it can be powered by 
renewable energy. Like many other 
developing countries, South Africa needs 
to introduce a capacity for material flow 
analysis linked to a set of indicators for 
evaluating future progress.! 
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4.1 Trade and the 
distribution of resources 
and environmental 
burdens 
Global trade of the resources being 
assessed here is a complicated process, 
with different influences at the various 
stages of the life cycle (described in 
Chapter 1, section 1.1.), from initial 
extraction of a resource to the ultimate 
disposal of the commodity produced from 
the resource (though many products 
contain large numbers of material 
resources, each of which may have come 
from a different part of the globe). Different 
actors, often from distant countries, may 
play a key role at the various stages, 
making it challenging to determine where 
responsibility for decoupling should be 
assigned. Further complicating the 
challenge, different policies may be 
required at different stages of the life cycle. 
Ideally, every stage of the life cycle should 
be accompanied by appropriate policies 
promoting decoupling, though this ideal 
remains far in the future. This section will 
assess some of the current challenges.
Globally, the geographic distribution of 
resource extraction does not necessarily 
correspond to the geographic distribution 
of manufacturing processes and 
consumption, and to the environmental 
impacts coupled to these parts of the life 
cycle. The largest material flows occur at 
the point of extraction, and there they add 
most to the indicator of resource use. Once 
the raw materials have been extracted and 
become subject to trading, they have 
already left some of their original volume 
behind as wastes and emissions. Generally 
speaking, in the chain from extraction to 
manufacture to sale for consumption, each 
commodity gains economic value as it has 
embodied ever more labour and 
intellectual capital over the value chain, but 
at the same time loses physical weight as it 
travels. This creates a major problem for 
objective international comparisons of 
resource productivity and decoupling, 
because the benefits of international trade 
shift burdens in ways that often are difficult 
to unravel. The decoupling elements of 
‘greening of global trade’ warrant further 
investigation.1 
4.1.1 The dynamics of global trade 
in economic (monetary) and 
physical terms
Over the past few decades, international 
trade has increased dramatically. Between 
1970 and 2006, worldwide trade volumes in 
monetary units (real terms) grew by an 
average of 7.2% each year. Compared with 
1970, in 2006 the value of trade was almost 
a factor of 10 higher for manufactured 
products, 2.3 times higher for fuels and 
mining products, and more than 3 times 
higher for agricultural products (WTO, 2008). 
Growing trade in monetary terms reflects 
an increase in physical trade flows, albeit 
somewhat dampened. In 1970, around 
5.4 billion tons (5.4 Gt) were internationally 
traded, increasing to 19 billion tons (19 Gt) 
in 2005. A relative decoupling between 
1 The IRP is planning to produce a report on the impacts of trade on 
resource use and environmental impacts.
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monetary and physical trade flows has 
occurred: trade in manufactured products 
with a higher price per ton has grown 
faster than trade in primary materials. In 
2005, manufactured products made up only 
24% of physical trade, but contributed 74% 
to the economic value (Dittrich, 2009). 
At the global level, physical trade is 
dominated by fossil fuels, which accounted 
for almost 49% of all exports in 2005. 
Biomass ranked second with over 20%, 
followed by metals (18%), minerals (10%) 
and other products (3%) (Dittrich, 2010).
Intensifying global trade also implies 
growing environmental pressures 
associated with trade activities. On the one 
hand, these include direct pressures, in 
particular due to the impacts of 
transportation. According to the IPCC’s 4th 
Assessment Report, by 2004 the transport 
sector contributed 13.1% to the total 
CO2-eq emissions. On the other hand, the 
indirect (or embodied) environmental 
pressures are augmented with growing 
trade volumes. According to recent model 
calculations, CO2 emissions embodied in 
internationally traded products accounted 
for 27% of the total energy-related CO2 
emissions in 2005, up from 22% in 1995 
(Bruckner et al., 2010). Other studies have 
calculated the volume of CO2 emissions 
embodied in global trade at 22% for the year 
2001 (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). For the 
issue of water consumption, measured by 
the ‘water footprint’ indicator (a measure of 
the direct and indirect use of water to 
produce a good), total water embodied in 
global trade was around 16% of the global 
water footprint in the 1997 to 2001 period 
(Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). First 
estimations of material extraction embodied 
in global trade are about 20% of total 
world-wide material extraction in the year 
2000 (Giljum et al., 2008). 
Environmental pressures directly and 
indirectly linked to international trade thus 
make up a significant share of total 
environmental pressures. Therefore, 
different results are obtained when 
resource use and environmental pressures 
are accounted for from a production 
perspective (i.e. allocation to the country 
where the pressure occurs) versus from a 
consumption perspective (i.e. allocation to 
the country where the product is finally 
consumed). In established international 
accounting systems (such as the GHG 
accounts in the UNFCCC framework), 
production-based systems are far more 
common, particularly as they allow for the 
setting of clear system boundaries. 
However, in order to properly take trade-
related effects into account, 
complementary consumption-based 
accounting systems are required at the 
global level (see for example Peters, 2008). 
Such a double system of accounts could 
serve as the empirical basis for developing 
options for sharing environmental 
responsibility between producing and 
consuming countries (Lenzen et al., 2007).
4.1.2 The economic structure of 
global trade
From an economic perspective, the global 
trading system has four major players. The 
EU-27 (excluding intra-EU trade) is the 
largest exporting region with a 15.9% share 
of global exports and an 18.3% share of 
global imports in 2008. China ranked second 
as exporter (11.8%) and third as importer 
(9.1%), followed by the US, which held a 
10.6% share of global exports and a 17.4% 
share of global imports, and by Japan at 
6.5% and 6.1%, respectively. Half of the 
volume of world trade is shared between 
these four players (44.8% of world exports 
and 50.9% of world imports, WTO, 2009). 
On the other end of the spectrum, a large 
number of – mostly developing – countries 
play a negligible role in global trade. Some 
49 of the least developed countries, mostly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, 
together account for only 1.1% of global 
trade (WTO, 2009). While some developing 
and emerging countries (most notably 
China, but also Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, 
and India) have achieved successful 
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integration into the global trade system, 
globalization has not benefitted all 
countries and individuals. 
The degree of economic integration into the 
world market is one issue, the role played 
in the international division of labour is 
another issue. A main distinction that 
matters needs to be drawn between mainly 
trading in raw materials and trading in 
manufactured products.
Industrialized countries largely export 
manufactured products. This segment of 
world trade is characterized by high value 
added, is associated with employment and 
has various positive spin-off effects. Many 
developing regions, on the other hand, 
continue to rely strongly on the export of 
primary materials. Latin America earns 
almost 70% of export revenues from 
agricultural and mineral raw materials, 
more than three quarters of total exports of 
the Middle East are fossil fuels, and Africa 
has the highest share in primary products 
(80% of exports, consisting of agricultural 
products, minerals and fossil fuels, see 
Figure 4.1).
However, this general pattern has some 
important deviations, as some industrial 
countries, typically those with a very low 
population density, also play a major role 
as exporters of primary products. Australia, 
for example, has significantly expanded its 
primary sectors (in particular, coal and iron 
ore) in the past few years in order to serve 
growing demand in Asian countries, 
notably China. Some 70% of Australia’s 
exports in 2008/08 were primary products 
(food, fuels, minerals), up from 57% in 
2003/04 (Australian Government, 2009). 
More than 47% of Canada’s exports in 2008 
were agricultural products, minerals or 
fuels, and the US, with 21% of its exports 
comprising primary products, is a major 
world market supplier of natural resources 
(WTO, 2009). 
Figure 4.1. Composition of exports (in monetary units) by world regions, 2006
Source: WTO, 2008
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4.1.3 The physical structure of 
global trade
The total extraction of material resources 
is not so unevenly distributed across the 
world, as becomes apparent from the 
physical data (see Figure 4.2). Looked at in 
more detail, biomass extraction is 
distributed most evenly (in close relation to 
population numbers), and the extraction of 
fossil fuels is distributed most unevenly, 
depending on resource endowment and 
previous exploitation. International trade 
redistributes these resources across the 
globe, allowing some countries to export 
resources and other countries to be 
supplied with primary products for 
manufacture and consumption (both 
domestic and abroad). 
As Figure 4.2 illustrates, industrialized 
countries have the highest share in trade 
activities, while their share in materials 
extraction corresponds roughly to their 
share in world population. Even if they are 
also active exporters, they import two 
thirds of all traded materials.2 This 
difference is also reflected when 
comparing economic (monetary) and 
physical trade balances (Figure 4.3).
While monetary trade balances tend to be 
relatively even,3 physical trade balances 
have a systematic asymmetry: industrial 
countries tend to be net material 
importers, while developing countries have 
served as net exporters over the whole 
time period. During the last decade, the 
group of countries with economies in 
transition have also turned into net 
exporters. In 2005, the industrial countries 
imported around 2 billion tons (2 Gt), of 
which two thirds originated from 
developing countries and one third from 
the former Comecon countries. 
2 See Figure 2.1 for global material extraction, amounting to 
nearly 60 billion tons (60 Gt) in 2005, though the amount traded 
is considerably less; the precise amount is difficult to determine 
because an unknown amount of materials extracted are converted 
into manufactured goods that may also contain some imported 
materials.
3 Since the late 1990s the trade balance of the industrialized countries 
has become negative, which is due mainly to the rapidly-growing 
trade deficit of the US.
Source: Drawn from SEC database, http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/3812.htm, see Steinberger et al., 2010
Figure 4.2. Raw material extraction and trade by country type
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Figure 4.4 provides a detailed world map of 
net suppliers and net demanders of 
material resources. The map illustrates 
– as was to be expected – European 
countries, the US and Japan to be the most 
important net importers of resources in the 
world economy. What is new compared to 
earlier decades is that several emerging 
economies, particularly in Asia (such as 
China, India and South Korea) have now 
also become net importers, augmenting 
domestic resource use with resources 
imported from abroad. Important suppliers 
of material resources with net exports of 
more than 50 million tons (50 Gt) in 2005 
were Russia, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Saudi 
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Arabia, Iran, Brazil, Argentina and 
Venezuela. In some countries that 
specialized in natural resource exports, 
such as Peru and Chile, domestic material 
extraction grew faster than GDP, resulting 
in a rising material intensity of these 
economies, i.e. a reverse decoupling effect 
(see Russi et al., 2008). However, as Figure 
4.4 shows, some industrial countries are 
among the group of net exporting 
countries, in particular Australia and 
Canada. As a single country, Australia has 
accumulated the highest net exports in the 
past 40 years (Dittrich, 2009).
4.1.4 Indirect resource flows 
embodied in trade
A growing literature deals with resource 
flows indirectly associated with traded 
resources or commodities. This is relevant 
to decoupling both economically (for 
respective domestic resource depletion) 
and in terms of environmental impacts. 
Standard economy-wide material flow 
indicators, as explained above, register 
the weight of traded commodities at point 
of entry into a country. Indicators under 
development (for example so-called Raw 
Material Equivalents (RME), as proposed 
by the European Statistical Office 
(Eurostat, 2001, p.22), or ‘hidden flows’ 
– materials that are extracted or moved 
but do not enter the economy – as 
calculated in the framework of the Total 
Material Requirement indicator seek to 
capture those indirect flows associated 
with trade, both for imports and for 
exports, in terms of weight. For European 
countries for which such research has 
been conducted, the results usually show 
that indirect flows are in the same order 
of magnitude or somewhat larger than 
direct flows, and that indirect flows 
associated with exports do not fully 
compensate for indirect flows associated 
with imports. Thus, in effect, a certain 
amount of material burden and the 
associated environmental impacts are 
being ‘externalized’ from importing 
countries to the exporting countries 
(Buyny et al., 2009; Schaffartzik et al., 
2009; Weinzettel and Kovanda, 2009; 
Figure 4.4. Physical trade balances, year 2005a
a For countries that are blank, no appropriate data exist.
Source: Dittrich and Bringezu, 2010
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Weisz, 2006; Schutz et al., 2004). The 
importing countries become responsible 
for the last stage in the life cycle – 
disposal – but can also recycle these 
wastes or re-export them, often to 
developing countries. 
Including indirect flows is crucial for 
assessing decoupling trends. Countries 
may improve their decoupling performance 
most easily by outsourcing material-
intensive extraction and processing to 
other countries and by importing the 
concentrated products instead. 
Comprehensive indicators that include 
indirect flows are essential for comparing 
performance of countries in decoupling 
(Moll et al., 2005). Over the past decades, 
these indirect flows have increased for 
net-importing world regions, such as 
Europe (Bringezu and Bleischwitz, 2009). 
Such indirect material flows have also been 
calculated for resource-exporting 
countries. The biggest difference between 
direct trade flows and trade flows including 
indirect flows can be observed for 
countries that extract large amounts of 
crude metal ores with low concentrations, 
but export highly concentrated ores. In the 
case of Chile, the world’s biggest exporter 
of copper, the physical trade balance in the 
year 2003 changes from net exports of 
1 million tons (1 Mt) in terms of direct flows 
to net exports of 634 million tons (634 Mt), 
if calculated including indirect flows for the 
same year (Munoz et al., 2009). Resource-
exporting countries thus may have an 
interest in applying comprehensive 
consumption-based accounting systems 
that can identify costs of these indirect 
flows, which may increase the price of 
resources for the importing countries. The 
effects of such price increases for both 
exporters and importers remain to be seen, 
but may lead to at least some decoupling.
Related efforts are being undertaken to 
identify the amount of water embodied in 
international trade (also called ‘virtual 
water’, the amount of water required to 
produce a good or service). The concept of 
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Figure 4.5. Virtual water trade balances and flows of agricultural products, 1997–2001
Source: Adapted from Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2008
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virtual water is applied mainly to the trade 
in biomass and biomass products, but can 
apply to manufactured goods as well. 
Europe, Japan, China, and India are the 
biggest net importers of water embodied in 
trade of agricultural products, followed by 
the countries of the Middle East (Figure 4.5). 
Contrary to the trade in materials 
described above, the US is the biggest net 
exporter of embodied water, due to its high 
net exports of agricultural products, 
notably cereals. Many net exporters of 
materials (Figure 4.4) are also net 
exporters of virtual water from agriculture, 
including Canada and Australia from the 
OECD, and South America, South Africa 
and Southeast Asia from the developing 
world (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007).4
 
The discussion on the allocation of 
embodied environmental factors to either 
the producing or the consuming countries 
also covers greenhouse gas emissions. For 
example, up to a quarter of China’s total 
CO2 emissions are embodied in Chinese 
exports to the rest of the world (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008a; Yunfeng and Laike, 2010). 
This has important policy implications for 
the design of international environmental 
agreements: should the cost of these 
emissions be included in the price of the 
exports, or assumed by the importer? 
The relocation of environmentally-intensive 
economic activities from developed to 
developing countries can also induce a net 
increase of global environmental 
pressures. For example, global CO2 
emissions increased by 720 million tons of 
CO2 between 1997 and 2003 due to the 
outsourcing of production from the US to 
China (Shui and Harris, 2006), due to the 
high share of coal used for electricity 
production in China and less efficient 
manufacturing technologies in China’s 
industrial sectors.
4 Similar patterns have also been found for the net trade of embodied 
HANPP (human appropriation of net primary production). The US by 
far leads the ranking of the top net-exporters of embodied HANPP, 
followed by Australia, Argentina and Brazil. Most important net 
importing countries are Japan, followed by China, the Netherlands 
and South Korea (Erb et al., 2009)
4.1.5 Trade, decoupling and 
development
Current economic specialization and 
resulting physical trade patterns have had 
both positive and negative implications for 
economic development in developing 
countries (Eisenmenger and Giljum, 2006; 
Giljum and Eisenmenger, 2004; Muradian 
and Giljum, 2007; Muradian et al., 2002; 
Pérez-Rincón, 2006; Russi et al., 2008). The 
balance of positive and negative depends 
largely on the enabling and regulatory 
conditions and the specific conditions that 
are agreed. Factors cited for contributing to 
the negative impacts have included:
• Prices for raw materials have been 
falling for decades (Figures 2.4 and 
2.5), forcing developing countries to 
export ever larger amounts of natural 
resources to maintain a constant level of 
income;
• Developing countries may export natural 
resources with little or no domestic 
processing and thus little creation of 
added value for the domestic economy;
• Multi-national enterprises are major 
actors in primary sector production 
and trade and these enterprises act 
according to the economic interests 
of their stockholders rather than the 
long-term development of the country 
where the activity takes place – this 
may include, for example, favouring the 
repatriation of profits instead of local re-
investments into the regional economy; 
• Some primary sectors are poorly 
connected to the rest of the national 
economy, representing ‘extraction 
enclaves’ with little spill-over effects 
on regional markets (agriculture is a 
significant exception); 
• Resource extraction activities, in 
particular in the mining sector, are 
very capital intensive and provide only 
modest employment for local people;
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• Rent-seeking and corruption are 
widespread phenomena in many 
countries specializing in resource-
intensive sectors, with local elites often 
spending revenues on consumption or 
foreign investment rather than investing 
in domestic sectors which are crucial 
for sustainable development, such as 
infrastructure, education and health. 
Despite these concerns, international trade 
can make an important contribution to 
global decoupling when guided by 
appropriate policies on environment and 
trade. These have hitherto been managed 
separately at country and global levels 
(with, for example, very limited connections 
between the work of the WTO and global 
environmental bodies such as the 
international environmental conventions 
and the UNEP Governing Council). Key 
policy principles that could inform an 
improved policy interface to support 
decoupling include the following (see 
Dittrich, 2007): 
1. trade could contribute to reducing 
global resource use through exploiting 
transport and physical or geological 
potentials in a way that minimizes 
negative environmental impacts;
2. trade negotiations could consider the 
full value chain of the commodities 
being traded, agreeing prices that 
incorporate environmental factors and 
social costs that are now considered 
‘externalities’; and 
3. trade agreements between countries 
whose economies are based on 
exporting primary resources could be 
accompanied by side agreements that 
assist these countries in diversifying 
their economies, including through 
adding value domestically and 
supporting impact decoupling.
Such measures could support the desire of 
developing countries to diversify their 
economies so that they can reduce 
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dependence on the export of a small 
number of commodities, support the 
development of domestic markets, and 
promote sustainable economic 
development. 
4.2 Decoupling, 
development and 
inequality 
Global economic growth has accelerated 
over the past quarter century due in large 
part to the complex process of economic 
globalization that absorbed the newly-
industrialized countries as major economic 
players into the global financial system. 
Although some assumed that 
computerization would lead to a 
dematerialized ‘knowledge economy’, 
material extraction also increased from 
about 35 billion tons (35 Gt) in 1980 to 
nearly 60 billion tons (60 Gt) in 2005, with 
substantial increases in particular in the 
extraction and use of construction minerals 
and ores (reflecting the twin impacts of 
accelerated urbanization and population 
growth on resource requirements). 
The benefits of global economic growth 
were not evenly distributed. In 1998, the 
richest 20% of the world’s population was 
responsible for 86% of consumption 
expenditure, whereas the poorest 20% 
were responsible for only 1.3% of 
consumption expenditure (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1998). While 
consumption expenditure does not 
translate directly into consumption of 
materials, these statistics are a dramatic 
reminder that the wealthy have ample 
room for resource decoupling, and 
associated impact decoupling would 
benefit all people.
Some decoupling accompanied the 
expansion of material consumption, as the 
overall material intensity of the global 
Figure 4.6. Material intensity of the world economy: Domestic extraction of materials per unit of 
GDP by world region
1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Source: Behrens et al., 2007
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economy declined from 2.1 tons in 1980 to 
1.6. tons per US$1000 in 2002 (Figure 4.6). 
In other words, 25% less material input 
was required in 2002 compared to 1980 to 
produce one unit of real GDP (Behrens 
et al., 2007). This decoupling was an 
economic response to the innovations 
made possible by the growth of 
information and communications 
technology, new materials, more efficient 
production methods, better health and 
education, and a host of other factors. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that 
resource decoupling on a global scale has 
been a significant part of global GDP 
growth, with many developing countries 
showing more rapid GDP growth than the 
industrialized countries, at least some of 
which experienced low, or even negative, 
GDP growth rates in at least some years. 
However, Figure 4.6 also reveals that 
Western Europe and North America 
remained the most efficient economies 
due to their knowledge infrastructures 
and technological capabilities, and the 
overall process of relocating extractive 
industries into other parts of the world. In 
contrast, the resource-rich resource-
exporting countries in Latin America, 
Africa, Oceania (due mainly to Australia’s 
rapid rise as a coal and iron ore producer) 
and Asia were either highly inefficient 
(Africa or transition countries) or were 
building fast-growing economies that 
were increasingly dependent on 
construction minerals, ores and fossil 
fuels (Asia and Oceania). 
Is decoupling a realistic basis for further 
policy work to support the green economy 
that has been advocated in principle by the 
G20 (Barbier, 2009; Houser et al., 2009; 
Pollin et al., 2008; Renner & Sweeney, 
2008; Green New Deal Group, 2008)? Will 
the solutions to the global economic 
recession depend on investments in ‘green 
growth’ rather than just be a return to 
business-as-usual? No definitive answers 
are available, but some evidence suggests 
cautiously positive answers.
UNEP considers a green economy is “one 
that results in improved human well-
being and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and 
ecological scarcities. In its simplest 
expression, a green economy can be 
thought of as one which is low carbon, 
resource efficient and socially inclusive”.5
UNEP’s Green Economy initiative 
commissioned a report (Barbier, 2009) that 
describes a ‘business-as-usual’ approach 
as follows:
• global energy demand will rise by 45% 
by 2030, pushing oil prices to US$180/
barrel;
• GHG emissions, coupled to energy 
demand, will increase by 45% by 2030, 
pushing average temperatures up by as 
much as 6 degrees;
• global GDP could shrink by 5–10%, with 
poorer countries suffering losses in 
excess of 10%;
• degradation of ecosystem services 
will continue and water scarcities will 
become more pervasive;
• over 3 billion people will be living on 
less than US$2 a day by 2015.
It then argues that the US$2–3 trillion that 
will be invested to revive the global 
economy should be inspired by more than a 
narrow economic recovery vision. It 
proposes three inter-linked investment 
objectives:
• revive the world economy through 
employment creation and protecting the 
most vulnerable;
• reduce carbon dependence, ecosystem 
degradation and water scarcity; and
• realize the Millennium Development 
Goal of ending extreme poverty by 2025.
5 See http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/
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Many countries have incorporated ‘green 
growth’ elements into their economic 
rescue packages (Figure 4.7). These 
include retrofitting buildings to make them 
more energy efficient, expanding public 
transport and freight rail services, 
constructing ‘smart’ electrical grid 
management systems, investing in 
renewable energy (wind, solar, bioenergy), 
greening of living spaces, restoring rivers 
and forests, recycling wastes, and 
implementing GIS-based green information 
systems (Barbier, 2009). Many of these 
investments are concentrated in new kinds 
of urban infrastructure, thus reinforcing 
the significance of cities in managing the 
transition to ‘green economies’. 
4.2.1 Africa as a special case?
Growth rates in Africa in the 1980s 
averaged below 2%, but by the end of the 
1990s were getting close to 3% and by 2005 
were reaching 5%. However, these 
impressive growth rates declined after the 
collapse of commodity prices from 2008 
onwards, mitigated only slightly in 2009 by 
the rising price of oil. This is indicative of 
the structural weaknesses of the African 
growth model. 
In 2000, the export of primary natural 
resources accounted for nearly 80% of all 
exports from Africa. This is much higher 
than for the rest of the world (see Figure 
4.1). According to the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, in 2003 many 
African countries were highly dependent 
on the export of a single resource – for 
example, crude oil (Angola, Congo, Gabon, 
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea), copper 
(Zambia), coffee (Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Uganda), tobacco (Malawi) or uranium 
(Niger) (Oxfam, 2005). Many more were 
dependent on the export of just two or 
three primary products.
The World Bank has estimated the ‘real 
wealth’ of countries by calculating 
‘genuine savings’, by adjusting the gross 
savings component of the Gross National 
Income (GNI) as follows: first, depreciation 
of fixed capital was deducted to create a 
figure for ‘net savings’; to this was added 
expenditures on education (deemed to be 
an investment in human capital); then the 
value of the depletion of natural capital 
and of pollution was deducted in order to 
arrive at the figure for Genuine Savings 
(World Bank, 2006). Because most African 
countries are exporters of primary 
resources, the result of this study was that 
most African countries had a net negative 
rate of Genuine Savings relative to Gross 
National Income. The fact that the 
Figure 4.7. Eco-friendly spending, total amount and percentage of total fiscal stimulus package
Source: HSBC, 2009
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Genuine Savings for sub-Saharan Africa 
hover around zero is an important 
explanation for why poverty almost 
doubled between 1981 and 2005 (World 
Bank, 2006, p.42). 
However, whereas countries with relatively 
diverse economies, like Kenya, Tanzania 
and South Africa, have positive genuine 
savings rates, resource-dependent 
countries like Nigeria and Angola have 
genuine savings rates that decline to -30. 
The countries with the highest resource 
dependence and lowest capital 
accumulation included some of the largest 
resource exporters, namely Nigeria, 
Zambia, Mauritania, Gabon, and Congo. 
Unfortunately, raising resource prices in 
absence of appropriate regulatory 
arrangements and good governance could 
exacerbate what Sachs and Warner (2001) 
called the ‘resource curse’, a way to 
explain why countries with substantial 
resource endowments end up poor. They 
suggest that over-dependence on export 
income removes the incentive to invest in 
the human resources and innovations 
required for growth through economic 
diversification. Instead of funding 
institutional and human capital resources 
to benefit the majority, resource rents 
bolster the power and prestige of elites. It 
follows that any strategy to increase 
resource rents for resource-rich resource-
exporting economies will need to be 
coupled to a ‘good governance’ strategy 
aimed primarily at strengthening 
democratic institutions and accountability 
(Evans, 2006).
The above-cited World Bank report comes 
after more than 20 years of trade 
liberalization. African governments have 
lifted protective tariffs, thus undercutting 
local industries that were unable to 
compete with prices of imported goods. In 
the name of increasing trade, the opposite 
was achieved. According to Christian Aid, 
“[t]rade liberalization has cost sub-
Saharan Africa US$272 billion over the past 
20 years. Overall, local producers are 
selling less than they were before trade 
was liberalized” (Christian Aid, 2005, p.3).
Despite increased demand for primary 
resources from the emerging economies 
such as China and India, the value of 
Africa’s primary resource exports are 
generally falling. This is particularly true 
for agricultural products that declined in 
absolute value from US$15 billion in 1987 
to US$13 billion in 2000. According to 
Aksoy and Beghin (cited in Bond, 2006, 
p.61), non-oil exporting sub-Saharan 
countries suffered from declining terms of 
trade for the period 1970–1997 resulting in 
a cumulative reduction in revenue levels 
that amounted to 119% of their total actual 
GDP for the period. In other words, if the 
terms of trade had remained stable, the 
combined GDP of these countries for the 
period 1970–1997 would have been more 
than double what it was, with all the 
attendant potential development benefits 
(Bond, 2006, pp. 60–63). 
Remaining so dependent on the export of 
primary resources does not make 
economic sense for any resource-rich 
resource-exporting countries. What will 
make a difference in Africa are substantial 
investments in the development of 
indigenous innovation capacity and 
governance systems that make it possible 
to capture resource rents for re-investing 
in human capital development, 
infrastructure and technological 
innovation. An ideal model that may have 
some lessons is Norway’s approach to 
investing its resource rents generated 
from oil in ways that will continue to be 
economically productive after the decline 
of oil revenues. 
4.3 Decoupling and the 
rebound effect
This paper has shown that both resource 
decoupling (achieving the same or greater 
output with fewer inputs) and impact 
decoupling (doing less environmental harm 
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per unit of output) are feasible, and indeed 
are taking place (driven largely by market 
forces). It logically follows from this that 
any innovation that results in less inputs/
impacts per unit of output will contribute to 
decoupling. In practice, however, other 
factors come into play. This is the problem 
that has come to be known as the ‘rebound 
effect’ (otherwise known as Jevon’s 
Paradox). The rebound effect is the 
quantitative difference between the 
projected savings of resources that should 
have been derived from a given set of 
technological changes and the actual 
savings derived in practice, measured in 
percentage terms. It determines the actual 
level of decoupling that can be achieved by 
a given set of sustainability innovations. 
Jevon’s Paradox in its original form 
claimed that “with fixed real energy prices, 
energy efficiency gains will increase energy 
consumption above what it would be 
without these gains” (Saunders, 1992). 
Under the condition of constant prices, the 
rebound effect can amount to more than 
100% of the savings achieved by the 
original innovation.
Various efforts have been made to classify 
rebound effects (Greening & Greene, 1997; 
Sorrell, 2007). A common classification is 
into micro effects (or direct rebound) and 
macro effects (indirect rebound). Micro 
effects occur at the consumer level: even 
though the final price of a product is not 
determined entirely by the resource price, 
in general if a consumer saves money on a 
commodity because it has been produced 
with less resources and therefore possibly 
at lower cost, he may consume more of 
this commodity, or spend his money saved 
on something else that again consumes 
resources. Macro effects occur at the level 
of national economies, are more long term 
and more difficult to assess. How these 
direct and indirect effects may be 
distinguished from the effects of economic 
growth in general depends on the 
respective theory of economic growth. For 
some, this is possible (Sorrell, 2007), but 
others contend that rebound effects are a 
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necessary outcome of economic growth 
and therefore cannot be distinguished from 
growth (Ayres and Warr, 2005). 
Research on micro level rebound effects 
has, in general, concluded that across time 
and across products, the rebound effect is 
not a major problem and does not 
undermine the case for investing in 
resource efficiency or productivity 
(Greening et al., 2000; Herring, 2004; 
Berkhout et al., 2000; Schipper, 2000). In 
most cases, the direct rebounds range 
from 0% to 40% (Sorrell, 2007). The size of 
direct rebound effects depends on income: 
the richer the consumer, the greater the 
likelihood that he will not buy more of the 
same if it gets cheaper, and the resource 
savings will be achieved. The poorer the 
consumer, the more likely he will redirect 
his savings into more or other consumption 
that will reduce the resource gains. This 
way, however, the rebound effect actually 
allows for improvements in material 
welfare. Research on rural electrification in 
India, for example, shows that a rebound 
effect of at least 50% could be observed, 
but thereby allowed for meeting basic 
needs that could not be met prior to 
electrification (Roy, 2000). 
However, when it comes to the macro-
economic level the implications of the 
rebound effect are much less clear, and are 
potentially problematic from a decoupling 
perspective. The macro-level rebound effect 
does not adequately address the divergence 
between projected efficiency gains and 
actual efficiency gains. Where efficiency 
increases, the divergence is in the level of 
economic activity which, in theory, should 
be higher with efficiency gains than without. 
It is very difficult to verify this empirically, 
especially for efficiency increases that are 
the result of government policy. This is 
clearly an issue for further research, with 
some plausible support for this proposition 
(Ayres and Warr, 2005; Ayres and van den 
Bergh, 2005) but no definite proof of a direct 
link between increases in energy efficiency 
and economic growth. 
4.4 Prices and resource 
productivity
The size of rebound effects depends at 
least partly on the trajectory of prices. In a 
context of constant or sinking price levels, 
rebound effects tend to become larger. This 
issue will be dealt with in more detail in the 
Second Report of the Decoupling Working 
Group that will focus on specific 
applications of decoupling across a range 
of sectors. 
Figure 2.4 showed that the long-term 
historical trajectory of real resource prices 
has been downward in the 20th century, 
with some periods of soaring resource 
prices. Since the turn of the Millennium, 
many have argued that now, finally, 
resource prices will continuously rise. The 
surge of oil, gas and other mineral 
resource prices until the economic crisis in 
2008 was triggered by steeply rising 
demand from the rapidly developing Asian 
economies, led by China, following 
standard economic theory of supply and 
demand. But the economic interpretation 
that declining price levels are a correct 
market indicator for resources not 
becoming scarcer is risky: one may find 
the opposite when it is already too late to 
take corrective measures (see discussion 
in De Bruyn et al., 2009). 
In the context of the climate debate, where 
agreements have been achieved about 
limits not of resource use, but of the 
absorption capacity of the atmosphere, 
policy interventions into the price system 
seem inevitable. Trading permits for CO2 
emissions will – indirectly – raise prices for 
energy use from fossil fuels. Various 
instruments are available – the cap and 
trade regime, feebates, fees and charges 
– and various command and control 
instruments steering technologies have 
direct and indirect effects on prices. 
Another major instrument for influencing 
prices is a tax escalator regime, used in 
Britain and Germany since the 1990s. The 
‘escalator’ idea is to add small annual 
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price signals that are agreed for many 
years in advance. 
These two historical examples of fuel tax 
escalators can be seen as proof of 
effectiveness. The British escalator on 
petrol taxes was introduced in 1993, and the 
German ecotax reform came six years later. 
In both cases the fiscal duty increased year 
by year by very small amounts, which by 
itself would have hardly any steering effect. 
But the certainty of future steps to come 
had a major effect on customer behaviour. 
Families would buy more fuel-efficient cars, 
travelling by rail and other public transport 
enjoyed some renaissance, and unnecessary 
trips were reduced. Figure 4.8 shows the 
effects on CO2 emissions from fuel 
consumption per capita and year. It shows 
that German petrol consumption falls before 
the ecotax escalator began were also 
caused by fuel taxes, which were raised 
three times by the previous government 
since 1991 for purely fiscal reasons to pay 
for costs of the German unification.
Figure 4.8 contrasts the British and 
German experiences with those of Canada 
and the US. In the latter two countries, the 
increasing efficiency of compact cars was 
more than compensated by the 
introduction of tax breaks for sport utility 
vehicles (SUV’s) and small trucks and by 
added miles driven; no signs of recovery 
can be seen in the mostly outdated and 
inefficient railway systems in the North 
American countries.
If climate protection policies are going to 
be taken seriously worldwide and it is 
agreed that a strong downward trajectory 
of CO2 emissions needs to be achieved, 
policy interventions directly or indirectly 
into the price of fossil fuel will be required, 
and this is likely to increase the price level 
of all raw materials. In the way this 
transition is planned now (Stern, 2007; 
Edenhofer et al., 2008), it might transfer 
some of the income achieved into 
developing countries where an increase in 
material welfare is highly warranted.!
Figure 4.8. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption
1993  1998  2003  2008 
Source: UNEP, 2011. The UNEP GEO Data Portal, as compiled from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). United Nations 
Environment Programme, http://geodata.grid.unep.ch.
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Conclusions and major policy 
challenges5
5.1 Conclusions
This report has sought to clarify the 
concept of decoupling as applied to 
sustainable development. This concept 
provides a basis for enhancing human 
well-being while reducing the intensity of 
resources being used in economic activities 
(resource decoupling) and reducing 
negative environmental impacts from any 
use of natural resources (impact 
decoupling). Resource decoupling leads to 
increasing efficiency with which resources 
are used, sometimes called 
‘dematerialization.’ Impact decoupling 
means using resources better, more 
wisely, or more cleanly, but does not 
necessarily reduce the amount of 
resources used, or the cost of production.
The report’s focus has been on material 
resources: construction materials; ores 
and industrial minerals; fossil fuels; and 
biomass. These natural resources have 
been harvested at increasing rates over the 
past century, helping to support 
increasingly rapid growth in GDP 
(Figure 2.1). They may gradually approach 
limits of production, as their prices in 
recent years are showing increasing 
volatility after a long-term decline of about 
30% during the 20th century. Increasing 
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demand for resources, declining grades of 
several key ores, and increasing 
environmental impacts associated with 
resource use suggest that decoupling 
could be a timely policy response. 
Other categories of resources are also 
important and would benefit from 
decoupling (such as water, soils and land), 
but these are being addressed elsewhere, 
including by other working groups of the 
International Resource Panel (IRP).
The report has built on several 
fundamental concepts:
• A distinction between relative decoupling 
(in which the growth rate of resources 
used is lower than the growth rate of GDP, 
though resource use continues to grow) 
and absolute reductions of resource use. 
Absolute reductions are rare, as they 
require resource productivity to grow 
faster than GDP.
• A focus on material resources, 
characterized by qualities that render 
them useful for certain applications, and 
get lost (or diminished) by use. They are 
natural assets deliberately extracted by 
human activity for their utility to create 
economic value; they can be measured in 
both physical units and monetary terms.
• A life cycle perspective on resource 
use, showing that resource use implies 
a series of transformations. While 
each of the four classes of material 
resources are different in many ways, 
generally speaking, their life cycle 
begins with extraction of the resource, 
then transport to a processing 
plant, combustion or conversion 
into a commodity, contribution to a 
manufactured product, transport to 
consumers, consumption, and finally 
disposal or recycling. Each part of 
the life cycle can take place in various 
parts of a country or even different 
parts of the world, with the costs and 
benefits widely distributed. Decoupling 
can contribute to resource efficiency 
at many parts of the life cycle, with 
different actors responsible for the 
decoupling and different policies 
required for supporting decoupling at 
the different stages of the life cycle.
• Resources can be accounted for as total 
global or national amounts annually 
used, and as individual metabolic 
rates, which is the amount of resources 
consumed by an average person on the 
entire globe or a particular country. 
Metabolic rates are a relatively objective 
way of comparing how resource 
consumption is changing over time, 
or for comparing countries with each 
other. The average global metabolic rate 
doubled from 4.6 tons per capita in 1900 
to 8–9 tons per capita at the beginning 
of the 21st century. Metabolic rates vary 
widely among countries, an indicator of 
inequity, though it appears that densely 
populated areas and regions need 
fewer resources per capita for the same 
standard of living and material comfort.
• A distinction between economic growth 
(defined as the added monetary value 
of all final goods and services produced 
within a country in a given period of 
time) and physical growth (defined as 
the growth of physical throughput in the 
economy). It is physical growth that is 
coupled to environmental pressures and 
resource depletion.
International trade is a critical issue in 
decoupling, given that some 20% of the 
consumption of the resource categories 
addressed in this report is traded 
internationally, and CO2 emissions 
embodied in internationally traded 
products accounted for 27% of the total 
energy-related CO2 emissions in 2005, up 
from 22% in 1995 (Bruckner et al., 2010). 
Environmental pressures directly and 
indirectly linked to international trade thus 
make up a significant share of total 
environmental pressures. Internationally 
traded materials increased from about 
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
72
5.4 billion tons (5.4 Gt) in 1970 to 19 billion 
tons (19 Gt) in 2005, an indication of the 
challenge of trying to assign responsibility 
for decoupling along the value chain from 
original extraction to ultimate disposal.
The report was nourished by the detailed 
case studies from China, Japan, Germany, 
and South Africa, all of which have 
experienced the long-term consequences 
of resource depletion and negative 
environmental impacts, and responded by 
adopting policies that include decoupling. 
While some decoupling has occurred 
‘spontaneously’ (for example, GDP grew at 
a considerably faster rate than material 
extraction or metabolic rates during the 
20th century, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2, respectively), much more is needed if 
society is to be sustainable over the longer 
run, as resources come under more 
pressure with population growth and 
increasing GDP. 
This need is indicated by considering 
several scenarios for the future. Business 
as usual would triple global annual 
resource extraction by 2050, compared to 
2000, amounting to some 140 billion tons 
(140 Gt) – far beyond what is likely to be 
sustainable. Moderate contraction and 
convergence would require industrialized 
countries to reduce their per capita 
resource consumption by half the rate for 
the year 2000 while developing countries 
reach the metabolic rate of the 
industrialized countries by 2050 – this 
would lead to a global annual resource use 
of 70 billion tons (70 Gt). Tough contraction 
and convergence would keep global 
resource consumption at its 2000 level, but 
redistribute the resources so all countries 
achieve roughly the same per capita 
metabolic rate; this would be unlikely to be 
politically acceptable. Even the last 
scenario would not lead to an actual global 
reduction in resource use. 
The report finds that innovation, even 
radical innovation, will be required to 
achieve resource and impact decoupling. 
Some of this will need to be economic 
innovation, for example UNEP’s Green 
Economy Initiative, which seeks to couple a 
revived world economy with reducing 
ecosystem degradation, water scarcity, and 
carbon dependence. Other forms of 
innovation will be based on new knowledge 
and ways of managing information, leading 
to technological, institutional and relational 
innovations.
An especially promising source of 
innovation could be cities, where more 
than half the world’s population lives. 
People are attracted to cities for jobs, 
education, shelter, protection, access to 
information, and cultural diversity. Cities 
usually have a lower metabolic rate than 
rural areas, though richer cities have 
higher metabolic rates. But cities also 
concentrate the knowledge, financial, 
social and institutional resources needed 
for sustainability innovations. While cities 
drive unsustainable use of resources, they 
can also provide the greatest potential for 
sustainability innovations.
Ultimately, one main objective of the IRP is 
to provide information about how to reduce 
the consumption of resources required to 
support well-being for all people. Non-
material economic growth has been 
proposed as one means of doing so. 
Decoupling is seen as a major conceptual 
basis for helping to achieve this, but many 
challenges remain. This report has 
identified some of the major challenges 
and suggested possible approaches to 
addressing them.
Many governments have adopted ‘green 
growth’ as an important part of their 
economic development, as the overall 
material intensity of the global economy 
declined from 2.1 tons per US$1,000 in 
1980 to 1.6 tons in 2002, requiring some 
25% less material input in 2002 compared 
to 1980 to produce one unit of real GDP 
(Behrens et al., 2007). 
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In summary, resource and impact 
decoupling are already taking place, 
though at a rate that is insufficient to meet 
the needs of an equitable and sustainable 
society. Far greater efforts will be required 
in the coming years to accelerate 
decoupling and avoiding any rebound 
effect, and the report has identified some 
key challenges that the IRP will address in 
the coming years. Success in meeting 
these challenges will contribute to meeting 
the needs of a growing population, reduce 
poverty, and support economic 
development without threatening the 
ecosystem services upon which human 
well-being depends. 
5.2 Major policy challenges
This report has provided evidence that it is 
time to recognize the limits to the natural 
resources available to support human 
development and economic growth. 
Growing resource constraints will not 
affect everyone equally. The world’s 
poorest people will be deprived of 
opportunities to develop, even though they 
are minor consumers of most materials 
covered in this report. At the same time, 
the world’s richest nations will find it 
increasingly difficult to enjoy their current 
levels of consumption and the fruits of a 
stable world if resource depletion 
continues and resource prices increase. 
The optimal solution for all countries is to 
make sustainable resource management a 
central focus of global policy frameworks 
for growth and development. As a 
contribution to what this means in practice, 
this report has shown how decoupling of 
resource consumption and environmental 
impacts from economic growth could 
provide a policy tool for calibrating the 
shifts required over time to manage the 
transition to a more sustainable global 
economy.
To make the transition to a more 
sustainable global economy, sustainable 
resource management strategies will be 
required that promote resource and impact 
decoupling, with an emphasis on absolute 
resource use reductions in developed 
economies and relative decoupling in 
developing economies (up to a certain point 
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after which they must also shift into an 
absolute reduction mode). 
This approach to decoupling poses at least 
the following major challenges: 
• How can global resource flows and 
their associated environmental impacts 
be integrated with efforts to deal with 
problems such as climate change, 
degradation of ecosystem services, and 
pollution?
• How can policymakers (and the public) 
be convinced of the reality of physical 
limits to the quantity of natural 
resources available for human use and 
that the negative environmental impacts 
of economic activities also have limits?
• What are the economic factors driving 
the decoupling that is already taking 
place, and how can these be mobilized 
more effectively to enhance escalations 
in investments in innovations and 
technologies that can accelerate 
decoupling?
• How can market signals generate 
increases in innovation for resource 
productivity? How can international 
trade best incorporate the concepts of 
resource decoupling to support equitable 
conditions of trade in natural resources? 
• How can the current economic growth 
model be modified to realize the aims 
of ‘non-material growth’ through 
sustainable resource management?
• Given that the multiple challenges of 
economic growth, sustainable resource 
management and ending poverty take 
place in the midst of the ‘second wave of 
urbanization’, how can cities become the 
spaces where ingenuity, resources and 
communities come together to generate 
in practice what decoupling means in the 
way cities produce and consume? 
• How can decoupling be demonstrated 
as a necessary precondition for 
reducing the levels of global inequality 
and eventually eradicating poverty? In 
particular, how can developing countries 
find a growth and development strategy 
that eradicates poverty by increasing 
resource productivity and restoring 
ecosystem services? 
The IRP intends to seek answers to such 
questions in its future work.!
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Country case studies
What follows are four case studies of countries that have in one way or 
another started to address the challenge of decoupling. The countries 
studied are Germany, China, South Africa and Japan. Each case is 
structured in accordance with the following headings:
• Recognizing limits: this section addresses whether the country has 
experienced and recognized resource constraints and limits;
• Policy responses: the various policy responses are then assessed in 
order to show how the country understands the challenge and the 
related responses (mainly at the level of intent);
• Decoupling: whether there is evidence of decoupling, both empirically 
and at the level of policy intent;
• Conclusion and outlook: key challenges going forward.
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Germany1 6
A ddressing overall resource productivity as a key element of sustainable production and consumption only very recently 
came into the focus of the Federal 
Government of Germany with the 
formulation of a National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (NSSD) in 2002. 
The government’s goal to double resource 
productivity by 2020 evolved as a key 
indicator to evaluate policy progress in the 
process of formulating the NSSD. 
‘Governance by evaluation, integration and 
coordination’ is how Zieschank (2006) 
labels the use of an indicator set in the 
NSSD. This is, however, quite an 
uncommon practice in German 
policymaking. The new government, in 
place since 2009, reconfirmed this policy 
line and established a national resource 
efficiency programme, serving as an input 
to the Rio+20 UN Conference.
6.1 Recognizing limits
Germany is often described as an early 
front-runner in environmental 
policymaking. Recognition of natural limits 
to resource use – albeit more biased to 
impacts – was already apparent in the early 
1970s when the basis for successful 
reduction of air and water pollution and for 
a proper system of waste disposal and 
handling was laid (Andersen and Liefferink, 
1997). In its 1971 Environmental 
Programme the Brandt government of 
Social Democrats and Liberals adopted a 
1 The main text of this case study was completed in January, 2009. A 
few factual amendments were added in December, 2010.
strategic planning approach and attempted 
to treat environmental protection in an 
integrated manner. The programme 
formulated ambitious long-term targets for 
air pollution control and water protection, 
described nearly 150 concrete policy 
measures, and set up guiding principles of 
environmental policy. New institutional 
arrangements2 were established, leaving 
the Ministry of the Interior in charge of 
environmental policy.3 Despite formal 
adoption of environmental policy as a 
cross-sectional task and formal 
continuation of the Environmental 
Programme by the federal government in 
1976, the integrated and strategic planning 
approach in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
gave way to a medium-term approach 
relying heavily on detailed command-and-
control regulations to control emissions at 
the source. Federal environmental policy 
thus became increasingly focused on key 
resource carriers such as air, water and 
soil, with pollution addressed in most 
cases by means of ‘best available 
technology’. Though the Kohl Conservative-
Liberal government after 1982 halted 
further progress in environmental policy, 
advances continued to be made in the 
1980s and early 1990s with respect to air 
pollution, water protection and waste 
disposal and management. By the middle 
of the 1990s, however, the former front-
runner had turned laggard as the Kohl 
government failed to formulate an 
integrated approach to the concept of 
2 In 1972 the Environmental Expert Council (SRU) was established, as 
well as Cabinet Committees and Standing Committees of Federal 
executives; two years later the Federal Environmental Agency 
(UBA) was set up.
3 The Federal Ministry for the Environment was established later in 
1986.
77
sustainable development conceptualized by 
the 1987 Brundtland Report and the 1992 
UNCED in Rio. It may be worth mentioning, 
though, that in 1998, the then environment 
minister Dr. Angela Merkel, who later 
became chancellor, issued a comprehensive 
policy paper on sustainable development4 
intended to answer the challenges from 
Rio de Janeiro. But in the 1998 elections, 
three months later, political majorities 
changed, and the government of Social 
Democrats and Greens (1998–2005) set out 
on another, yet more proactive agenda.
6.2 National Strategy 
for Sustainable 
Development
The call to develop a National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (NSSD) was 
raised by think-tanks (BUND/MISEREOR, 
1996) and in the Bundestag, the federal 
parliament. The work of two successive 
parliamentary committees of enquiry5 
finally led to the Bundestag asking the 
federal government to elaborate a NSSD 
and to establish a sustainable 
development council.6 After the election in 
1998 a new government coalition of Social 
Democrats and Greens transposed this 
decision into its coalition agreement: a 
NSSD with concrete objectives should be 
elaborated by the new government and be 
prepared by 2002. In 2000 the government 
decided on the institutional framework for 
a NSSD. Its main feature is a strong role 
for the Chancellor’s Office 
(Bundeskanzleramt); its mandate is to 
horizontally coordinate the work of the 
federal ministries involved in the NSSD 
through a Committee for Sustainable 
Development at the level of permanent 
secretaries.7 An inter-ministerial working 
group at the level of sub-directors 
4 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit (BMU), 1998. Entwurf für ein umweltpolitisches 
Schwerpunktprogramm. Bonn: BMU.
5 Cp. Deutscher Bundestag, 1998.
6 This decision in 1998 was made using a wide cross-party 
consensus.
7 This Committee was called “Green Cabinet” under the Schröder 
government; after the election of 2005 this name was dropped.
prepares the meetings of the Committee. 
Other important institutional innovations 
were the establishment of the German 
Council for Sustainable Development 
(RNE) in 2001 and a new Committee for 
Sustainable Development in the 
Bundestag in 2004. The RNE significantly 
contributed to the NSSD that was finally 
endorsed by the government in 2002. 
Recalling the patterns of environmental 
policymaking in Germany as described 
above, it is no small achievement that the 
NSSD was developed and that its 
institutional setting was established. The 
NSSD can be seen as a remarkable policy 
innovation – whether it proves to be a 
long-term success remains open as the 
structural conditions of integrated policy-
formulation and policymaking continue to 
be unfavourable. 
The German NSSD comprises strategic, 
mostly quantitative, trend objectives and 
indicators – all in all a set of 21 indicators 
grouped under the headings 
‘intergenerational equity’ (including 
indicators for natural resource use, state 
budget, innovation and education), ‘quality 
of life’ (including indicators for economic 
prosperity, quality of the environment, 
mobility, nutrition, health and crime), 
‘social cohesion’ (including indicators for 
employment, equal opportunities and 
families) and ‘international responsibility’ 
(including indicators for expenditure for 
development aid and opening EU 
markets). In the context of this report, 
Indicator 1 (‘resource conservation’) is the 
most important, as it includes sub-
Indicators 1a ‘energy productivity’ and 1b 
‘resource productivity’. The NSSD goal is 
to double both energy productivity (base 
year 1990) and resource productivity by 
2020 (base year 1994). The ‘resource 
productivity’ indicator includes all used 
abiotic raw material extracted in Germany 
as well as abiotic imports. Biotic raw 
material, though, is not included, which 
constitutes a grave problem as will be 
discussed later. A different indicator 
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(Indicator 4 ‘land use’) calls for the 
reduction of the daily increase in land use 
(daily increase reduced from 120ha to 
30ha by 2020). 
The NSSD is subject to regular review and 
some indicators were revised in 2006 
(though none referring to resource use). 
Why each of the 21 indicators was chosen 
is not always easy to comprehend. As 
Jänicke (Jänicke et al., 2001) points out, 
there is a fundamental lack of agreement 
in the federal administration on how to 
define sustainability. Be that as it may, the 
NSSD doubling resource productivity by 
2020 became the official goal of the federal 
government. This goal was affirmed by the 
new Merkel government after 2005 and can 
now be considered as the cornerstone of 
the government’s position on resource use. 
The Chancellor’s political commitment to 
the goals of the NSSD should be seen as 
an important prerequisite for the 
continuing efforts towards implementing 
sustainable patterns of consumption and 
production in Germany.
6.3 A feasible vision? The 
‘2000 Watt/cap society’
The feasibility of raising energy efficiency by 
a factor of four (at least) has been 
demonstrated for many specific examples 
and with national and global scenarios.8 In 
particular, the Swiss concept of a ‘2000 Watt 
per capita society’9 is interesting, because it 
includes a vision for the combination of 
energy efficiency with material efficiency as 
a goal, though the mutual reinforcing effects 
have not been quantified in integrated 
scenarios up to now. 
Meanwhile, the concept is debated in 
Germany as well: decoupling, leapfrogging 
and socio-technical innovations are the 
basic rationale behind the concept of the 
‘2000 Watt per capita society’ for OECD 
8 Compare Weizsäcker et al., 1998 and Lovins & Hennicke, 1999. 
WBGU 2003 and Ecofys/ DLR et al., 2007 and 2008.
9 The 2000-watt society is a vision, originated by the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zürich at the end of 1998, in which each 
person in the developed world would cut their overall rate of energy 
use to an average of no more than 2,000 watts (i.e. 17,520 kilowatt-
hours per year of all energy use, not only electrical) by the year 
2050, without lowering their standard of living.
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countries. 2000W/cap (= 65 GJ/cap) 
corresponds to one third of today’s 
European per capita energy use. Enabling a 
GDP/cap growth of two thirds by 2050, the 
‘2000 Watt per capita society’ implies a 
factor 4 to 5 increase in energy efficiency. 
Swiss research institutes have been working 
on this concept for many years 
demonstrating the technical feasibility of 
this challenging vision. As the world average 
energy consumption in the last two decades 
has been 70 GJ/cap, one of the Swiss 
report’s hypotheses is that 65–70 GJ/cap 
could even be a future convergence value for 
a sustainable world energy system. 
Thus, an ambitious increase in energy and 
material productivity, a complete change of 
the innovation systems, the exploitation of 
long re-investment cycles and gradual 
structural change to more sustainable 
patterns of consumption and production are 
important preconditions for establishing a 
‘2000 Watt per capita world society’. 
It should be added that by reducing the 
gigantic losses of existing energy systems10 
and by raising the share of renewables (as 
decided for EU-27 and especially for 
Germany) the vision of ‘a sustainable 
energy society’ could even today be taken 
as guidance for concrete implementation 
steps. Meanwhile, for Germany very 
sophisticated databases and dozens of 
medium-term (2020) and long-term (2050) 
scenarios are available that demonstrate 
the feasibility of a sustainable German 
energy system.
6.4 The key to sustainable 
energy: efficiency 
increase by a Factor x 
Up to now, the debate on resource efficiency 
has focused on energy. Many detailed 
databases and sophisticated scenarios are 
available, especially for Germany. But no 
10 On average only about 30% useful energy is derived from 100% 
primary energy inputs in the worldwide energy system and in most 
national energy systems; see Jochem, 2004.
fully integrated scenario analysis of 
strategies to foster the combined increase 
of material and energy productivity for 
Germany or other countries exists. 
A detailed, but again only energy-related 
analysis of the feasibility of a sustainable 
energy system was presented for Germany 
in 200811 in the so-called ‘BMU 
Leitszenario’,12 serving as an orientation 
for energy, climate and resource policies 
advocated by the German Ministry of 
Environment. This scenario demonstrates 
that the phase-out of nuclear power (by 
2023 as decided), the reduction of CO2 by 
80% (by 2050), a moderate 1.2% annual 
(green?) increase of GDP-growth and 
additional job creation are technically 
feasible and cost-effective in the long run: 
the moderate additional societal costs for 
the energy system up to 2030 will be more 
than compensated for by the benefits by 
2050. One crucial assumption is that 
(besides an ambitious increase in the share 
of renewables in all sectors) energy 
productivity increases at least by a factor of 
4 – in other words, a fourfold increase in 
the efficiency with which energy is used.
With the so-called Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (IECP, 2007/2008) the 
German government adopted two dozen 
policies and measures whose collective aim 
by 2020 is to raise the share of renewables 
for electricity to 30%, for heat to 14%, the 
share of Combined Heat Power (CHP) for 
electricity to 25% and to save energy in all 
sectors. With the help of the IECP and 
additional measures it is expected that at 
least a 30% CO2-reduction by 2020 (and 40% 
reduction conditioned to ambitious goals of 
the EU27) can be reached. 
While not fully convincing with regard to 
implementation (e.g. too moderate goals 
for new coal power plants and efficiency 
standards for the car industry) the IECP 
nevertheless is one important step forward 
11 Sustainable world energy scenarios with comparable goals and 
results have been developed by Lovins/Hennicke, 1999; WBGU, 
2003; and Ecofys/ DLR et al., 2007 and 2008.
12 See BMU, 2008a.
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in the direction of the new Ecological 
Industrial Policy of the Ministry of 
Environment.13 The key to this new strategy 
is to foster an increase in resource 
productivity (e.g. the integrated increase of 
energy and material productivity) and 
development of ‘lead markets’ e.g. for 
sustainable energy and mobility systems, 
for renewables, for recycling technologies 
and for sustainable water and waste 
management.14 It has been calculated that 
the world ‘market’ (profitable potential)15 
for GreenTech adds up to €1000 billion 
(2005) with the prospect to more than 
double by 2020.
In September 201016 the Christian 
Democratic and Free Democratic coalition 
government (in power since October 2009), 
mostly reconfirmed these approaches but 
modified the position on nuclear power, 
allowing for an extended time frame for the 
phase-out of nuclear reactors.
6.5 Integrating material 
and energy efficiency 
strategies
Up to now, strategies to foster energy 
efficiency and climate/resource protection 
have been separated from activities to 
develop and disseminate material-efficient 
production processes, products and 
services. Within enterprises an integrated 
accounting of energy and material flows is 
still an exception. But from the cost 
perspective of enterprises as well as for 
the national economy there are close 
inter-linkages if energy and material 
productivity is stepped up in an integrated 
way. In general, addressing resource 
productivity increases as a top priority 
seems to be a promising strategy for 
decoupling added value and economic 
growth from resource use and to create 
13 See BMU 2008b.
14 See BMU/ UBA 2007.
15 Though the study speaks of “markets“, the formulation “profitable 
options“ is preferred. Because of market failures and obstacles, 
it requires incentives, guidelines and a new policy mix to convert 
these gigantic profitable options into self-sustained markets. 
16 See BMWi/BMU, 2010.
structural changes to new green patterns 
of growth. 
To make it happen, technology and 
resource prices will become the key 
instrument for driving the eco-efficiency 
revolution. However, this will need to be 
accompanied by a discourse and policies 
on more environmentally-viable lifestyles 
and on new patterns of sustainable 
consumption and production. In that case, 
the technological efficiency revolution 
helps to gain time and may support a 
structural change to new models of wealth.
According to official statistics, material 
throughput accounts for more than 40% of 
total cost of production in the German 
processing industry. This is more than 
twice the labour cost share. The share of 
energy cost in the processing industry lies 
on average only at about 2%. Thus, the 
‘material’ cost factor is more important for 
competitiveness of the economy and of 
enterprises than labour costs.17 The same 
order of magnitude applies to other 
OECD countries. 
On the other hand raw material and energy 
prices (oil, gas) are mostly determined by 
the world market and thus will influence 
competitors all over the world in a more 
general and equalized way than domestic 
wages. Furthermore, concerning material 
and energy costs there are specific market 
failures and obstacles – even in the period 
of rapidly growing raw material and energy 
prices up to summer 2008 – that make 
SMEs especially reluctant to exercise even 
very cost-effective options for cost 
reduction. The lists of obstacles to realize 
cost-effective energy-efficiency potentials 
is long (e.g. deficits of awareness, 
information, market transparency and 
capital availability, missing life cycle-cost 
calculations, asymmetric payback 
expectations split incentives, etc.) and will 
be certainly even longer and more complex 
17 Engaging in resource strategies on the enterprise level is in the 
interest of German Trade Unions (especially IG Metall), as it would 
lower pressure on labour costs; see BMU/IGM/WI, 2006. 
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when it comes to material efficiency.18 The 
huge variety of raw materials, substances, 
composites, etc. and of substitution or 
recycling options is the main reason why 
without the help of a new policy mix (e.g. 
external experts, networking, information 
programmes and incentives) highly cost-
effective potentials are not realized. 
In this respect, it makes sense to ask how 
to jointly increase material and energy 
efficiency in practice by an integrated 
strategy and how to create positive 
incentives especially for small and medium 
enterprises. The management consultancy 
Arthur D. Little (AdL) assumes that by 
consulting external experts companies can 
regularly reduce their material throughput 
costs. Experience shows that an annual 
cost reduction of 20% can be achieved by 
non-recurrent expenditure that has an 
average payback of 12 months.19
18 See Bleischwitz et al., 2008.
19 See AdL/ISI/ WI, 2006.
6.6 Decoupling – empirical 
evidence and strategic 
actions
Empirical evidence suggests that between 
1994 and 2007 a seemingly impressive 
absolute (resource) decoupling of GDP 
growth and raw material inputs20 occurred 
in Germany. While resource productivity 
(raw materials) rose by 35.4% and GDP by 
22.3%, raw material input decreased by 
-9.7% (see Figure 6.1).
But the average annual increase of about 
2% from 1994–2007 must more than double 
if the official NSSD goal is to be achieved. 
While there is some evidence that this goal 
is still within reach, scaling up existing 
successful programmes and accelerating 
the rate of increase of resource productivity 
will require ambitious new initiatives 
especially from the German government 
20 This includes all used abiotic raw material extracted in Germany as 
well as imported abiotic materials.
Figure 6.1. Resource productivity and GDP growth 
Source: DESTATIS, 2008, http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Publikationen/
SpecializedPublications/EnvironmentEconomicAccounting/Statement2010,property=file.pdf
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and from industry. Furthermore, the 
German raw materials concept does not 
include biotic raw materials,21 i.e. it ignores 
the very important trade-off between 
biomass and fossil fuels or between biotic 
and abiotic raw materials as inputs for 
industry. Also not included are the 
economically not used primary material 
extracted in Germany and all indirect 
requirements associated with imported 
goods. These ‘ecological rucksacks’ and 
international side effects of the domestic 
use of resources are therefore neglected in 
these metrics. 
At the EU-1522 level there is clear empirical 
evidence that the burden of growing 
resource extraction is shifting to the 
outside world, especially to developing 
countries. While domestic Total Material 
Requirement (TMR)23 between 1980 and 
1997 absolutely decoupled from GDP 
growth, the foreign TMR increased (Moll 
et al., 2005). The problematic substitution 
of fossil fuels by biodiesel encouraged by 
tax exemptions and later by a mandatory 
blending of fossil-based diesel 
(Beimischungsgebot) and the general 
increase in energy use from imported and 
domestic biomass (mostly not certified 
from sustainable production) is also not 
covered by the German raw materials 
indicator. 
6.7 Impulse programme 
for material efficiency 
(2005–2009)
A macroeconomic analysis for German 
industry (see Box) demonstrates that even 
if only half of the existing material 
efficiency potentials were realized, there 
would still be an increase in gross national 
product, and creation of new business 
21 See UBA, 2008.
22 EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
23 Total Material Requirement (TMR) measures total primary material 
requirements of production and consumption. It comprises the 
domestic and foreign share and the used and unused extraction of 
resources.
areas and of employment. These macro-
economic effects seem to justify a long-
term modernization and innovation policy 
for reducing material costs, growth and 
employment. A feasibility study by AdL and 
others (Jochem et al., 2005) identified a 
first mix of instruments and measures to 
address and overcome prevailing barriers. 
Based on the encouraging results of these 
studies, the German Government in 2005 
initiated a pilot phase for an Impulse 
Programme for Material Efficiency to test 
instruments and create pilot projects and 
networks for SMEs and public enterprises. 
The overall economic goal is to reduce 
material and energy costs in the 
manufacturing industry and public sector. 
Minimization of resource use, residues, 
waste and emissions are expected to yield 
cost savings, identify new business fields, 
and increase employment and 
competitiveness. A pre-feasibility study 
identified potentials and priority sectors for 
pilots.24 The programme offers financial 
support for audits (VerMat) and for 
establishing networks (NeMat) for SMEs. 
24 See: www.wupperinst.org
The Aachener Modell
Results of the Aachener Modell 
(reducing material costs for German industry by 10%)
At the end of the simulation period (2020):
 8[[`k`feXc\dgcfpd\ek1
  + 1,000,000 jobs
 8[[`k`feXcYlj`e\jji\m\el\j1
  + €120 billion 
 8[[`k`feXc`eZi\Xj\f]\Zfefd`Z^ifnk_1
  + 1% per year
 ?Xim\jk`e^Ôijkdfm\iX[mXekX^\jf]
competitiveness
 I\[lZ`e^`dgfik[\g\e[\eZpf]jkiXk\^`Z
resources
 :feki`Ylk`e^kf^\fjkiXk\^`Zi`jbd`e`d`qXk`fe
 8ggifXZ_`e^k_\f]ÔZ`Xc>\idXe^fXc
 (“doubling resource productivity in 2020“)
Source: Aachener Stiftung, Kathy Beys, 2005
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A German Material Efficiency Agency 
(DEMEA) has been established.
By September 2008, DEMEA had 
successfully supported in-depth audits for 
more than 236 projects. On average, cost 
savings of €229,000 (2.5% of revenues) with 
a payback time of less than 6 months were 
demonstrated. Additionally, about 40 SME 
networks for raising material efficiency 
were established. 
In North Rhine Westfalia the Efficiency 
Agency (EFA, established in 2000) has 
supported more than 700 projects in 
collaboration with five affiliates across the 
region. A balance sheet of 140 completed 
projects concludes that a €27.8 million 
investment in resource efficiency 
technologies has yielded an annual cost 
reduction of €8.7 million (average payback 
time of about 3 years) has been achieved. 
6.8 Research on integrated 
strategies (Ecological 
Industrial Policy) 
Based on scientific research results and 
successful practical examples the German 
Ministry of Environment and the German 
Environment Agency launched an 
ambitious four-year research project on 
material efficiency and resource 
conservation (MaRess)25. Coordinated by 
the Wuppertal Institute in cooperation with 
a consortium of 30 partners from research 
institutes, universities and industry, 
MaRess is expected to define a new policy 
mix for increasing resource productivity as 
a key strategy of a new Ecological 
Industrial Policy. The project structure is 
summarized in Figure 6.2. 
The Wuppertal Institute has also proposed 
an Innovation Programme for Resource 
Efficiency to form part of a comprehensive 
German ‘Konjunkturprogramm’ to mitigate 
the economic crisis.26 By scaling up 
25 See www.wupperinst.org 
26 See Hennicke & Kristof, 2008.
existing experiences of the DEMEA and EFA 
(see above) with a total amount of €10 
billion from the federal budget for the 
SME-sector, its aim would be to foster 
ecological modernization, and create new 
employment and business fields for 
GreenTech. It would be operated by a lean 
federal Resource Agency together with a 
network of regional and local partners. 
Support for SMEs would comprise a 
mixture of impulse and in-depth audits 
combined with investment subsidies. The 
key rationale for this programme is a 
threefold integration:
It is estimated that (especially through this 
integrated approach) the programme 
would have a high self-financing effect for 
the federal budget and would contribute 
towards defending and extending the world 
market position of German GreenTech 
industries.
1. Integration of five key thematic 
strategies
 Zi\Xk\jljkX`eXYc\dXib\kj#^`m\`eefmXk`fejX
direction
 \jkXYc`j_jkife^`ejk`klk`fej#Yl`c[gXike\ij_`gj
and networks to foster the diffusion of existing 
GreenTech
 [\m\cfgjljkX`eXYc\gif[lZkjÊZiX[c\kfZiX[c\$
approach’)
 lj\k_\dXib\kgfn\if]k_\jkXk\XjX
consumer
 Zi\Xk\e\nk_`eb`e^k_ifl^_kiX`e`e^Xe[
education (e.g. ‘Resource University’)
2. Integration of sectoral policies 
 _Xidfe`q\fm\icXgg`e^Xe[kXi^\kfi`\ek\[
policies – at least the Ministry of Economics, 
Ministry of Science and Education, Ministry 
of Transport and Buildings, and Ministry of 
Environment should cooperate
3. Integration across technology and 
product-development cycles
 `ek\^iXk\kXi^\kfi`\ek\[I;kfiX`j\dXk\i`Xc
and energy efficiency with Demonstration, 
Pilots and Market Aggregation (fostering 
diffusion)
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Successful implementation of this 
programme will depend on many factors, 
including a convincing demonstration of 
the economic benefits, effective scaling up 
of the German innovation system, 
mitigation of rebound and 
counterproductive growth effects, 
development of an effective 
communications strategy and – in general 
– acceptance by the target group and the 
voting public. 
Figure 6.2. Structure of the project MaRess
Source: Wuppertal Institute, http://ressourcen.wupperinst.org/en/project/index.html
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6.9 Institutional context for 
decoupling: selected 
problems
Integrated environmental policymaking, 
understood in its full meaning as 
sustainable development, proves difficult in 
the institutional context of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The federal structure 
leads to an asymmetrical allocation of 
environmental competencies between the 
federal and Länder level. Moreover, 
Germany is a strong example of a 
consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999), its 
constellation of veto players leading to 
incremental policy evolution or, even worse, 
deadlock in times of opposed majorities in 
both chambers of parliament. The electoral 
system creates coalition governments, 
normally comprised of a big (Social 
Democrats or Conservatives) and a small 
(Liberals or Greens) party, with considerable 
ideological heterogeneity of the actors 
involved. Coalition governments of the 
German kind tend to view their coalition 
agreements as binding contracts, making 
the formulation of new policies not agreed 
upon in the original agreement very difficult 
(Martin, 2004). This held true especially for 
the 2005–2009 ‘Grand Coalition’ between 
Conservatives and Social Democrats. 
Although the Chancellor has the power to 
specify the overall direction of government 
policies (Richtlinienkompetenz), the 
administrative structure of the federal 
government is, in general, not favourable for 
integrated policy approaches and horizontal 
coordination as ministers have strong 
positions, leading their ministries under 
their own or their parties’ responsibility, 
respectively. Finally, Germany is usually 
described as a ‘high regulatory state’, 
meaning that the body of environmental 
laws and regulation is dense and policies 
are, overall, geared towards top-down 
approaches. The use of new instruments of 
environmental governance, such as market-
based instruments (eco-taxes, tradable 
permits, etc.) was only reluctantly 
introduced in the repertoire, none of them 
addressing the issue of sustainable 
production directly. On the other hand, 
(legally non-binding) voluntary agreements 
between government and industry were 
used quite often in the context of 
sustainable production, e.g. leading to the 
phasing-out of the use of harmful 
substances such as lead in petrol (Wurzel 
et al., 2003). In the field of waste policy, 
however, instruments were implemented to 
influence product design at an early stage. 
The principle of producer’s product 
responsibility was introduced with the Waste 
Management Act of 1986 and reconfirmed in 
the Cyclic Economy and Waste Act in 1996. 
This approach was quite successful with 
regard to packing materials for household 
products and batteries (Müller, 2002). 
6.10 Conclusion and outlook
On the one hand there are still numerous 
problems to be solved and obstacles to be 
overcome for a ‘decoupling policy’ in 
Germany. Successful implementation of a 
new resource policy would certainly 
accelerate the ongoing structural change 
as well as the eco-efficiency revolution in 
Germany. In every period of rapid structural 
change there will be winners and losers, 
which raises specific challenges for the 
willingness and capabilities of 
governments and politics to take the lead. 
On the other hand, for Germany there is 
much evidence that in the long run raising 
resource productivity is a win-win-win 
option, leading to (net) benefits for the 
private sector, creating new ‘green’ 
business fields and jobs, and reducing 
environmental impacts and social tensions 
from resource extraction. 
Over the long term, a new resource policy 
will need to aim to change the direction of 
technical progress, fostering resource 
productivity at least with the same intensity 
as that of the growth in labour productivity. 
The ultimate socio-economic goal should be 
a new labour-augmenting and nature-saving 
pattern of social and technological progress 
on the way to sustainable development.!
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South Africa17
South Africa has only recently emerged from a colonial and apartheid history spanning four centuries of racially-based 
dispossession and disenfranchisement, 
and which produced widespread, systemic 
poverty. The 1994 democratic transition 
heralded unprecedented change. Virtually 
every facet of policy and practice in the 
emergent democratic state was reviewed 
and revised. A Bill of Rights forms part of 
the new Constitution and specifically 
1 This case study is based on a report entitled Growth, Sustainability 
and Dematerialisation: Resource Use Options for South Africa, by 
Mark Swilling, commissioned by The Presidency, South African 
Government, presented at the Workshop on Scenarios for South 
Africa in 2019, The Presidency, Pretoria, July 2007 (Swilling, 2007).
guarantees the right of all South Africans 
to have the environment protected for the 
benefit of present and future generations. 
But reconciling complex and sometimes 
conflicting relationships between poverty, 
economic development and protection of 
environmental assets is a major challenge. 
In particular, the dominant economic 
growth and development paradigm fails to 
address a wide range of underlying 
resource constraints that can rapidly 
undermine the preconditions for the kind of 
developmental growth that is required.
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7.1 Recognizing limits2
It is becoming increasingly apparent that 
key ecological thresholds in South Africa 
are being breached by its prevailing 
approach to growth and development, and 
that this is resulting in dysfunctional 
economic costs. This condition of rising 
costs caused by a new set of material, 
ecologically-driven constraints sets the 
context for new ways of thinking about the 
country’s economic growth model and 
poverty reduction strategies. Since the first 
democratic elections in 1994, South Africa 
has experienced an unprecedented growth 
period that came to an end towards the end 
of 2008. As a resource-rich resource-
exporting country, South Africa benefited 
2 This section is based primarily, but not exclusively, on background 
research materials commissioned to inform development of the 
National Framework for Sustainable Development. The materials 
were circulated publicly and most are available on www.deat.
gov.za. The commissioned research papers are referenced in 
the sub-headings that follow, and additional research integrated 
where necessary. Because this section relies quite heavily 
on these papers, they are not specifically referenced. The 
supporting research and backup references can be found in these 
commissioned papers.
from the rise in commodity prices over the 
past decade, but suffered as they collapsed 
during 2008 as a result of the global 
financial crisis. Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 
demonstrate this growth period, and how 
economic growth has correlated with 
employment growth, which is a key 
strategy to reduce poverty. 
South African economic growth has been 
driven by a combination of expanded 
domestic consumption financed by rising 
levels of household debt, which in turn is 
securitized against residential properties, 
and exports of primary resources. The 
manufacturing sector has, unfortunately, 
declined in response to a vigorous strategy 
to lower import tariffs and liberalize the 
capital markets (thus favouring 
investments in liquid assets rather than 
long-term fixed investments). Figure 7.3 
and Figure 7.4 reveal the rise in 
consumption spending and the decline in 
manufacturing.
Figure 7.1. Real GDP growth 1983–2004 
1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  2008 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. Data cited in Quantec, 2010
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Figure 7.2. GDP and employment change 1983–2004 (non-agricultural sectors) 
1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  2008 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. Data cited in Quantec, 2010
Annual change
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Figure 7.3. Final consumption expenditure by households
1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  2008 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. Data cited in Quantec, 2010
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Source: South African Reserve Bank. Data cited in Quantec, 2010
Figure 7.4. Percentage of household saving and debt 1970–2006
1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005  2008 
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The growth in final real demand is shown 
in Table 5.6, but when read against rising 
debt levels and decline in the 
manufacturing sector in the figures that 
follow, it is clear that debt-financed 
consumption has been the driver of 
consumer demand for an increasing 
quantity of imported products. The balance 
of payments pressures this created was at 
first mitigated by the beneficial impacts of 
rising commodity prices. But with the 
global economic crisis, both easy credit to 
drive consumption and high commodity 
prices came to an end. 
South Africa’s dependence on its rich 
endowment of natural wealth is reflected in 
Figure 7.5. It reveals the significance of ore 
extraction, although it has declined since 
1980. At the same time, coal extraction has 
increased to fuel the coal-based electricity 
generation industry which supplies the 
cheapest electricity in the world to South 
Africa’s economy. The low-price coal and 
mineral policy has resulted in limited 
diversification of the economy and high 
levels of inefficiency.
Despite the dependence on ore and coal 
extraction, there is also evidence of 
decoupling in the 20 years leading up to 
2000 as revealed in Figure 7.6. Although 
based on a limited study, Figure 7.6 does 
suggest that a relatively minor level of 
decoupling is taking place – domestic 
material consumption (DMC) of primary 
materials3 has declined while population 
growth and GDP have grown. However, this 
may be misleading because the calculation 
of DMC excludes exported materials, with 
dramatic increases in the export of ores 
and coal as a key driver of GDP growth (see 
Figure 7.7).
In short, South Africa is a good example of 
an economy caught up in the 
financialization of a globalized economy. 
This has undermined manufacturing as 
tariff barriers have been lowered and cheap 
imports from Asia have risen. It has also 
resulted in debt-financed consumption 
spending, and increased dependence on 
revenues from exported primary resources 
3 Domestic material consumption is the sum of domestic extraction 
of primary resources, plus imported primary resources, minus 
exported primary resources. 
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Figure 7.5. Domestic extraction
Source: Social Ecology Database (SEC database, http://www.uniklu.ac.at/soc ec/inhalt/3812.htm) and SERI (www.materialflows.net)
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Figure 7.6. Material efficiency 1980–2000 
1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Source: Social Ecology Database (SEC database, http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/3812.htm) and SERI (www.materialflows.net)
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1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Figure 7.7. Primary material exports 1980–2000
Source: Social Ecology Database (SEC database, http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/3812.htm) and SERI (www.materialflows.net)
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at low prices. The unsustainability of this is 
recognized by the government and key 
stakeholders and various interventions are 
being made. 
However, South Africa is a robust 
constitutional democracy with three layers 
of government (National, Regional, Local) 
that are, in turn, independent from one 
another. This has resulted in very low levels 
of intra-governmental coordination. Each 
sector responds to the sustainability 
challenges in its own way, but what is 
lacking is a government-wide approach 
that connects industrial policy, 
environmental policy, and resource 
management strategies. These sectoral 
responses are discussed further below. 
7.2 Climate change4
Using the Global Climate Models the 
following changes to the South African 
climate within the next 50 years were 
predicted, with drastic impacts on national 
water availability, food and biomass 
production capacity, incidence of disease 
and the country’s unique biodiversity:
• continental warming of between 1 and 
3°C;
• broad reductions of approximately 5 to 
10 % of current rainfall;
• increased summer rainfall in the 
northeast and southwest, but reduced 
duration of summer rains in the 
northeast;
4 Based on the work of the Scenario Building Team 2007, Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2005a.
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• nominal increases in rainfall in the 
northeast during winter season;
• increased daily maximum temperatures 
in summer and autumn in the western 
half of the country; 
• extension of the summer season 
characteristics.
CO2 is South Africa’s most significant 
greenhouse gas (GHG), contributing more 
than 80% of its total GHG emissions for 
both 1990 and 1994. The main source of 
CO2 emissions was from the energy sector, 
which generated 89.7% of total CO2 in 1990 
and 91.1% in 1994. These high emission 
levels relate to the high energy intensity of 
the South African economy, which depends 
on large-scale primary extraction and 
processing, particularly in the mining and 
minerals beneficiation industries. Although 
still a developing economy, its energy 
intensive nature and its dependence on 
coal-driven energy sources results in an 
extremely high carbon emission level per 
unit of GDP compared to the rest of the 
world (see Table 7.1).
A Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) 
exercise (see next page) produced two 
primary scenarios, namely the Growth 
without Constraints Scenario and the 
Required by Science Scenario. The first 
models long-term implications of current 
economic policy, and concludes that 
emissions will grow from 440 megatons of 
CO2-equivalent in 2004 to 1600 megatons of 
CO2-equivalent by 2050. This would involve 
fuel consumption rising by 500%, building 
seven new coal-fired power plants or 68 
Integrated Gassification plants, constructing 
nine conventional nuclear and 12 Pebble 
Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) plants, and 
introducing five new oil refineries. 
Renewable energy will play a negligible role. 
The Required by Science Scenario envisages 
very radical interventions to position South 
Africa in a post-carbon world. The result 
would be a 30–40% reduction of CO2-
equivalent emissions by 2050 from 2004 
levels. The scenario views this ambitious 
programme of extreme decoupling as 
necessary, but admits it cannot be reliably 
costed as the required technologies must 
still mature. The LTMS document was 
adopted by the South African Cabinet in July 
2008, with a commitment to the Required by 
Science Scenario as the preferred option. 
This has major implications for economic 
and development policy.
7.3 Oil resources5
Imported oil meets approximately 16–20% 
of South Africa’s energy needs. Table 7.2 
illustrates that if demand for liquid fuels in 
South Africa (essentially the hydrocarbons 
petrol, diesel and jet fuel) is driven by 
current transport demand patterns and 
transport modes, even modest growth 
rates of 3% and 6% per year would lead to 
increases of 1.8 and 3.2 times the present 
(2004) volumes. 
5 Based on the work by Jeremy Wakeford (Wakeford, 2007).
Population
 (million)
GDP per capita
 US$
Carbon footprint 
(CO2 emissions per 
capita (tons))
Carbon intensity 
(CO2 emissions per 
unit of GDP)
South Africa 46.6 10,715 9.8 0.99
Sub-Saharan Africa 781.3 1,945 1.0 0.57
USA 293.6 40,971 20.6 0.57
OECD 1160.5 28,642 11.5 0.45
World 6389.3 9,348 4.5 0.55
Source: UNDP, 2007
Table 7.1. Comparative carbon emissions 2004
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Current macro-economic policy documents 
do not address the challenge of peak oil. 
There is no estimate of the rate of increase 
of the oil price, nor is there an assessment 
of the potential impact if oil prices continue 
to rise, as they inevitably will. The 
combination of growing demand and rising 
prices will severely undermine economic 
growth and poverty reduction measures. It 
follows that either growth rates must be 
revised downwards, or massive 
investments are required to substantially 
reduce consumption of imported 
hydrocarbons.
7.4 Energy6
Just over 70% of South Africa’s energy is 
derived from coal. This is a long-term trend 
and will more than likely continue well into 
the future. The remaining 30% is derived 
from oil (20%), gas (1.5%), nuclear (3%) and 
biomass (5.1%). Significantly, coal-to-liquid 
and gas-to-liquid technologies account for 
30% and 8% respectively of the total liquid 
fuel supply. 
Cheap energy (possibly the cheapest in the 
world) and abundant coal supplies have 
made it possible to build an energy-
intensive economy. Table 7.3 reveals how 
resource intensive the South African 
economy is compared to other parts of the 
world.
The biggest future challenge for the energy 
sector is the steady growth in electricity 
6 Based on AGAMA Energy, 2005.
demand without a clear plan to increase 
generation capacity. Expanding access to 
electricity by poor households and the 
imperatives of a growing economy put 
increasing pressure on supply. In 2006–07 
rolling blackouts across the country took 
place because reserve margins dropped 
below a safe level of 15% exacerbated by 
inefficient management of coal supply and 
maintenance regimes. 
To date policymakers have paid little 
attention to large-scale energy efficiency 
(EE) and renewable energy (RE) 
interventions. The White Paper on 
Renewable Energy (November 2003) 
identified a RE target of 4% by 2013 and a 
12% reduction in energy intensity by 2014. 
Scenario-building exercises have provided 
evidence that up to 50% of South Africa’s 
future energy supply could come from RE 
by 2050. However, for this to be realized, 
planning and investments need to 
proactively focus on this long-term trend. 
In other words, there is agreement that the 
energy sector must be dematerialized, but 
no agreement on how far this should go or 
on the balance between RE and EE.
In the short term, immediate electricity 
generation needs will be met by re-
commissioning old coal-fired power 
stations. The long-term financial viability 
and security of nuclear power remains 
uncertain. Short-term high-impact 
investments in proven wind and solar 
power technologies could rapidly create the 
basis for a long-term supply of renewable 
energy. 
Low 
growth 
rate (3%)
High 
growth 
rate (6%)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2024 2024
Petrol 10,153 10,566 10,798 10,883 10,861 10,396 10,340 10,335 10,667 10,985 19,840 35,230
Diesel 5,432 5,759 5,875 5,959 5,993 6,254 6,488 6,831 7,263 7,679 13,869 24,628
Jet fuel 1,368 1,601 1,777 1,877 1,995 2,020 1,924 1,967 2,099 2,076 3,749 6,658
Source: Cairncross, 2005
Table 7.2. Past and projected consumption of transportation fuels (million litres/year)
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
94
7.5 Water and sanitation7
With an average annual rainfall of 497mm 
South Africa is a dry country. And, 98% of 
available water resources have already 
been allocated. This means that “South 
Africa simply has no more surplus water 
and all future economic development (and 
thus social well-being) will be constrained 
by this one fundamental fact that few have 
as yet grasped” (Turton, 2008,p.3). The 
country therefore has no further ‘dilution 
capacity’ when it comes to absorbing 
effluents in its water bodies. The 
Johannesburg-Pretoria complex – South 
Africa’s most significant urban-economic 
conurbation – is located on a watershed 
which means that outflows of wastewater 
pollute the water resources this 
conurbation depends on. The result is that 
after China, South Africa’s national water 
resources contain some of the highest 
toxin levels, in particular mycrocystin for 
which no solution currently exists. 
Cyanobacteria blooms, caused by end-of-
pipe NPK loads, threaten national water 
security. Inter-basin water transfers have 
degraded the ecological integrity of 
aquatic systems, and radionuclides, heavy 
7 This section relies on the following documents: Turton, 2008; 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2006; Republic of South 
Africa, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004; Republic 
of South Africa, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2002; 
Ashton & Turton, 2008).
metals and sulphates from mining 
activities have polluted valuable water 
resources. In short, the combination of 
low average rainfall, overexploitation and 
re-engineered spatial flows have led 
South Africa to an imminent water crisis 
in quantity as well as quality. 
According to the Department of Water 
Affairs, in 2000 there was still surplus 
capacity of around 1.4%. Recent models 
indicate that very serious water shortages 
can be expected by as early as 2013. 
Significantly, it is the urban and domestic 
sector where consumption increases are 
set to triple:
Table 7.4 graphically represents the 
resource use crisis that will be generated 
by economic growth and poverty 
TPES/capita TPES/GDP TPES/GDP
Elec. consumption per 
capita 
(national average)
Toe/capita Toe/ 000 1995 US$ Toe/ 000 PPP 1995 US$ kWh/capita
South Africa 2.51 0.63 0.29 4,533
Africa 0.64 0.86 0.32 503
South Korea 4.10 0.31 0.30 5,901
Indonesia 0.69 0.70 0.25 390
Non-OECD 0.96 0.74 0.28 1,028
OECD 4.78 0.19 0.22 8,090
World 1.67 0.30 0.24 2,343
Key: TPES = total primary energy supply, toe = tons of oil equivalent, PPP = purchasing power parity (i.e. adjusted to remove distortions of exchange 
rates), GDP = Gross domestic product.
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin
Table 7.3. Energy intensities
Sector
m3/year
1996 2030
Urban and domestic 2,171 6,936
Mining and industrial 1,598 3,380
Irrigation and afforestation 12,344 15,874
Environmental 3,932 4,225
Total 20,045 30,415
Table 7.4. Historical water consumption (1996) 
and projected water demand (2030) by sector
7. South Africa
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eradication if existing water management 
systems and processes remain unchanged. 
There is scope for major water saving in 
two sectors – urban and domestic use, and 
the agricultural sector. Recycling urban 
wastewater is an urgent priority. For 
example, between 40% and 50% of all 
water piped into households is used to 
flush toilets. Yet it is technically possible to 
flush toilets from on-site grey water flows 
(in particular for large middle class 
homes), or via neighbourhood-level closed 
loop systems that recycle water back to 
households. Rainwater harvesting and grey 
water supplies for irrigation also have 
potential. The second major water-saving 
priority is in agriculture, especially in 
combination with organic farming methods 
that simultaneously rebuild the biological 
capacity of soils and moisture retention 
capacity in the top layers. 
The government is aware of these severe 
water supply constraints. In her 2007 
Budget Speech, the Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry dedicated considerable 
space to her water efficiency campaign, 
with apparent emphasis on regulations and 
tighter controls. But unless more 
immediate and drastic action is taken, 
economic growth will soon be undermined 
by water shortages and related 
dysfunctionalities (like salinization of 
aquifers, etc,). The research results are 
clear: available physical extra capacity in 
2000 was at most 1.7% higher than existing 
requirements, while growth in water 
demand could be as much as 25% higher 
than available yield by 2025. Even if 
demand only increases by 1% per year, by 
2014 the economy will already be facing 
severe shortages on a number of fronts. By 
2019, water shortages will have pulled the 
economy into a downward spiral of low 
growth and growing socio-economic 
inequalities, with associated mini-’resource 
wars’ over water supplies. 
Sophisticated modelling work by University 
of Pretoria researchers shows that a 
combination of physical, fiscal, institutional 
and technological interventions could turn 
this potential disaster into a major 
opportunity for effective sustainable 
resource use (Blignaut, 2006). However, for 
this to occur, water resources need to be 
seen as a ‘binding constraint’, and the 
government must seriously invest in the 
sustainable resource use approach 
advocated by all leading researchers and 
policy managers in the water resource 
sector. 
7.6 Solid waste8
Solid waste includes all municipal and 
industrial waste. As of 2005, the solid 
waste system managed the disposal of 20 
Mt9 of municipal solid waste (MSW), 450 Mt 
of mining-related wastes and 30 Mt of 
power station ashes. 
MSW quantities are growing faster than the 
economy in many cities.10 The typical daily 
average of 2kg/person is 3–4 times that in 
many European cities. Both the quantity 
and nature of solid waste differs 
considerably across the socio-economic 
spectrum. People in informal settlements 
generate on average 0.16kg per day, 
whereas over 2kg per day is not unusual in 
affluent areas. Food and green waste make 
up 35% of waste in affluent households, 
compared with 20% for poor households. In 
Cape Town 60% of industrial waste is 
recycled, compared to only 6.5% of 
residential and commercial waste (among 
the lowest in the world). There is no reason 
to believe that the situation is very different 
in other South African cities.
While many countries have moved away 
from ‘disposal-to-landfill’ as the primary 
means of solid waste management, in 
South Africa the large bulk of MSW is 
disposed of in landfill sites spread out 
across the country. Although national costs 
8 Based on Von Blottnitz, 2005.
9 Mt =1 million metric tonnes or 1 billion kg.
10 For example, in Cape Town MSW is growing by 7% per year.
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have not been calculated, they are probably 
similar to those in Cape Town where the 
cost of managing landfills – and related 
dumping – doubled between 2000 and 
2004. 
Growth in the minerals and coal-based 
energy sector directly leads to increased 
industrial wastes with limited productive 
recycling and reuse – a clear example of 
the way unsustainable resource use is 
coupled to growth and poverty reduction. 
Yet technologies and processes for 
decoupling waste from growth and poverty 
eradication are simple, low cost and 
extensively used throughout the world. 
Waste recycling represents one of the most 
immediate, tangible and low-cost 
investments in dematerialization available. 
It saves on capital costs, creates jobs, and 
forces the middle classes to take greater 
responsibility for the resources they throw 
away. It is also normally a highly 
competitive sector, with sophisticated value 
chains with respect to resources like used 
engine oil, used vegetable oils, a wide 
range of plastics, building rubble, organic 
matter for composting, glass, cans, paper, 
etc. Numerous studies confirm that 
recycling has very positive economic 
benefits with respect to job creation, 
manufacturing and technology and 
innovation. Furthermore, waste recycling 
also has significant export potential.
The National Integrated Waste 
Management Act adopted by Parliament in 
2009 will force every local government 
authority to prepare an Integrated Waste 
Management Plan with defined targets for 
recycling, thus paving the way for a 
recycling revolution in South African cities. 
The stage is now set to move South Africa 
decisively into a post-disposal approach 
with respect to MSW, with a special focus 
$!!$" $!!)" $!#$" $!#)" $!$$"
Figure 7.8. Solid waste disposal in millions of tons in Cape Town, 2002–2027 
a Excludes effect of tourism and industry growth
Note: Effect/implications of waste minimization: Roll-out/implementation must create infrastructure, educate 
and make all aware, encourage public/industry participation, facilitate creation of recycling market through 
partnerships (industry, NGOs, CBOs), enable job creation through recycling rather than clean-ups, and 
enforce stricter standards.
Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town, 2007
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on middle and high income consumers. 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (2002) makes specific 
provision for waste management and 
pollution control in the mining sector. This 
Act, together with the emerging MSW 
approach, provides the basis for the 
emergence of a vast decentralized network 
of market-driven and community-based 
recycling businesses. In addition the 
National Cleaner Production Strategy is 
being beefed up, establishing incentives 
and legal requirements to stimulate 
cleaner production systems (CPS) in the 
business sector – particularly mining and 
construction – with a special focus on 
investments in recycling enterprises. 
7.7 Soils11
South Africa falls within the so-called ‘third 
major soil region’ typical in mid-latitudes on 
both sides of the equator. The result is that 
South Africa is dominated by very shallow 
11 Based on Laker, 2005.
sandy soils with severe inherent limitations 
for agriculture. Only 13% of the land is arable 
and just 3% high potential land. The result is 
overexploitation and the use of inappropriate 
farming methods, as the nation tries to 
exceed its soils’ capacity to meet growing 
food requirements. All this has resulted in 
far-reaching nationwide soil degradation.
Water erosion remains the biggest 
problem, responsible for the loss of an 
estimated 25% of the nation’s topsoil in the 
past century and continuing still. Other 
factors include: wind erosion affecting 25% 
of soils; soil compaction due to intensive 
mechanized agriculture; soil crusting 
caused by overhead irrigation systems; 
acidification of more than 5 million 
hectares of arable land, caused by poor 
farming practices particularly incorrect 
fertilizer and inadequate lime applications; 
soil fertility degradation resulting from 
annual net losses of the three main plant 
nutrients (Nitrogen, Phosphorous and 
Potassium); soil pollution caused by 
various human practices; urbanization 
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often spreading across high-value arable 
land on the outskirts of cities. 
Once degraded, there is little potential for 
recovery. Areas where degradation is 
limited must be prioritized so that efforts 
can be focused on prevention via 
appropriate farming practices. Reversing 
the above trends will require locally 
trained soil scientists who recognize that 
soil conditions are unique (because they 
are ‘third major soil region’ soils) and that 
therefore the nation cannot copy solutions 
generated in countries with a different soil 
profile. Location-specific technical 
solutions are required as blanket 
solutions have proven unworkable. Locally 
trained soil scientists must work together 
with local leader farmers via horizontal 
learning practices. This has worked in 
India, Cuba and many other places in the 
developing world and is urgently required 
in South Africa. 
7.8 Biodiversity12
South Africa is globally recognized as the 
third most biologically diverse country in 
the world, yet this diversity is one of the 
most threatened on the planet. 
Significantly, this concerns not just the 
prevalence of plant and animal species, but 
also critical ecosystems that provide vital 
services to human society.
12 Based on Driver et al., 2005.
Although South Africa has invested 
enormous public, private and community 
resources in the expansion of protected 
areas, conservation areas and reserves, in 
the future, the innovative partnerships will 
be required to ensure that the burden for 
all this is not carried entirely by the fiscus. 
To this end the Protected Areas Act offers a 
unique opportunity. It provides for any land, 
including private or communal, to be 
declared a formal protected area, co-
managed by the landowner(s) or any 
suitable person or organization. This 
means that formal protected area status is 
not limited to state-owned land, and that 
government agencies are not the only 
organizations that can manage protected 
areas, opening the way for a range of 
innovative arrangements not previously 
possible. A related challenge is to make the 
links between protected area development, 
sustainable tourism, and benefits to 
surrounding communities who should be 
key stakeholders in protected areas. 
The National Environmental Management 
Act provides for a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for protecting key 
environmental resources. The core 
instrument used to give effect to this Act is 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
Although development projects must be 
subjected to an EIA, the focus is on costs of 
pollution and environmental impacts, and 
not resource inputs and prices. This does 
not provide a sufficient basis for decoupling 
over the long run. 
Officially classified as threatened Main issues and causes
Terrestrial ecosystems 34% degradation of habitat, invasion by alien species
Freshwater ecosystems
UÊ 7iÌ>`ÃÊ`iÃÌÀÞi`
UÊ ÃÊÌÀi>Ìii`
82%
50%
36%
pollution, over-abstraction of water, poor water 
course condition
Marine ecosystems
UÊ 
ÃÌÕ>ÀiÃÊi`>}iÀi`
65%
62%
climate change, unsustainable marine 
harvesting, seabed destruction by trawling, 
coastline urbanisation, marine pollution
Source: Driver et al., 2005
Table 7.5. Key threats to South Africa’s ecosystems
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7.9 Policy responses
Recent years have witnessed an emerging 
trend in South Africa’s national policy 
discourse calling for more responsible use 
of natural resources. Growing numbers of 
policy statements acknowledge that the 
country’s economic growth and 
development path is too resource-intensive 
and that this needs to change. However, 
this way of thinking is by no means a 
dominant paradigm in policymaking 
circles. Section 24(b) of South Africa’s new 
Constitution commits the state to “secure 
ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social 
development”. This provides the point of 
departure for the National Framework for 
Sustainable Development (NFSD) adopted 
in June 2008 (Republic of South Africa, 
Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, 2007). However, key macro-
economic policy documents make no 
reference to this constitutional provision.
7.9.1 Macroeconomic policy 
versus Section 24(b) of the 
Constitution
In line with an ideological shift since 2002 
away from neo-liberalism towards a more 
‘developmental state’ approach, the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South Africa (ASGI-SA) was adopted in 
2006 as the official economic policy 
framework. Its focus is on specific ‘binding 
constraints’ that must be dealt with via 
concerted state-coordinated interventions 
that run contrary to traditional neo-liberal 
prescriptions. ASGI-SA lists the following 
binding constraints: currency volatility; 
cost, efficiency and capacity of the logistics 
and transport system; shortage of skilled 
labour; barriers to entry and limits to 
competition; regulatory environment; and 
state capacity. 
In 2007, the cabinet adopted the National 
Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) 
(Republic of South Africa, Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2007). The NIPF lists 
four preconditions for effective 
industrialization through industrial sector 
interventions:
• stable and supportive macroeconomic 
environment
• adequate skilled labour supply 
supported by appropriate education 
infrastructure
• existence of traditional and modern 
infrastructure13
• innovation capabilities to foster 
development of domestic technologies 
and systems.
Neither ASGI-SA nor NIPF make any 
reference to Section 24(b) of the 
Constitution. Natural resources and 
ecosystem services are not identified as 
‘binding constraints’ suggesting that no 
action is required to prevent further 
degradation. A viable set of ecosystems 
and long-term supply of natural resources 
are not regarded as preconditions for 
successful industrialization. The implicit 
assumption appears to be that natural 
systems, within which the socio-economic 
system is embedded, are intact and 
durable.
7.9.2 National Framework for 
Sustainable Development
The NFSD was adopted by the cabinet in 
June 2008. In sharp contrast to 
macroeconomic policy, it explicitly 
acknowledges the growing stress on 
environmental systems and natural 
resources from economic growth and 
development strategies, and maps out a 
vision and five ‘pathways’ to a more 
sustainable future:
• enhancing systems for integrated 
planning and implementation
13 Traditional infrastructure includes transport, electricity, water, while 
modern infrastructure refers to wireless, satellite, broadband, fixed 
line and mobile telecommunication networks.
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• sustaining our ecosystems and using 
resources sustainably
• investing in sustainable economic 
development and infrastructure
• creating sustainable human settlements
• responding appropriately to emerging 
human development, economic and 
environmental challenges.
The NFSD commits South Africa to a 
long-term programme of resource and 
impact decoupling. The Government has 
resolved that the NFSD will be converted 
into a full-blown National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development by the end of 
2009 that will include specific targets, 
commitments and budget allocations.
7.9.3 Growing influence of 
sustainability thinking
In July 2008, the South African cabinet 
endorsed the outcomes of the Long Term 
Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) process, which 
explored options for climate change 
mitigation in a multi-stakeholder exercise. 
Reinforcing the NFSD, the LMTS 
recommended the Required by Science 
Scenario that envisages a 30–40% reduction 
in South Africa’s emissions by 2050.
In April 2006 the National Treasury 
published for comment a remarkable 
document entitled A Framework for 
Considering Market-Based Instruments to 
Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in 
South Africa. The document defines an 
environmental tax as a “tax on an 
environmentally-harmful tax base” 
(Republic of South Africa, National 
Treasury, 2006ii (emphasis in original)) and 
examines all existing environmental taxes, 
charges and levies,14 which combined 
14 Transport fuel levies (General Fuel Levy, Road Accident Fund 
Levy, Equalisation Fund Levy, Customs and Excise Levy); Vehicle 
Taxation (Ad Valorem Customs and Excise Duty, Road Licensing 
Fees); Aviation Taxes (Aviation Fuel Levy, Airport Charges, Air 
Passenger Departure Tax); Product Taxes (Plastic shopping bags 
levy); Electricity (NER Electricity Levy; Local Government Electricity 
Surplus); Water (Water Resource Management Charge, Water 
Resource Development and use of Water Works Charge, Water 
Research Fund Levy), and Wastewater (Wastewater Discharge 
Charge System - proposed).
account for approximately 2% of GDP and 
just under 10% of total tax revenue. The 
report suggests that in light of the 
sustainable development challenge, tax 
shifting is required so that taxes levied on 
‘bads’ (such as pollution) can be increased 
and taxes on ‘goods’ (such as labour) 
reduced. This, the report argues, is the 
‘double-dividend hypothesis’ – “minimising 
the burden of environmentally-related 
taxes on the affected sectors, whilst 
creating the required behavioural 
incentives to achieve certain environmental 
outcomes” (Republic of South Africa, 
National Treasury, 2006v). Put differently, 
taxes from unsustainable practices should 
increase, and be re-invested in more 
sustainable practices.
It is noteworthy that the National Treasury 
perspective described above is effectively a 
command-and-control perspective focused 
on impacts. This is different to ‘upstream’ 
interventions that focus on primary 
resource inputs and prices. Nevertheless, 
this report, plus the gathering influence of 
the NFSD, did lead to the following 
statement by the Minister of Finance 
during his Budget Vote speech in 2008:
“We have an opportunity over the decade 
ahead to shift the structure of our economy 
towards greater energy efficiency, and 
more responsible use of our natural 
resources and relevant resource-based 
knowledge and expertise. Our economic 
growth over the next decade and beyond 
cannot be built on the same principles and 
technologies, the same energy systems 
and the same transport modes, that we 
are familiar with today.”
The above quote is the clearest and most 
radical statement by a senior South 
African politician to date about the need 
for far-reaching measures to decouple 
rates of growth from rates of resource 
consumption. Nevertheless, there are 
other Ministers who have responded to 
resource constraints in their respective 
sectors by emphasizing the need for 
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sustainable resource use approaches. 
These include the Minister of Water Affairs 
and Forestry who has admitted that by 
2013 South Africa will face severe water 
shortages if alternatives are not 
implemented; the Minister of Minerals 
and Energy who has finally acknowledged 
that South Africa needs a rapidly 
expanding renewable energy sector;15 and 
the Minister of Housing who wants to see 
all low-income housing settlements 
subsidized by government to include 
sustainable design elements such as 
correct orientation, insulation, public 
transport links, recycling, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy supply. 
Significantly, the Minister of Science and 
Technology has called for a ten-year 
science investment plan that will include a 
strong focus on innovations for 
sustainability, with decoupling referred to 
as a specific goal for innovation research 
and incentives. The Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism has 
completed the National Cleaner 
Production Strategy. This document lays 
down the framework through which 
different stakeholders (government, 
industry and civil society) will participate 
in ensuring that South Africa achieves her 
goals on sustainable production and 
consumption (DEAT, 2005b).
7.10 Decoupling – 
opportunities for action
Perhaps the most significant prospect for 
decoupling in South Africa is the massive 
injection of public and private investment 
funds to drive a vast multi-year 
infrastructure investment programme 
worth nearly R800 billion. A cornerstone of 
the government’s long-term growth 
strategy, this national programme offers a 
unique opportunity to advance towards a 
more sustainable future. There is no doubt 
that public investment in infrastructure is a 
powerful way to ensure that growth sets up 
15 A renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff was introduced in 2009, as well 
as a new Air Quality Management Act.
the conditions for meaningful poverty 
reduction. But there are two key questions.
 
The first is whether these investments 
address the challenges discussed above. 
There are some obvious positive 
investments, such as in public transport, 
upgrading of the rail infrastructure, and 
sustainable approaches to housing. These 
are already government priorities. There 
are also some obvious gaps, e.g. 
investments in soil rehabilitation, water 
and sanitation, air quality and renewable 
energy on scale.
The second question is less about what is 
being built, but rather about how it will be 
built. There is an enormous opportunity to 
design and build low-carbon 
infrastructures and buildings that could 
contribute significantly to decoupling. 
Furthermore, the way infrastructures and 
buildings are developed on scale could be 
the single biggest catalyst ever available to 
drive a long-term commitment to 
sustainable resource use that, in turn, 
frees up resources for poverty eradication. 
Finally, doing things in new ways opens up 
a wide range of new value chains that 
could be exploited by new entrants into the 
sector with major employment creation 
opportunities. In its response to the global 
economic crisis, the government has 
accepted that ‘green collar jobs’ will play a 
role. The box, opposite, provides an 
overview of feasible and affordable 
strategic measures, following priority 
headings used in the ASGI-SA policy 
document to prioritize investment focus 
areas.
7.10.1 Decoupling opportunities
The summary below is an elaboration of 
the national economic development 
priorities of the country aimed at 
demonstrating what the decoupling 
opportunities are. They do not have official 
status, but many are already being 
considered or could be considered with 
relatively minor shifts in policy. 
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7.11 Conclusion
The dominant economic paradigm in 
post-apartheid South Africa has to date 
failed to recognize and address a wide 
range of underlying resource constraints 
that will almost certainly undermine many 
preconditions for growth and 
development. This case study 
demonstrates that growth and poverty 
eradication strategies are not decoupling 
from unsustainable natural resource use 
and exploitation. Reversing this trend will 
require policy frameworks and 
interventions that are currently absent 
from national economic policy documents.
There is broad consensus around two 
economic and social challenges for South 
Africa’s second decade of democracy:
• how to boost growth to 6% and ensure a 
more equitable distribution of wealth;
• how to eradicate poverty, with 
special reference to the Millennium 
Development Goals.
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The sustainability perspective means there 
now is a third challenge, and due to the 
adoption of the NFSD and LTMS, this is 
being recognized:
• how to decouple growth rates and 
poverty eradication from rising 
levels of natural resource use and 
waste (commonly referred to as 
‘dematerialization’).
Many of South Africa’s leading scientists 
have for some time been saying that 
economic growth policies are premised on 
incorrect assumptions about the health 
and durability of its natural resources and 
ecosystem services. Aligning economic 
policy with Section 24 (b) of the 
Constitution is not simply about preserving 
the environment. As other countries have 
experienced, it is also about preventing 
wasteful expenditures on avoidable system 
failures. But above all, it can also be about 
the creation of new opportunities for 
driving non-material forms of growth that 
improve quality of life for all, forever.!
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China8
F our decisive factors determine China’s environmental and ecological status. First, the country’s highly diverse but generally fragile ecological systems: 
one third of its land is arid or drought-prone, 
and one fifth is considered ecologically 
fragile (SEPA, 2004). Second, its huge 
population: currently at 1.3 billion, projected 
to reach 1.5–1.6 billion by 2030, stabilizing at 
around 1.4 billion by 2050 (He Juhuang, 
2001). Third, its limited natural endowment 
on a per capita basis compared to world 
averages.1 Fourth, its economic growth 
1 In per capita terms, China’s mineral resources are 58% of the 
world average; its water resources 25%; its arable land 33%; its 
forest cover just 21% (http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/19598240.
html?fr=qrl3).
path: given the first three factors, China’s 
pattern and pace of growth has become the 
most critical variable in relation to its 
environment.
Since the launch of reform 30 years ago, 
China has gone through four stages of 
economic development (Figure 8.1) (Wang 
Mengkui, 2005). The first was characterized 
by economic recovery featuring rural 
reform and rapid agricultural development. 
The second, from the mid-1980s, witnessed 
the rise of non-agricultural industries 
especially textile and light industries. In the 
third stage, the output of the heavy-
chemical industry began to overtake that of 
Source: China Statistics Yearbooks, 1979–2009, the People’s Republic of China 
Figure 8.1. The process of economic development in China since 1978 
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light industry. The fastest growing sectors 
were in energy and raw materials, such as 
oil and natural gas; infrastructure such as 
roads, ports and power; and household 
appliances. This period was accompanied 
by rapid urbanization. In the fourth stage, 
post-2000, the heavy-chemical industry 
became the major driver for growth.
Heavy-chemical industries are major 
consumers of energy and resources, and 
significant polluters. Starting in the late 
1990s, therefore, China entered an era of 
tremendous environmental challenges. 
Furthermore, China’s industrialization is 
taking place in a highly compressed and 
accelerated timeframe when compared to 
that of Europe, North America and even 
Japan. While this has brought about 
fast-growing material wealth for Chinese 
people, it also means that China faces a 
rapid accumulation of serious 
environmental problems.
8.1 Recognizing limits
Calculated in contemporary prices and 
current exchange rates,2 over the 30 years 
from 1978 to 2008, China’s GDP has 
expanded by an annual average of 9.8% to 
US$4.4 trillion (PRC, 1979; 2009). This 
growth has been non-linear with an 
accelerated rate of growth in later years 
accompanied by massive discharge and 
emission of pollutants. China is now the 
world’s second largest CO2 emitter, and 
may top the world in SO2 emissions and 
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
discharge. COD discharge in China has 
exceeded the environmental carrying 
capacity by 80% and the picture of SO2 
emissions is similarly grave (CCICED, 
2007a; MEPC, 2009). On the resource input 
side, resource intensity3 per unit of GDP is 
about 90% higher than the world average 
(Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2006), while 
energy efficiency is 10% below that of the 
2 US$1 against RMB 6.8337 in February 2009.
3 Including freshwater, primary energy, steel, cement and common 
non-ferrous metals.
developed world. The Chinese government 
acknowledges that the resource and 
environmental cost of economic growth 
has been excessive (CPC, 2007). 
While globalization has brought tangible 
benefits to China, it has also introduced a 
serious challenge of transferred emissions 
as a result of international trade in goods. 
As the world’s manufacturer, China has 
become a net exporter of embodied 
energy.4 CCICED estimates suggest that, 
from 2002 to 2006, China’s net export of 
embodied energy jumped from 240 million 
tons of standard coal equivalent (TCE) to 
630 million tons, and the proportion of 
exported embodied energy in China’s 
overall primary energy consumption 
increased from 16% to 26% (CCICED, 
2007a). This translates into 1,109 billion 
tons CO2 emissions, accounting for 23% of 
its total annual emissions (2005), or 
equivalent to the current total emissions of 
Japan. The percentage of SO2 emissions, 
COD discharge and water consumption 
embodied in net goods exports were 38%, 
18% and 12% respectively (CCICED, 2007a 
and 2007b; Wu Yuping et al., 2008 cited in 
Ren Yong, 2009).
8.2 Policy responses
Recognizing these various resource and 
environmental constraints as a major 
bottleneck for achieving its social and 
economic strategies, the Chinese 
government in 2007 put resource and 
environmental concerns at the top of its list 
of priority problems to be resolved in its 
development path, thereby fundamentally 
altering its development philosophy. The 
11th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (2006–2010) will go down as a 
landmark in the history of reconciling 
environment and economy. The plan sets 
22 quantitative indicators of which eight are 
4 Embodied energy refers to the energy consumed in the production 
of goods. When goods are exported, their embodied energy is also 
exported while pollution is left in the producer country; when a 
country exports more goods than it imports, it may become a net 
exporter of embodied energy, or from the perspective of pollution 
trade, it suffers from an ecological deficit.
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mandatory targets, five of them related to 
environment and resources. The most 
pivotal and challenging targets are a 20% 
reduction of GDP energy intensity, and a 
10% drop in SO2 emissions and COD 
discharge by 2010 (from 2005 levels). To 
ensure achievement of these targets, the 
State Council of China established the 
Leading Group on Energy Conservation and 
Pollution Reduction as well as Climate 
Change, headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, 
and issued the Action Plan for Energy 
Conservation and Pollution Reduction. An 
intensive programme was launched across 
the country, and significant progress has 
been made. By the end of 2008, the GDP 
energy intensity had reduced by 10.08%, 
and SO2 emissions and COD discharge had 
dropped by 8.98% and 6.61% respectively 
(PRC, 2009a).
8.3 Towards an ‘ecological 
civilization’
The concept of ‘ecological civilization’ was 
put forward by the government in 2007. 
From a long-term strategic perspective, 
the idea of ecological civilization elevates 
respect for nature and environmental 
protection to the level of concerns for 
human civilization. It illustrates a Chinese 
vision for green and harmonious 
development that is different from its 
current development path which is 
characterized by ‘black pollution’ 
associated with industrialization. In the 
short run, the idea of ecological civilization 
is to foster a common public consensus 
surrounding the value of environmental 
protection. The building of a resource-
efficient and environment-friendly society 
is the mid-to-long term goal. In order to 
materialize this goal, the Chinese 
government has taken large-scale and 
pragmatic actions. For example, since 
2006, it has launched nationwide 
mandatory energy saving and pollution 
reduction programmes to address low 
resource efficiency and high intensity of 
pollution; to address the linear process 
from primary resources to products and 
further to post-consumption wastes, it has 
promoted circular economy policies; in 
response to climate change, the National 
Action Plan on Climate Change was 
introduced in 2007. Also, in order to provide 
sufficient economic incentives to control 
pollution, the government started to 
introduce a systematic package of 
economic instruments in 2007.
8.4 The circular economy
China has placed great stock in the concept 
of a circular economy, with particular focus 
on the 3R principles5 (Ren Yong et al., 
2005). An official decision was made to 
incorporate the circular economy into the 
11th Five-Year Plan on Social and Economic 
Development. In addition, the State Council 
promulgated Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Speeding up the Development 
of Circular Economy. This was followed by 
expeditious circular economy policy pilot 
projects throughout China in 2006. So far, 
27 provinces and municipalities, 29 
recycling-oriented industrial parks and/or 
enterprises, 89 companies, four townships, 
and 44 industrial parks have become 
involved in these pilot activities under the 
oversight of the central government. In 
October 2008, China enacted the Circular 
Economy Promotion Law, the first of its 
kind in the world. The Law entered into 
force in January 2009, ushering in a new 
phase for the circular economy.
Additional specialized policy frameworks 
on the circular economy include the 
following:
• The Law on Cleaner Production 
Promotion; 
• Management and taxation policies for 
comprehensive utilization of wastes and 
used resources;
5 Reduction, reuse and recyling activities in the processes of 
resources exploitation, production, distribution and consumption.
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• Assessment Standards to evaluate eco-
industrial parks and set out codes for 
their establishment;
• Green procurement by governmental 
agencies and public institutions; 
• Investment policies for piloting the 
circular economy – a special fund to 
support pilot projects.
8.5 Environmental economic 
instruments
China generally relies on a command-and-
control approach to addressing managerial 
issues of various kinds. There is however 
growing recognition that this approach is 
far from adequate to solve the serious 
environmental pollution problems and 
non-compliance behaviour with 
environmental laws. Shortcomings include 
the absence of incentives and flexibility for 
business to control its own pollution, as 
well as negative impacts on social justice 
arising from law enforcement activities. 
This has led the state to introduce a system 
of economic instruments that provide 
incentive mechanisms for resource 
conservation and pollution abatement, as 
well as end-of-pipe pollution treatment. 
These instruments fall into the following 
categories:
1. Natural resource prices and 
environmental fees – this includes 
reform of natural resource and energy 
pricing, paid use of environmental 
services, and fees for pollutants 
emission/discharge, sewage treatment 
and waste disposal.
 Most natural resources in China are 
priced by market supply and demand. 
Government-guided pricing with some 
basis in market conditions is applied 
to a few strategic resources, such as 
electricity, petroleum and coal for 
power generation. In both cases, the 
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biggest challenge in pricing is the 
failure to internalize environmental 
externalities of resource and energy 
consumption. Efforts to reform these 
pricing mechanisms are inevitably time-
consuming and complicated. Pollution 
fees have been imposed on industry 
for over 20 years; fees for sewage and 
garbage disposal have been in place for 
nearly 10 years. Reforms of such fee 
policies are now targeting levy increases 
and focusing on widening the range 
of regulated entities. A further policy 
concept currently under discussion 
is one whereby any acquisition of 
environmental resources must not be 
undertaken without purchasing the 
initial right of use.
2. Resources, energy and environmental 
taxation – this refers to all types 
of taxes aimed at internalizing the 
external ‘diseconomy’. It includes 
taxes on resources, energy and the 
environment, as well as consumption 
taxes and preferential tax policies 
applicable to resource conservation and 
environmental protection.
 Since 2006 China has significantly 
increased tax rates for several mineral 
resources such as gold, petroleum, and 
coal. A consumption tax for fuel was 
introduced in January 2009. Taxes on 
CO2 and SO2 as well as on pollution-
intensive products are currently under 
study. Consumption taxes on large 
engine vehicles, disposable wooden 
chopsticks, and timber floor boards have 
been in place since 2006. The policy on 
mandatory payments for plastic bags has 
also been enforced. Preferential taxation 
policies to encourage investment 
in reuse and recycling facilities and 
pollution treatment have been expanding 
in scope and scale. Since 2007, China 
has imposed a differentiated electricity 
price policy that works against energy 
and pollution-intensive industries. This 
has led to more widespread adoption of 
flue-gas desulphurization (FGD).
3. Green trade policy – mainly targeting 
product export and import tariffs. In 
order to fulfil the mandatory targets 
of energy conservation and pollution 
reduction in the 11th Five-Year Planning 
Period and reduce the trade surplus at 
the same time, tariffs on a considerable 
number of products have been adjusted 
since 2007. For instance, higher export 
tariffs have been imposed on 142 energy 
and pollution-intensive commodities; 
export tariffs on over 80 types of iron 
and steel products will be further 
increased by 5–10%. Export rebates 
were removed from 553 energy-and-
pollution intensive products, including 
endangered fauna and flora. Exports of 
energy and pollution-intensive products 
reduced by as much as 40% by the end 
of 2007 as a result of these various tariff 
adjustments. 
4. Emissions trading – Collaborative 
research with the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency on 
emissions trading since mid-1990s has 
involved pilot activities in a number of 
Chinese cities. SO2 emissions trading 
markets have been established in some 
cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. 
The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection is studying a programme 
of SO2 emissions trading in the power 
sector. 
5. Green consumption policy – this 
includes green governmental 
procurement and other policies 
associated with consumption that 
benefits resource conservation and 
environmental protection. In October 
2006, the former SEPA and the Ministry 
of Finance jointly promulgated Opinions 
on the Implementation of Governmental 
Procurement of Environmentally 
Labelled Products, requiring public 
organizations to give preference to 
products with environmental and 
energy-saving labels when undertaking 
procurement paid for from fiscal 
resources. Following that, both agencies 
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promulgated the List of Environmentally 
Labelled Products for Governmental 
Procurement. 
6. Eco-compensation – also known as 
payments for ecological services. In 
China two types of environment-related 
behaviour are not effectively regulated 
by market-based instruments: (a) 
ecological damage and environmental 
pollution from mining; and (b) economic 
activities in the upper reaches of 
river basins normally restricted 
by regulations for water source 
conservation. In the early 1990s, China 
began to study eco-compensation as 
a solution to both types of problems. 
The basic idea is twofold: using the 
Damager Pays Principle, mineral 
product producers are requested to 
pay; likewise, following the User Pays 
Principle, the region along the lower 
reaches of the river basin and others 
benefiting from the eco-services are 
requested to compensate those in the 
upper reaches for their conservation 
efforts (Ren Yong et al., 2008). A large 
number of local governments are 
actively undertaking pilot activities 
on eco-compensation, with guidance 
provided by relevant government 
agencies. A harmonized national policy 
is expected to be promulgated in the 
near future.
7. Green fiscal policy – such as investment 
in environmental protection, research 
and development of environment-
friendly technologies and products.
 Consistent with the 11th Five-Year 
Plan for Environmental Protection, 
government investment in 
environmental protection from 2006 to 
2010 is expected to reach 1.3% of GDP, 
representing a substantial increase. The 
economic stimulus package launched 
at the end of 2008 in response to the 
financial crisis earmarks 5% for direct 
investment in environmental protection. 
The proportion could be much higher, 
taking into account the indirect benefits 
arising from ‘green elements’ of 
investments in other sectors.
8. Green Finance – green credit, 
environmental liability insurance, 
and environmental requirements for 
security financing are possibly the most 
important innovation since the Chinese 
government began formulating a new 
incentives system for the purpose of 
environmental protection.
 For example, under new protocols banks 
may deny a loan application, suspend 
or withdraw a loan, or provide a loan 
with prudence, based on borrowers’ 
significant environmental risks or 
environmental non-compliance. Green 
credit policy has been implemented 
in the majority of China’s provinces 
and cities, and is now developing in 
line with the Equator Principles.6 
Similarly, the government established a 
corporate environmental performance 
review system for companies entering 
the securities market, along with a 
requirement for information disclosure 
at the time of a company’s listing. And, 
although still in its infancy, an insurance 
system on environmental liabilities is 
being advocated, with pilots particularly 
targeting industrial sectors with a 
record of significant pollution accidents. 
8.6 Decoupling – evidence 
and strategic actions
The metrics of decoupling 
The distinction between absolute and 
relative decoupling has been made earlier 
in this report. But measuring the degree of 
decoupling in an economy remains a thorny 
issue. The OECD has published a set of 31 
indicators covering a broad range of 
6 The Equator Principles (EP) are a set of environmental and social 
benchmarks for managing environmental and social issues in 
development project finance globally. Once adopted by banks 
and other financial institutions, the Equator Principles commit the 
adoptees to refrain from financing projects that fail to follow the 
processes defined by the Principles. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Equator_Principles).
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environmental issues (OECD, 2002a). This 
case study attempts to define a ‘Decoupling 
Index’, a single indicator to help depict the 
degree of decoupling.
The Decoupling Index (DI) refers to the 
ratio of (1) change in the rate of 
consumption of a given resource (e.g. 
water), or in the rate of production of a 
given pollutant emission (e.g. SO2); to 
(2) change in the rate of economic growth 
(GDP) within a certain time period (typically 
one year). For example, if we define
• change in the rate of resources 
consumption or pollution emission 
between year t and year t-1 as 
!Pt = (Pt-Pt-1)
                    Pt-1
• change in the rate of economic growth 
as !Yt = (Yt-Yt-1)
                        Yt-1
• then the Decoupling Index in year t, 
DIt = !Pt
 !Yt
In the case of continued economic growth, 
namely !Yt>0, the Decoupling Index (DI) 
may imply one of three scenarios as follows:
1. When DI>1, it means the increasing rate 
of resource consumption or pollutant 
emissions7 keeps pace with or is higher 
than economic growth (see Case I in 
Figure 8.2). In this case, no decoupling 
is taking place. In other words, as the 
economy grows, resource consumption 
and environmental degradation increase 
rapidly. This is the first half of the 
Kuznets Curve, or ‘climbing stage’ (Area 
A in Figure 8.3). When DI equals 1, it 
is the turning point between absolute 
coupling and relative decoupling. In the 
stage of absolute coupling, a higher 
DI value means higher dependence 
on resources by economic growth, 
lower resource efficiency and heavier 
environmental pollution.
7 Since pollution emission/discharge is related to not only production 
and consumption activities, but also pollution treatment activities, 
in this case it refers to pollutants production. But certainly in case 
studies, pollutants emission/discharge is normally applicable.
Figure 8.2. Scenarios for economic growth and its pressures on environment and resources 
Source: Adapted from Figure 1.1
Trends of economic growth
Trends of resources consumption/pollutants emission
Case I: Coupling — DI!1
Case II: Relatively decoupling — 0"DI"1
Case III: Absolutely decoupling — DI#1
Economic growth
Time
8. China
111
2. When 0<DI<1, it means the rate of 
growth in resource consumption or 
pollutant emissions falls short of that of 
economic growth. In this case, relative 
decoupling is taking place (Case II in 
Figure 8.2 and Area B in Figure 8.3). 
When DI ranges from 0 to 1, lower DI 
means higher resource efficiency and 
lower dependence on resources.
3. When DI=0, it means the economy is 
growing while resource consumption 
remains constant. In other words, 
when the economy grows continuously, 
the amount of pollutants does not 
increase. When resource consumption 
or pollutant emissions/discharge 
decreases while the economy keeps 
growing, then DI<0 (Case III in Figure 
8.2). Here the relationship between 
environment and economy can be 
described as the ‘declining stage’ of the 
Kuznets Curve (Area C in Figure 8.3), 
namely, absolutely decoupling.
8.7 Decoupling trends in 
China8
By applying the DI metric to a number of 
resource input and impact variables, the 
following picture emerges. With respect to 
primary energy consumption since 1992, 
there is evidence of relative decoupling 
(Figure 8.4). During the Asian financial 
crisis, GDP growth rate fell to 7.1% in 1999 
from over 10% before 1996, while total 
energy consumption dropped slightly from 
13.89 trillion TCE to 13.38 trillion TCE. As a 
result, DI in 1997 and 1998 stood at -0.1 
and -0.5 respectively, representing 
absolute decoupling. From 2002, GDP 
growth climbed back to over 10% 
underpinned by massive growth in the 
heavy-chemical industry. 
As a result, DI in 2003, 2004 and 2005 
reached 1.5, 1.6 and 1.0 respectively, 
representing re-coupling of energy 
8 Data sources of all figures in this section include: China Statistics 
Yearbook 1990–2007, China Environmental Statistics Yearbook 
1990–2007, China Water Resources Statistics Yearbook 1998–2008.
Figure 8.3. Three stages of economic growth and pressures on environment and resources 
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Source: Adapted from Figure 2.8   
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Figure 8.4. Trends (left) of energy, GDP and population and the decoupling index (right) of primary 
energy consumption to GDP growth 
Source: China Statistics Yearbooks, 1993–2008, the People’s Republic of China
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consumption and economic growth. In 
2006, following the launch of a massive 
energy saving and pollution reduction 
programme, energy consumption began to 
relatively decouple from economic growth. 
A more remarkable trend can be observed 
in freshwater (Figure 8.5). For most of the 
last 10 years, China achieved absolute 
decoupling between freshwater 
consumption and economic growth. During 
1998–2007, total freshwater consumption 
varied within a small range between 290.1 
and 306.2 billion m3. But in terms of 
mineral consumption China faces huge 
challenges. For instance, the country’s 
steel consumption jumped nearly tenfold 
from 53 million tons in 1990 to 520 million 
tons in 2007, and steel consumption per 
unit of GDP increased at a rate higher than 
1998  2001  2004  2007  1998  2001  2004  2007 
1998 2001 2004
Figure 8.5. Trends (left) of fresh water consumption, GDP and population and the decoupling index 
(right) of fresh water consumption to GDP growth
Source: China Water Resources Statistics Yearbooks, 1999–2008, the People’s Republic of China
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Figure 8.6. Trends (left) of industrial waste water and solid waste discharge and GDP and the 
decoupling index (right) of industrial waste water and solid waste discharge to GDP
Source: China Environmental Statistics Yearbooks, 1993–2008, the People’s Republic of China
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GDP growth (China Statistics Yearbook 
1990–2007, cited in Ren Yong, 2000). 
On the impact side, the emission/discharge 
of a number of pollutants began to 
decouple from economic growth in the 
early 1990s. Since 1992, industrial 
wastewater discharge and solid waste 
discharge have absolutely decoupled in a 
number of years, with the DI of solid waste 
falling below -1 several times (Figure 8.6).9 
Progress in this area owes much to the 
improved recycling rate and proper 
disposal of industrial solid waste. 
9 China made an adjustment to the scale of data collection for a 
number of pollutants in 1998, causing irregularities in indicators of 
industrial solid waste, COD, SO2 and so on. This report therefore 
does not take into account the statistics in 1998, resulting in broken 
curves in relevant charts. However, this would not affect the 
analysis result as a whole.
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Figure 8.7. Trends (left) of COD discharge, SO2 emission and GDP and the decoupling index (right) of SO2 
emission and COD discharge to GDP 
Source: China Environmental Statistics Yearbooks, 1993–2008, the People’s Republic of China
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In most years since 1992, there has been 
absolute decoupling of COD discharge 
(indicator for water pollution) and relative 
decoupling of SO2 emissions (indicator for 
air polluttion) (Figure 8.7). These results 
are in part linked to China’s total volume 
control programme for pollutants launched 
back in 1996. However, a new stage of 
rapid economic growth and industriali-
zation since 2002 has seen a re-coupling of 
SO2 emissions and economic growth.
Finally, it should be noted that the 
decoupling of certain pollutant emissions/
discharge does not necessarily mean that 
environmental quality has improved. In 
fact, despite the decrease of total volume 
of some pollutants, their emissions/
discharge still far exceeds the self-
purification capacity of the environment. 
Given historical accumulation, environ-
mental quality may further deteriorate in 
China.
8.8 Actions towards 
decoupling
Following adoption of the 11th Five-Year 
Plan, the Chinese government has pursued 
a three-pronged strategy to raise energy 
efficiency and reduce pollution:
1. Industrial restructuring. The main 
approach here is the phasing out of 
outdated production capacity. In the 
Action Plan for Energy Conservation and 
Pollution Reduction, the State Council 
of China set detailed targets for phasing 
out outdated production capacity of 12 
energy-intensive and heavily-polluting 
industrial sectors.10 This work is ahead 
of schedule and has so far played an 
essential role in energy conservation 
and pollution reduction.
2. Energy conservation programmes and 
construction of pollution treatment 
facilities. The following programmes 
10 Power, iron, steel, electrolytic aluminium, iron alloy, calcium 
carbide, coke, cement, glass, paper, alcohol, and citric acid.
are ahead of schedule in terms of their 
respective targets:
• 10 national energy conservation 
programmes in energy-intensive 
industrial sectors aimed at 
conserving an equivalent of 240 
million TCE. 
• Wastewater treatment facilities 
aimed at increasing daily urban 
sewerage treatment capacity by 
45 million tons and daily usage of 
recycled water by 6.8 million tons. 
• Installation of desulphurization 
facilities (FGD) for coal power plants, 
aimed at reaching 0.355 billion 
Kilowatts.
3. Strengthened environmental 
management. Specific measures 
include:
• Making better use of environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) 
mechanisms and raising 
environmental benchmarks to stop 
the access of energy-intensive and 
heavily-polluting industrial sectors.
• Strengthening environmental 
supervision and inspection, 
and strict application of the 
‘regional environmental approval 
suspension’11 on serious breaches of 
environmental laws and regulations. 
• Setting up a complete system of 
statistics, monitoring and reviewing 
for pollution reduction; incorporating 
pollution reduction indicators into 
the performance review system 
for local governments and their 
main leaders; and establishing an 
accountability system. 
11 If environmental laws and regulations are seriously breached in a 
specific jurisdiction, MEP will suspend environmental approval for 
all new projects within this region.
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• Setting up a special fiscal fund for 
energy conservation and pollution 
reduction. 
• Introducing market-based 
and fiscal-oriented incentive 
instruments.
Circular economy activities involving all 
stages in the economic cycle – resource 
exploitation, production, distribution, and 
consumption – are being implemented at 
three levels: 
• enterprises – focusing on cleaner 
production and raw materials’ 
recycling, thus raising resource 
efficiency and reducing pollution, or 
even achieving zero emission;
• industrial parks – restructuring 
existing parks and organizing new 
industrial parks in line with 3R 
principles, focusing on building eco-
chains and shared infrastructure 
systems for water and energy supply 
and centralized waste treatment;
• regional (e.g. city, province) – using 
a dual approach: (a) establishing 
a reuse and recycle industry, and 
(b) among consumers, advocating 
resource and energy conservation, 
rational and environmentally-friendly 
lifestyles, green governmental 
procurement, energy efficiency 
certification and environmental 
product labelling.
The circular economy in China is at an 
early stage of development, and no 
systematic analysis of its effectiveness has 
yet been published. However, some 
preliminary findings indicate that the 
energy efficiency and pollution intensity in 
the pilot entities are superior to those in 
other areas (NDRC, 2008). 
8.9 One world, one dream – 
the Green Olympics
In 2002, Beijing Municipality formulated its 
Olympic Action Plan with an Environmental 
and Ecosystem Protection Plan as an 
integral part of it. In the following seven 
years, over 160 specific programmes were 
implemented, resulting in significant 
improvements of air quality and the 
environment of the entire city.
8.10 Conclusion
This case study demonstrates that through 
concerted efforts, resource and impact 
decoupling can be achieved. Resources and 
energy efficiencies in China have been 
increasing, and both intensities and 
volumes of major pollutant emissions have 
been falling. Since the early 1990s, a 
relative decoupling between primary 
energy consumption and economic growth 
has taken place, and there has been an 
absolute decoupling of freshwater 
consumption throughout most of the past 
decade. Since 1992, industrial wastewater 
discharge and SO2 emissions have 
relatively decoupled, and COD and 
industrial solid waste discharges have 
absolutely decoupled in most years. And, 
through a strong commitment to the 2008 
Green Olympic Games, industrial 
wastewater and COD discharges and SO2 
and NOx emissions in Beijing all absolutely 
decoupled from the city’s rapid GDP growth 
since the end of last century. 
Environmental quality in the city has been 
greatly improved.
However, many challenges for China’s 
decoupling ambitions are evident. They 
include a huge population; an extensive 
pattern of economic growth with a legacy of 
low resource efficiency and high intensity 
of pollution emissions centred on heavy-
chemical industrial sectors; rapid 
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
116
How Beijing fulfilled its commitments to Green Olympics
1. Air pollution control measures
Restructuring Energy Components: Natural 
gas supply increased from 1.4 billion m3 
in 2001 to 4.7 billion m3 in 2007. A total 
of 16,000 coal boilers below 14MW 
and 44,000 coal cooking facilities were 
converted to natural gas. Renewable 
energies such as biomass, ground thermal 
and solar energy were promoted; the 
ratio of cleaner energy in total energy 
consumption increased from 45.4% in 2001 
to 62% in 2007.
Vehicle Emission Control: (a) More 
stringent standards: Euro II, Euro III, and 
Euro IV Vehicle Emission Standards and 
relevant standards on vehicle fuels were 
introduced in succession. (b) Green Public 
Bus Fleet: over 10,000 old polluting public 
buses and 50,000 aged taxis were replaced. 
By the time of the games, all 20,000 public buses met Euro III emission standards, with 4,000 natural gas buses, the largest 
Õ\\kf]`kjb`e[`ek_\nfic[%Z MF:Zfekifc1Xcc^XjjkXk`fej#f`ckXeb\ijXe[[\gfkj`e9\`a`e^Zfe[lZk\[f`cXe[^Xji\Zfm\ip
renovation to reduce pollution generated in the fuel storage and refilling process. (d) Building attractive public transport: 
public bus and metro fares were reduced to attract the public; total mileage of the metro was extended from 40km in 2001 to 
200km in 2008; 60km of surface BRT system is now in operation. 
Industrial Restructuring: The economy was restructured and the regional development layout readjusted. Processes and 
\ek\igi`j\jn`k__`^_\e\i^pZfejldgk`feXe[_\Xmpgfcclk`fen\i\g_Xj\[flk%?`^_$\e[`e[ljki`\jjlZ_Xje\n_`$k\Z_
industries and modern service industries have been promoted and the ratio of tertiary industries is now over 70% of total 
GDP. From 2000 to 2007, 200 polluting enterprises were closed, converted to other production or resettled. Beijing’s 
large-scale coal-fired power plants underwent desulphurization, dust-removal and de-nitrification renovation, making their 
emission performance levels among the best in the world.
2. Eco-conservation
Three green eco-shelter-belts have been established in the mountainous areas, plains, and urban areas, with forest 
coverage at 51.6%, the urban green coverage at 43% and per capita green area of 48m2.
3. Water environment
16.1 billion Yuan were invested in protection of drinking water sources, wastewater treatment and rehabilitation of urban 
water courses. With the completion of 9 sewage treatment plants, the sewage treatment rate reached 92% in 2007. There 
are 11 recycling water plants in operation, and 57% of urban water is reused.
4. Solid waste management
Sorted collection of urban waste is promoted. Some 23 environmentally-safe disposal facilities have been completed. The 
waste collection rate in urban districts is 99.9% compared to 80% in suburban areas. Around 96.47% of industrial solid 
wastes are reused and recycled. 
5. Regional cooperation
Temporary measures were developed and implemented in cooperation with neighbouring cities and provinces to guarantee 
^ff[X`ihlXc`kp]fik_\Fcpdg`Z>Xd\j%>ff[X`ihlXc`kpnXjdX`ekX`e\[[li`e^k_\Fcpdg`Z>Xd\j]fike`^_k%
Source: Beijing Municipal EPB
©
 M
ar
k 
Hr
yc
iw
/D
re
am
st
im
e
8. China
117
urbanization and associated changes in 
consumption patterns; environmental 
impacts induced by globalization and 
China’s status as the ‘world’s 
manufacturing centre’. 
Addressing these challenges requires a 
complex combination of consolidated 
political willingness, scientific strategies, 
and pragmatic and intensive actions. With 
the birth of the Scientific Outlook for 
Development in 2003 as a milestone, China 
has moved into a strategy transformation 
period of restructuring the relationship 
between environment and society, and 
gradually drawn up a visible roadmap for 
reconciling the environment and socio-
economic development. Continuous, 
focused and intensive actions such as 
energy conservation and pollution 
abatement, the circular economy, the 
national climate change programme, 
introduction of environmental economic 
instruments and so on, are vital steps 
towards China’s vision of absolutely 
decoupling after 2030.!
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Japan9
T he Japanese economy is very dependent on imports of natural resources, such as energy, food and other raw materials. This 
geopolitical fact of life means that its use 
of primary materials is to a large extent 
separated from the ecological impacts at 
the point of their extraction. Yet even in 
Japan there are visible problems 
associated with the increasing volume and 
diversified nature of solid wastes (such as a 
shortage of disposal sites, risk of 
environmental pollution by waste treatment 
facilities, illegal dumping, and rising costs). 
The spirit of ‘Mottainai’ is a long-established 
Japanese concept meaning that it is a 
shame for something to go to waste without 
having made use of its potential in full. The 
expression incorporates a respect for the 
environment that has been handed down 
through the ages, and constitutes a societal 
value that is essential to the nation’s efforts 
to become a ‘Sustainable Society’ as 
signalled by a Cabinet decision on 1 June 
2007.1 This is finding expression in policy 
frameworks and innovations that are 
uniquely Japanese.
1 See www.env.go.jp/en/focus/070606.html.
©
 M
ar
ia
n 
M
oc
an
u/
Dr
ea
m
st
im
e 
119
9.1 Recognizing limits
9.1.1 Limits of resources – lessons 
learned from oil crises
In the beginning of the 1970s, Japan’s 
dependency rate on imported oil was more 
than three quarters of Total Primary Energy 
Requirement (TPER). Two world oil crises in 
1973 and 1979 caused significant shocks to 
the Japanese economy and society. Prices 
of goods soared and nervous consumers 
rushed into the market to secure daily 
necessities. Such reactions caused a vicious 
circle of rising prices and shortages of 
commodities. In this sense, it could be said 
that Japanese consumers did recognize the 
‘limits’ of an oil-dependent economy, though 
some of the short-term chaotic situations in 
the market were obviously a function of 
incomplete information.
Industries reacted to the crises by investing 
large amounts of money to save energy and 
improve energy efficiency. There were 
significant levels of decoupling between 
energy consumption and economic 
production by manufacturing industries 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
While oil dependency of national primary 
energy supply has decreased gradually to 
less than half, it is still higher than that of 
other developed economies. Energy saving 
and fuel switching as a reaction to the oil 
crises generated favourable side effects 
with respect to air pollution abatement. For 
the reduction of SOx emissions, it is true 
that impact decoupling such as flue gas 
desulfurization was successful. In addition, 
reduction of oil consumption through 
energy-efficiency improvements and fuel 
switching to natural gas and other primary 
energy sources also significantly 
contributed to SOx reductions (Ministry of 
the Environment, Government of Japan, 
1992). These successes can be taken as an 
example of the combination of resource 
and impact decoupling. 
9.1.2 Limits at the end-of-pipe
The amount of solid waste generation is 
sometimes regarded as a proxy of an 
affluent lifestyle, which implies high levels 
of resource consumption that ends up as 
waste products. Because of its high 
population density, Japan has been facing 
shortages of landfill capacity. To reduce 
waste volumes going to landfill, 
incineration has increased significantly. In 
the late 1980’s, the increase in municipal 
solid waste generation was obvious, 
apparently coupled to economic growth. 
However public concern over risks of 
environmental pollution associated with 
waste treatment processes has made it 
more difficult to expand the capacity of 
waste treatment facilities. Large 
investments were made to replace old 
incinerators with state-of-the-art facilities 
that successfully decoupled dioxin 
emissions from the voluminous waste 
incineration. Moreover, in parallel with 
these efforts at impact decoupling, the 
government began to take measures for 
decoupling waste generation from 
economic growth. The recognition of limits 
of resources was not the direct, primary 
driving force behind waste prevention, but 
it has been advocated and recognized, 
including through the Mottainai spirit, that 
waste prevention and recycling contributes 
to resource saving.
The Japanese government has been 
submitting annual Quality of the 
Environment reports (State of the 
Environment Report) to the Diet since 1969. 
In its prologue to the 1998 annual report 
(GoJ, 1998), ‘limits’ to resources was 
explicitly mentioned, including a reference 
to ancient civilizations. Roughly translated, 
the essence of the message was as follows:
“Many ancient civilizations developed 
utilizing their rich forest resources, but as 
development proceeded and human 
populations increased, the resources 
were depleted and the civilizations in turn 
declined and perished.
“Unlike the ancient civilizations, the 
environmental impacts of which were 
limited to certain areas on earth, our 
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
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society (civilization) of the present day 
stands at a point of no return. The reason 
for this situation is that in a very short 
period of time we have been consuming 
natural resources, including fossil fuels, 
which have been generated and stored 
over millions, if not billions, of years. 
“At the same time we have been disposing 
of great quantities of wastes. These have 
exceeded the natural capacity of 
ecosystems to break down waste and 
have thus placed, and continue to place, 
huge pressure on the environment.
“In order to avoid such environmental 
load, it is necessary first to properly 
control and circulate substances 
generated by human activities and to 
reduce the burden on the environment. 
Secondly, by understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of nature which 
are the foundations upon which all human 
activities depend, it is necessary to 
transform our society, establishing an 
economic and social system that is based 
on the principles of ‘circularity’ and 
‘coexistence’, wherein human activities 
can be harmoniously adjusted to suit the 
mechanisms of nature .”
Based on this recognition of limits, policies 
for transition to a Sound Material Cycle 
Society have been formulated.
9.2 Policy responses
Inspired by the Earth Summit in Rio 
(UNCED 1992), the Japanese government 
enacted the Basic Environment Law in 
1993. This was followed by adoption of the 
Basic Environment Plan in December 1994. 
This plan outlines the overall and long-
term policies of the government in 
environmental conservation. In its 
foreword, the plan recognized mainstream 
socio-economic activities as a common 
driving force behind various environmental 
problems: 
“There is a growing need to reconsider 
our values placing too much emphasis on 
the pursuit of material wealth, and the 
prevailing socio-economic activities and 
lifestyles marked by mass-production, 
mass-consumption, and mass-disposal.”
It went on to affirm that Japanese society 
must change to a sustainable one that 
generates little burden on the environment, 
while at the same time promoting 
international activities for conserving the 
global environment (GoJ, 1994).
However, a review conducted by the OECD 
pointed out that despite quite advanced and 
sometimes exemplary policies, the 
decoupling achieved in the 1990s had not 
been sufficient (OECD, 2002). CO2 
emissions continued to increase as did a 
number of pollution trends, most notably 
those related to traffic and energy use. 
Remaining waste disposal capacity was 
also reaching a critical point. This led the 
government to take firmer steps towards 
establishing a sound material cycle society 
(SMC). While its conceptual linkage with 
the policies for a low carbon society was 
made at later stage, reduction of CO2 has 
yet to be sufficient compared to the target 
of Kyoto Protocol. This case study does not 
undertake further analysis of energy and 
CO2 issues, but focuses on material cycles. 
An exception is the so-called ‘top runner’ 
approach for energy consumption by 
electrical appliances. 
9.2.1 Towards a sound material 
cycle society
The term ‘Junkan-gata-shakai’ (Sound 
Material Cycle Society) was first coined in 
1991 by an expert committee of the Japan 
Environment Agency (Moriguchi, 2008). The 
concept of a SMC is firmly rooted in 3R 
principles.2 Japan’s commitment to a 3R 
policy is premised on a growing recognition 
of two factors – first, that the increase in 
waste generation and waste not treated in 
an environmentally-sound manner is 
contributing to worsening environmental 
2 Reduce, reuse and recycle.
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pollution worldwide including air, soil and 
water pollution as well as greenhouse gas 
emissions; and second, that the quantity of 
raw materials wasted as a result of 
inefficient resource and waste 
management worldwide is immense.
Thus, the SMC society is one in which 
measures such as reduced waste 
generation and reduced extraction of 
resources, reuse, recycling, and 
appropriate disposal have been advanced 
in a balanced manner (Figure 9.1). The first 
step in building an SMC society is, 
therefore, to understand the flows of 
materials in the economic sector, in terms 
of the resources extracted, consumed and 
disposed of. This would not only enable 
reduced generation and cyclical use of 
wastes, but also generate knowledge to 
promote the efficient use of all material 
inputs to the economy and to inform future 
policy. Material Flow Accounts (MFA) have 
therefore become an integral feature in 
Japanese environmental policy, identifying 
the whole system of material flows in the 
national economy and providing itemized 
overviews for such flows. This enables the 
government to set numerical targets for 
so-called material flow indicators, as 
follows (GoJ, 2009):
• resource productivity = GDP/Direct 
Material Input; target value: Yen 
420,000/ton (60% improvement 
compared to the year 2000)
Figure 9.1. Scheme of a sound material cycle society (SMC)
Source: Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, 2009
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• cyclical use rate = cyclical use amount/
(natural resources input + cyclical use 
amount); target value: 14 to 15% (40 to 
50 % improvement compared to the year 
2000)
• final disposal amount = sum of general 
wastes and industrial waste; target 
value: 23 million tons (60% reduction 
compared to the year 2000)
There are successful trends towards the 
attainment of these targets, as shown in 
Figure 9.2.
9.2.2 The Fundamental Law and 
Plan
A Fundamental Law for Establishing a 
Sound Material Cycle Society has been in 
place since 2000. The 1st Fundamental Plan 
for Establishing a Sound Material Cycle 
Society was adopted by the cabinet in 2003, 
and a revised 2nd Plan was adopted in 2008. 
These legal instruments provide the 
fundamental framework to integrate 
environmentally-sound management of 
wastes and efficient use of natural 
resources into Japan’s mainstream 
economic processes. Several sectoral 
recycling laws for specific products and 
Figure 9.2. Trends of material flow indicators
Source: Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, 2010
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sectors have been enacted and revised to 
support the transition towards an SMC 
society. The Law on Promoting Green 
Purchasing supports demand-side of 
recycled products (Figure 9.3).
9.3 Contribution to 
international initiatives
In parallel with the enforcement of 
national 3R policies, the Japanese 
government has played an active role 
internationally to disseminate the concept 
and practical experiences of 3R, by 
proposing and implementing the ‘3R 
Initiative’ at the G8. The G8 environment 
ministers adopted the Kobe 3R action plan 
in 2008 under the Japanese presidency of 
G8. The action plan referred explicitly to 
the need to support capacity 
developments in developing economies. 
The plan also encourages each country to 
set targets such as resource productivity.
9.4 Japan’s strategy for a 
sustainable society
As shown in Figure 9.3, Japan’s policy for 
SMC is positioned under the umbrella of 
overall environmental policy. Despite the 
fact that resource efficiency is closely 
interrelated with energy efficiency, SMC 
policy has not been directly linked to 
energy and GHG mitigation policies. 
Recently, a strategy with a more integrative 
view across energy, material and 
ecosystem resources was proposed. 
“Becoming a Leading Environmental 
Nation Strategy in the 21st Century – 
Japan’s strategy for a Sustainable Society” 
was decided upon by the cabinet on 1 June 
2007. The strategy proposes to build a 
sustainable society through comprehensive 
measures integrating the three aspects of 
the society, specifically, a low carbon 
society, a sound material cycle society and 
a society in harmony with nature, as shown 
in Figure 9.4.
Figure 9.3. Legislative framework for sound material cycle policy
Source: Moriguchi, 2011
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9.5 Decoupling – evidence 
and innovation
9.5.1 Voluntary actions by industries 
The fundamental plan for SMC sets a 
national target of resource productivity and 
obligates the government itself to achieve 
it, but the plan does not set binding targets 
for industries. Nevertheless, voluntary 
efforts have been made to incorporate the 
Factor X concept into businesses. For 
example, as many as eight Japanese 
leading electronics companies (Fujitsu, 
Hitachi, Panasonic, Mitsubishi, NEC, Sanyo, 
Sharp and Toshiba) are collaborating to 
develop the guidance system for the 
Common Factor X approach: 
“Eight major electronics companies in 
Japan have voluntarily agreed to develop 
the guidance for Common Factor X via 
Eco-Efficiency Evaluation to provide 
meaningful indicators as a powerful 
communications tool between 
manufacturers and consumers.” 
“The first step is for air conditioners, 
refrigerators, lamps and lighting 
apparatus, because these four products 
cover 60% of electricity consumption of 
households in Japan.” (Shibaike et al., 
2008)
Innovative efforts by individual companies 
were published as peer-reviewed journal 
papers (for the Panasonic case, see Aoe, 2007 
and for Toshiba, see Kobayashi et al., 2007). 
As indicated by these example cases, 
manufacturing industries in Japan have 
been actively involved in research activities 
such as industrial ecology and cleaner 
production, and have applied this expertise 
to actual business practices. International 
conferences on eco-balance, eco-design, 
and eco-materials have been regularly 
organized during last decade with the 
participation of different industry sectors 
(Moriguchi, 2000). The most recent annual 
eco-products exhibition attracted as many 
as 174,000 visitors.
Figure 9.4. Framework of Japan's strategy for a sustainable society
Source: Government of Japan, 2007
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9.5.2 Actions by local authorities 
In Japan, local governments are 
responsible for the management of 
municipal solid waste (MSW). Their efforts 
to reduce environmental and economic 
burdens associated with waste 
management vary significantly, according 
to their demographic, geographic, and 
industrial diversities. The following is just 
an example quoted from the recent Annual 
Report on the Environment and the Sound 
Material Cycle Society.
“With no incinerating facilities of its own, 
Shibushi City has to dispose of all its 
wastes in landfills. By means of the 
sorted collection of wastes into 28 
categories, the city government has 
successfully reduced the amount of 
landfill wastes by 80% [as shown in Figure 
9.5]. To deal with kitchen garbage, the city 
also implements the ‘Sun Sun Sunflower 
Plan’, which produces sunflower oil from 
kitchen garbage as part of its efforts to 
achieve zero landfill wastes through 
regional collaboration.”
9.5.3 A Japanese approach to 
decoupling: the Top Runner 
Programme3
In many countries, the energy efficiency of 
electrical appliances is enhanced by 
Minimum Efficiency Performance 
Standards (MEPS). Japan followed a 
different strategy. Instead of setting a 
minimum efficiency standard, its Top 
Runner Programme searches for the most 
efficient model on the market and then 
stipulates that the efficiency of this top 
runner model should become the standard 
within a certain number of years. The Top 
Runner Programme applies to machinery 
and equipment in the residential, 
commercial, and transportation sectors.
The Top Runner Programme sets targets by 
product category.4 In each category, the 
most efficient model currently on the 
3 This section is largely based on an article by Bruno Wachter (2006).
4 Products currently covered are: passenger vehicles, freight 
vehicles, air conditioners, electric refrigerators, electric freezers, 
electric rice cookers, microwave ovens, fluorescent lights, electric 
toilet seats, TV sets, video cassette recorders, DVD recorders, 
computers, magnetic disk units, routers, switches, copying 
machines, space heaters, gas cooking appliances, gas water 
heaters, oil water heaters, vending machines, transformers (see 
http://www.eccj.or.jp/top_runner/index.html).
Figure 9.5. Waste management efforts in Shibushi City 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Source: Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, 2008
Tons
15,000
12,500
0
10,000
!"Recycled waste
!"Waste for landfill/incineration
2,500
5,000
1998 20041999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006
7,500
Fiscal year
Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth
126
Product category
Energy efficiency improvement 
(actual result, %)
Energy efficiency improvement 
(initial expectation, %)
TV receivers 25.7 16.4
VCRs 73.6 58.7
Air conditioners 67.8 66.1
Electric refrigerators 55.2 30.5
Electric freezers 29.6 22.9
Gasoline passenger vehicles 22.8 22.8
Diesel freight vehicles 21.7 6.5
Vending machines 37.3 33.9
Computers 99.1 83.0
Magnetic disk units 98.2 78.0
Fluorescent lights 35.6 16.6
Source: ECCJ, 2008
market is used to set the standard to be 
attained by the rest of the industry within 
four to eight years. By the target year, each 
manufacturer must ensure that the 
weighted average of the efficiency of all its 
products in that particular category is at 
least equal to that of the top runner model. 
This approach eliminates the need to ban 
specific inefficient models from the market. 
At the same time, manufacturers are made 
accountable and, perhaps most importantly, 
they are stimulated to voluntarily develop 
products with an even higher efficiency than 
the top runner model.
The Top Runner standards are set by 
committees with representatives from the 
manufacturing industry, universities, trade 
unions, and consumer organizations. They 
follow well-defined procedures. An 
efficiency standard for a product category 
will rarely be a single numerical value. In 
most cases, it will vary according to a basic 
index, for instance, the weight of a car, the 
size of a TV screen, or the power of an air 
conditioner. If certain additional functions 
of a product correspond to a high market 
demand, but make it virtually impossible to 
achieve target values, a separate category 
may be created. If the pay-back ratio of 
newly developed products complying with 
the standard becomes too low, two 
separate categories may be created as 
well: one for the expensive, highly efficient 
models, and one for the reasonably priced, 
low-energy models. These kinds of flexible 
principles ensure that the Top Runner 
Programme does not limit the consumer’s 
choice.
The programme has achieved good results 
(see Table 9.1), despite having relatively 
weak legal leverage. Prescribed under 
Section 6 of the Energy Conservation Law, 
it merely stipulates that manufacturers 
have ‘the obligation to make efforts to 
achieve the target’. The real power of this 
programme lies in the fact that non-
compliance puts the brand image of a 
company at risk. If a company is not able to 
meet targets or fails to make a good faith 
attempt at reaching the standard in spite of 
several warnings, this fact is publicized. 
Given the strong role that corporate pride 
plays in Japanese culture, this is 
something each company will make 
considerable efforts to avoid. Consumers, 
in turn, are also made to assume a certain 
level of responsibility through a labelling 
system. Individual products that do not 
meet the target are not withdrawn from the 
market, but they receive an orange label, in 
contrast to a green label for the models 
which do achieve the top runner standard.
Table 9.1. Top Runner Programme achievements 
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9.6 Lessons from the use 
of resource productivity 
indicator
The Fundamental Plan for Establishing the 
Sound Material Cycle Society adopted a 
resource productivity indicator in its 
simplest form, i.e., GDP divided by DMI 
(Total weight of direct inputs of resources). 
This kind of simplicity was useful to 
demonstrate the concept of decoupling of 
economic growth from physical growth. 
However, experts have often debated 
whether or not these macroscopic material 
flow indicators are useful proxy indicators 
that properly represent both resource and 
environmental problems.
Since the adoption of the 1st Fundamental 
Plan in 2003, the performance of the Plan 
has been reviewed annually by the Central 
Environmental Council of Japan. The 
progress of material flow indicators toward 
numerical targets has also been reviewed. 
This review process revealed needs for 
improvement and further examination. For 
example, it was found that annual values of 
DMI were significantly influenced by 
fluctuations in construction material 
inputs. To lessen this influence, another 
resource productivity indicator, calculated 
as GDP divided by DMI minus inputs of 
construction minerals was introduced and 
the numerical target in the second Plan 
revised in 2008. Resource productivity in 
terms of fossil resources was also added to 
monitor trends. Compared to the recent 
steep upwards trend of the resource 
productivity indicator calculated as GDP/
DMI, these two new indicators show more 
moderate trends, i.e. smaller 
improvements in resource productivity.
A decomposition analysis study was also 
undertaken (Hashimoto et al., 2009) to 
elucidate in more detail what factors have 
changed Japanese Resource Productivity 
for the period 1995–2002. Effects of the 
following four factors were analysed: (1) 
Recycling factor, (2) Induced material-use 
intensity factor, (3) Demand structure 
factor, and (4) Average propensity to import 
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factor. The study concluded that changes in 
the demand structure (factor 3) produced 
the largest contribution to a reduction in 
resource-use intensity. The decline of final 
demand for construction materials 
resulted in the largest contribution to the 
decline in resource-use intensity (i.e. 
improvements in resource productivity). 
The study also found that the aggregate of 
the effect of improvements in induced 
material-use intensity of goods and 
services (factor 2) and the effect of the 
increase of recycled resource inputs (factor 
1) contributed to the change in resource 
productivity as much as the effect of 
changes in demand structure.
9.7 Conclusion
In Japanese environmental policy, the 
limits of the current socio-economic 
system characterized by mass-production, 
mass-consumption and mass-disposal 
have been recognized since the 1990s. The 
geopolitical specificity of Japan which 
depends for most of its natural resource 
supply on imports and the spiritual 
tradition of ‘Mottainai’ explain this.
The case study revealed that the concept of 
‘decoupling’ has been explicitly 
incorporated into Japanese national policy 
for establishing a sound material cycle 
(SMC) society, as represented by the 
adoption of material flow indicators, 
including resource productivity. While the 
direct driver of the SMC policy was a visible 
limit in solid waste management, it has 
been successfully coupled to resource 
input issues. 3R policies have been 
enforced by the national legislative 
framework and its concept and practical 
experiences have been disseminated 
internationally.
In contrast, though not directly reviewed in 
detail by this case study, decoupling of CO2 
emissions from economic growth has not 
been sufficient, as pointed out by the 
OECD’s environmental performance review. 
While the top runner approach for electric 
appliances and the voluntary consorted 
efforts towards Factor X by electric 
companies shed light on these 
circumstances, further efficiency 
improvements are necessary to accomplish 
reductions in energy and resource 
consumption in absolute terms.
While the Resource Productivity indicator 
measured as GDP/DMI shows a successful 
trend towards the target, this is 
significantly influenced by a decline in final 
demand from the construction sector 
caused by recessionary conditions. The real 
challenge is to achieve reduction in inputs 
of valuable natural resources such as fossil 
fuels and metal ores, by integrating SMC 
policy with other major components of 
environmental policies such as those for a 
low carbon society.!
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The International Resource Panel (IRP) was established to provide decision makers and 
other interested parties with independent and authoritative policy-relevant scientific 
assessments on the sustainable use of natural resources and, in particular, on their 
environmental impacts over their full life cycles. It aims to contribute to a better 
understanding of how to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation. This 
report on decoupling is part of the first series of reports of the IRP, covering amongst 
others biofuels, metal stocks in society and environmental impacts of consumption and 
production.
About the International 
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The objectives of the International Resource Panel are to:
a. provide independent, coherent and authoritative scientific assessments of policy 
relevance on the sustainable use of natural resources and in particular their 
environmental impacts over the full life cycle; and 
b. contribute to a better understanding of how to decouple economic growth from 
environmental degradation.
The rationale and overall objective of the Working Group (WG) relate to the second bullet 
point and the core strategic basis for the work of the International Resource Panel. 
The first report titled Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from 
economic growth defines decoupling. It offers important sets of data on resource 
extraction and use, and it presents findings that indicate that decoupling is happening, but 
absolute resource use reductions are a rare exception. The four country studies (China and 
South Africa for the developing world, and Germany and Japan for the highly industrialized 
world) show that developing countries pursue no strategies of absolute decoupling and 
that industrialized countries may have policies but very modest successes in absolute 
decoupling. The Report is very cautious about policy implications, in line with the mandate 
of the International Resource Panel.
The combined challenges of global warming, limits of fossil fuels and some other 
resources, destruction of habitats of wild living plants and animals seem to make a case 
for arrive at an absolute decoupling worldwide in the not too distant future. It is suggested 
to put the emphasis of the second report on technologies that will allow a massive 
improvement of eco-efficiency; case studies at national, sectoral or city levels of 
successful decoupling of wellbeing from resource consumption; and policy instruments 
that have been proven to be effective in reducing resource use. Case studies from the 
private sector are welcome. 
The second report will explore to what extent economic growth and wellbeing can be 
decoupled from resource consumption and environmental impacts. Opportunities for 
decoupling at the micro level would also be of use in later information dissemination and 
policy relevance, particularly at the sectoral level. The Working Group will look at 
technology options and policy instruments that can facilitate and accelerate decoupling. 
Working Group on Decoupling
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The UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE) 
helps governments, local authorities and decision-makers in 
business and industry to develop and implement policies and 
practices focusing on sustainable development.
The Division works to promote:
$ sustainable consumption and production,
$ the efficient use of renewable energy,
$ adequate management of chemicals,
$ the integration of environmental costs in development policies.
The Office of the Director, located in Paris, coordinates activities through:
$ The International Environmental Technology Centre – IETC (Osaka), which 
implements integrated waste, water and disaster management programmes, focusing 
in particular on Asia.
$ Sustainable Consumption and Production (Paris), which promotes sustainable 
consumption and production patterns as a contribution to human development through 
global markets.
$ Chemicals (Geneva), which catalyzes global actions to bring about the sound 
management of chemicals and the improvement of chemical safety worldwide.
$ Energy (Paris and Nairobi), which fosters energy and transport policies for sustainable 
development and encourages investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.
$ OzonAction (Paris), which supports the phase-out of ozone depleting substances 
in developing countries and countries with economies in transition to ensure 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol.
$ Economics and Trade (Geneva), which helps countries to integrate environmental 
considerations into economic and trade policies, and works with the finance sector to 
incorporate sustainable development policies.
UNEP DTIE activities focus on raising awareness, improving the 
transfer of knowledge and information, fostering technological 
cooperation and partnerships, and implementing international 
conventions and agreements.
For more information, see www.unep.fr
About the UNEP Division of 
Technology, Industry and Economics
    
Humankind has witnessed phenomenal 
economic and social development in 
the past century. However, there are 
increasing signs that it has come at a cost 
to the environment and to the availability 
of cheap resources. Despite progress, 
there is still great disparity between the 
rich and the poor.
 
The dilemma of expanding economic 
activities equitably while attempting to 
stabilize the rate of resource use and 
reduce environmental impacts poses an 
unprecedented opportunity and challenge 
to society. In this report, the International 
Resource Panel has sought to apply the 
concept of decoupling economic growth 
and human well-being from environmental 
impacts and resource use to address this 
challenge.
 
The report provides a solid foundation 
for the concept of decoupling, clearly 
defining key terms and providing 
empirical evidence of escalating resource 
use. It shows that decoupling is already 
taking place to some extent, but is lagging 
far behind its potential. The scenarios 
show that we are facing a historic choice 
about how we use resources and the 
report scopes the potential of innovation, 
rethinking economic growth and the 
role of cities in building more resource 
efficient economies. Four case studies at 
the country level show how policy makers 
are implementing decoupling strategies.
 
This report focuses on material resources, 
namely fossil fuels, minerals, metals and 
biomass and will be complemented by 
parallel reports of the IRP on land and 
soil, water, metals, cities and technologies 
to mitigate GHG emissions. These future 
reports will contribute to the International 
Resource Panel’s objective to build a 
better understanding of how to decouple 
environmental impacts from economic 
growth and improved human well-being.
 
It is hoped that policy makers aiming 
to green their economies will greatly 
benefit from the contributions that the 
International Resource Panel is making 
through its work on decoupling resource 
consumption from economic growth.
For more information, contact:
UNEP DTIE
Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Branch
15 rue de Milan
75441 Paris CEDEX 09
France
Tel: +33 1 4437 1450
Fax: +33 1 4437 1474
E-mail: resourcepanel@unep.org
www.unep.org/resourcepanel 
DTI/1388/PA
ISBN: 978-92-807-3167-5
United Nations Environment Programme
P.O. Box 30552 Nairobi, 00100 Kenya
Tel:  (254 20) 7621234
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